L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes études de défense nationale

L’IHEDN lance la rénovation de son amphithéâtre Lacoste

Adèle Thoumieux — Thu, 2 July 2026 08:04:22 +0000

The consultation is accessible directly on the PLACE platform at the following link:

Access the consultation at marches-publics.gouv.fr

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Découvrez la liste des auditeurs de la session nationale 2026-2027

Adèle Thoumieux — Tue, 30 Jun 2026 12:46:41 +0000

The Order of 29 June 2026 issued by Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu appointing the auditors of the 6th^e The national intake for the Institute of Higher National Defence Studies (2026–2027 academic year) was published in the Official Journal on 30 June 2026.

This intake comprises 294 successful candidates out of 816 applicants. The number of applications has increased by 20% compared with the previous national intake, and by 90% since the first integrated national intake in 2021–2022.

See the list of listeners to Channel 6^e IHEDN national session: Official Journal of the French Republic – No. 151 of 30 June 2026

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Transmettre la noblesse des humbles : chaque promotion de l’IHEDN sous le patronage d’un Compagnon de la Libération.

Coline Dassonville — Wed, 24 Jun 2026 09:56:22 +0000

From 2026, each of the Institute’s regional sessions, Youth Programme and Economic Intelligence Programme will be named after a figure from the Order of the Liberation or the French Resistance.

This initiative forms part of the partnership established between the IHEDN and the Order of the Liberation, whose missions are aligned around a common objective: to foster a spirit of defence.

Established by General de Gaulle in November 1940, the Order of the Liberation is intended to honour individuals, military units and communities who have distinguished themselves in the struggle to liberate France. It also aims to convey a sense of commitment and to keep alive the memory of those who served the nation at the most decisive moments in its history. With only 1,038 Companions of the Liberation, this honour remains one of the most prestigious in the nation’s history.

Beyond the duty to remember, this initiative aims to introduce listeners to inspiring, often little-known stories that illustrate the power of civic engagement. As Jean-Pierre Vernant, a Companion of the Liberation, once remarked, these men and women were, above all, ordinary individuals who became extraordinary in exceptional circumstances.

The individuals selected will meet several criteria: strong local ties to the region in question; a particular focus on young people who are actively involved in their communities; and a diversity of backgrounds, particularly from the worlds of education, research or everyday professions.

By highlighting these stories, the IHEDN aims to provide its students with concrete examples of responsibility, courage and service, which reflect the values that have underpinned its work for the past 90 years.

The first cohorts have already chosen their patron’s name

La 250^e The Brittany regional session thus selected Jean Devé, known as «Dewey», a soldier and pilot in the Free French Forces. Born in Brest in 1897, he travelled to London in June 1940 to continue the fight alongside General de Gaulle. He was killed in action at Bir Hakeim in 1942 and was posthumously awarded the title of Companion of the Liberation in 1943.

For its part, the 93^e The economic intelligence course is now named after «Morhange», alias Marcel Taillandier. Founder of the eponymous Toulouse resistance network, he led a decisive struggle against the Gestapo in the south-west before dying in action in 1944. He was appointed a Companion of the Liberation in 1946.

As the sessions progress, new figures will thus enrich the Institute’s collective memory and serve as a reminder that the spirit of defence rests not only on institutions or the armed forces, but also on individual commitment to the common good.

Through this initiative, the IHEDN is continuing its mission: to train citizens and decision-makers who are aware of the challenges of their time, whilst drawing inspiration from those who, through their actions, have embodied the values of courage, responsibility and resilience.

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Clap de fin pour la 252e session en région Corse !

Coline Dassonville — Wed, 24 Jun 2026 08:34:16 +0000

After three weeks of in-depth study of defence, security and sovereignty issues, the 44 trainees of the 252nd^e Participants in the Corsica regional session have completed their training programme. This session enabled them to deepen their understanding of the major contemporary strategic challenges through a programme combining high-level lectures, field visits and group work.

The first week in Bastia gave the participants the opportunity to explore the strategic challenges facing Corsica and France. Visits to the 126th Air Base, the company Stella Mare and SITEC provided a practical insight into the challenges relating to security, innovation and sovereignty. This part of the programme was further enriched by several lectures on Corsica’s geostrategy, the capabilities of the three armed forces, and France’s nuclear deterrent.

The second week, devoted to the armed forces and defence equipment, took place in Toulon. In particular, the participants had the opportunity to visit the amphibious helicopter carrier Thunder as well as the naval base at Toulon. Lectures on cyber security, the military programming law, the geopolitics of the Middle East and issues in the Mediterranean provided food for thought for the trainees. This residential period also proved to be a highlight in terms of team-building and hard work, characterised by committee work.

