WHAT IS HIGH-INTENSITY WARFARE, AND WHY IS IT RELEVANT TODAY?
Every day on television we see images, some of them tragic, of the war in Ukraine, and there is much talk of "high-intensity warfare". To understand this concept, we need to look at what is happening on the ground, and understand the challenges faced by the units engaged in battle. You also need to know at what level you want to analyse the phenomenon of war.
On the ground, therefore, at the tactical level, high-intensity warfare is - not a definition, but a distinguishing criterion - where the third dimension comes into its own:
- Firstly, in the air, there is competition for air superiority, and very often neither of the two sides facing each other will succeed in retaining it. So there will always be a danger in the skies.
- On land, it's much the same: forces have to fight under the threat of air strikes, drones and artillery fire, which will generate permanent psychological pressure in addition to the physical effect. In addition, large units will be manoeuvring and there will be attempts to encircle or break lines of communication.
- At sea, high intensity is also characterised by the third dimension, i.e. the air and underwater threat, which calls for very demanding detection postures for crews.
Finally, there is perhaps also a fourth dimension, which is that of time: we are fighting over time, which is very demanding for all our forces.
WHAT DOES HIGH INTENSITY MEAN IN TERMS OF MILITARY RESULTS?
This is reflected in two ways at operational level. Firstly, significant losses, probably at least a few hundred soldiers, although these figures depend on each conflict; in the air, the loss of a large number of aircraft, several dozen; at sea, one or more first-rate ships will be sunk.
Then, the second aspect of high intensity at the operational level, the fighting results in the seizure of a major objective in space, with a certain symbolic significance: for example, the town of Kherson, recently in Ukraine.
Finally, high intensity is not free, and it has strategic and even political results, of two kinds. Either regime change, as in Iraq with Saddam Hussein or in Libya with Muammar Gaddafi. As Vladimir Putin has also threatened in Ukraine. Or an imposed territorial settlement: one of the two belligerents is forced to lose a territory, or on the contrary manages to keep it, as was the case in the Korean or Falklands wars, or more recently - and even if the settlement is probably not final - between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
IS THIS POSSIBILITY CURRENTLY LOW, OR EVEN NON-EXISTENT, FOR FRANCE, AS SOME COMMENTATORS MAINTAIN?
We haven't seen a high-intensity war in Europe since 1945, and for the French army, it goes back at least to the Indochina War. That was a long time ago, and it is no doubt for this reason that a number of commentators are dismissing this possibility for our country today.
When I hear this kind of reasoning, it reminds me of some risky predictions from the past. Aristide Briand, Minister of Justice, on 31 July 1914: "What I do know is that the Germans are not going to declare war on us. They're not idiots. They're not mad. I'm telling you, they won't go to war. Or that of Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel, a few months before the 1973 Yom Kippur War: "The idea that the Arabs could cross the Suez Canal is an insult to intelligence. They crossed it.
Beyond that, this is not the position of the French political authorities, as demonstrated by the French President's speech on 17 January 2020. He mentioned the hypothesis of a "climbing no controlled, hostile power"justifyingthe involvement of our land, naval or air forces in a major conflict".
COULD THE WAR IN UKRAINE LEAD US INTO A HIGH-INTENSITY CONFLICT?
I would say that while it does not herald a high-intensity confrontation, it does reinforce that possibility. Firstly because we do not know the outcome, and it is unlikely that it will not have consequences for security in Europe.
Secondly, the lesson I personally draw from this conflict is that its outbreak alone shows that improbable or irrational events are possible, and we would be wrong not to take this warning seriously.
High-intensity warfare is basically war in all its rigour, with its tragic side. To avoid it, or at least to control it, and in any case to achieve our ultimate objective, which remains the protection of the French people, we need to study it, we need to prepare for it in line with our national defence strategy, the ultimate keystone of which remains nuclear deterrence.