The third and final week took place in Ajaccio. It provided an opportunity to address issues relating to government action at sea, internal security and crisis management. Participants benefited from numerous presentations by experts and field visits, notably to the Civil Protection Training and Response Unit, Corse Composites Aéronautiques and Safran. These meetings highlighted the diversity of stakeholders involved in ensuring the resilience and security of the region. This final session also featured an event organised by the Association régionale 33 Corse, offering participants a unique opportunity to engage with the Institute’s alumni network.

This was also an opportunity to officially announce the name of the graduating class: Fred Scamaroni (1914–1943). A senior Corsican civil servant who became an officer in the Free French Forces, he played a major role in organising the Resistance in Corsica, preparing for the island’s liberation under the command of General de Gaulle. Arrested and tortured by the Italian authorities in March 1943, he chose to take his own life rather than reveal the secrets of his mission, leaving as his final message: «Long live France, long live De Gaulle!». His actions earned him a posthumous appointment as a Companion of the Order of the Liberation on 11 October 1943.

At the end of this 252^e Following the course in Corsica, participants leave with an in-depth understanding of the defence and security issues that shape our strategic environment, as well as having forged lasting bonds with their fellow students.

Well done to them!

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Clôture de la 5e session nationale : trouver des opportunités stratégiques dans les crises mondiales

Coline Dassonville — Fri, 19 Jun 2026 14:26:42 +0000

Friday 12 June, listeners to Channel 5^e Participants in the IHEDN national session presented a summary of the committee work they had carried out since September 2025 to the authorities and their fellow students. This summary does not claim to be exhaustive, given the diversity of the 23 committee reports arising from the five main themes of the national session, but it highlights how they contribute to and shed light on the central annual theme: «Strategic Opportunities». Each of these committees worked on a strategy and specifically highlighted a key recommendation to address the challenges of the future.

FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANNUAL THEME: IMAGINING THE WORLD OF TOMORROW

Against a backdrop of rapid change, marked by major geopolitical, economic and technological upheavals, France finds itself at a pivotal moment in its history. As challenges mount – escalating international tensions, the waning of multilateralism, global economic vulnerabilities – this period of intense turbulence makes in-depth reflection all the more necessary. Faced with uncertainty and growing complexity, rethinking our national strategies has become an absolute necessity to ensure our country’s security, autonomy and ability to adapt.

Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 undoubtedly represents the major strategic turning point of the early 21st century^e century, redefining the international order and calling into question the security architecture in Europe. This shift has been intensified by developments in transatlantic relations since Donald Trump’s second inauguration in January 2025, as well as by major crises in the Middle East (Gaza, Israel, Syria, Iran, Lebanon, etc.). These upheavals have led to a significant increase in defence budgets and have made it necessary to refocus attention on territorial defence and the role of the citizen.

It is precisely at the heart of these upheavals that «strategic opportunities» lie: external circumstances, often unpredictable, which France and its allies must be able to anticipate, bring about and seize in order to capitalise on them.

STRATEGIC PRIORITY NO. 1: ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

Faced with the reshaping of the world order, France – a founding member of the UN, NATO and the European Union – must reassess its international ties. To paraphrase Winston Churchill: «There is nothing more dangerous than being alone in the world. » Whilst the interests of certain traditional partners may be changing, these shifts pave the way for essential geopolitical innovation, whether through the emergence of a strengthened European approach in the Indo-Pacific or via innovative frameworks within Europe (European Political Community, E5^[1]).

Five committees have proposed redefining the scope of these alliances:

1. Advanced deterrence and the European security architecture

Committee 1 of the Armaments and Defence Economics (AED) major: What strategy should France adopt with regard to deterrence at European level?

The first committee tackled the paradox of combining deterrence – a quintessentially sovereign concept – with the notion of partnership. Building on the concept of «advanced deterrence» introduced in the President of the Republic’s speech at Île Longue last March, the committee’s work outlines a model of «multibilateralism» in which French deterrence becomes the non-negotiable foundation of collective European security. Without competing with NATO, this approach relies on education and strategic acculturation to extend the perception of our vital interests across the continent.

2. Strategic economic autonomy and trade renewal

Committee 1 of the Economic Defence and Security (DSE) major : Alliances and partnerships: what new global partnership strategies can France and the EU draw upon to consolidate their economic power and security, as well as that of their partners, over the next ten years?

In light of the risks of coercion, particularly in the economic sphere, this committee proposes the creation of an economic community of middle powers. Based on reciprocity and financial solidarity (via a support fund for partners subjected to economic aggression), this strategy aims to align the EU and existing bilateral agreements towards convergence with the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The priorities are clear: to secure energy, AI and critical resources, by establishing a common European mandate within two years.

3. Maritime strategy and information sharing in the face of hybrid threats

Committee 3 of the Maritime Issues and Strategies (ESM) degree programme: In order to capitalise on current geopolitical changes and safeguard our sovereignty over maritime areas, how should we adapt our maritime strategy to counter hybrid threats posed by state actors (dark fleet, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing fleet, illicit activities of all kinds, information warfare)?

To counter the hybrid strategies of strategic competitors (IUU fishing fleets, ghost fleets, information warfare and sabotage), the key lies in the sharing and centralisation of maritime data. Whilst information exists across the public and private sectors and within European agencies, it remains compartmentalised due to psychological and administrative barriers. The committee advocates a pragmatic approach to centralisation in order to pool verified information and thereby break down these silos through trust and small-scale collaborative projects.

4. France as a balancing power and sovereignty over critical minerals

Committee 1 of the Defence Policy (POLDEF) major: France claims to be a balancing power and enjoys a special relationship with countries such as Brazil and India. Is France destined to act as a «bridge» between the «West» and the «Global South»? From this perspective, what strategy should be adopted to fulfil this role?

Exclusive reliance on third-party powers (such as China) for rare earths is a critical vulnerability. For France to fully play its role as a balancing power between the West and the Global South, the committee recommends that it become a key player in the physical control of resources. This involves making the most of our overseas territories (particularly French Guiana) by establishing high-purity refining facilities there, designated as «projects of major national interest».

5. Coercive diplomacy and European air and maritime power projection

Committee 2 of the POLDEF major: The displays of power by Israel and the United States in the Middle East in the spring of 2025 can be interpreted as a resurgence of coercive diplomacy, through the use of aerospace military power. France’s capabilities and expertise in this field have been mobilised in the past. What strategy should France adopt to capitalise on these opportunities?

Drawing inspiration from the US-Israeli shows of force in the Middle East in the spring of 2025, this committee has broadened the concept of coercive diplomacy. To amplify France’s impact, the proposed solution is the creation of modular European air and maritime task forces. Centred around inter-allied amphibious helicopter carriers (PHA), these assets offer significant political and operational flexibility (special operations, evacuations) at a lower cost and with a smaller footprint than a conventional aircraft carrier strike group.

6. Technology alliances and sovereignty in defence AI

Committee 1 of the Digital Sovereignty & Cybersecurity (SNC) major: What strategy should France adopt to forge alliances centred on the new technologies that are revolutionising the defence sector?

Artificial intelligence is the new determining factor in military superiority. To break free from American and Chinese monopolies, the committee identifies, amongst several short-term opportunities, the need for a bilateral strategic partnership with Ukraine. Based on the principle of «exchanging operational experience for industrial expertise», this alliance would enable France to train its AI models using real battlefield data, whilst embedding Europe’s leading military force within a community of shared interests.

STRATEGIC PRIORITY NO. 2: INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL SOVEREIGNTY

Faced with globalisation and the critical concentration of value chains, France must, as a matter of urgency, regain control of its strategic industrial and technological sectors. The objective is clear: to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers for essential goods and services. Whether in the defence industrial and technological base (BITD), agriculture or healthcare, reindustrialisation and the repatriation of production are vital priorities.

The shift towards proactive strategies requires a return to the basics: identifying our strengths, clarifying governance, mobilising talent and, above all, acting within an extremely tight timeframe to stay one step ahead of global developments. To explore these challenges, the committees have structured their reports around a four-stage strategic framework: Europe, France, artificial intelligence and human capital management.

1. The European level and the institutionalisation of the internal market

Committee 2 of the DSE degree programme : Industrial and technological sovereignty: what proactive strategies can the European Union adopt to turn dependencies into assets, with a view to establishing a form of economic deterrence?

To achieve genuine economic deterrence, the EU must stop being naïve or merely reactive in the face of the major powers« extortion strategies. The committee proposes rolling out the »MIGA’ concept: the Internal Market, Guarantor of our Autonomy, by transforming the purchasing power of our 450 million consumers into an offensive geopolitical weapon. Three strong measures are recommended:

To transform the fledgling European Customs Agency into a genuine «radar» for detecting vulnerabilities.
Make full use of existing regulatory tools (anti-coercion measures, cyber regulations).
To provide Europe with an extraterritorial enforcement arm by extending the powers of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to sanction foreign actors, following the model of the Department of Justice American.

2. The State as Strategist in France and Disruptive Innovation

Committee 2 of the SNC degree programme: What strategy should France adopt to strengthen the resilience of its value chain and accelerate agility in the development of its cyber capabilities?

The auditors highlighted a French paradox: although the country has world-class strengths (excellence in research, 6^e (high global ranking for patents, strong BITD), the ecosystem lacks a «team captain». The key recommendation is to enshrine this technological priority in law from the start of the next five-year term, through a Law on Support for Technological Disruptions (LART), which would be passed in the course of 2027. This law would secure long-term funding for five priority sovereign sectors: AI, quantum computing, cybersecurity, space and advanced semiconductors.

3. The resilience of the AI value chain and the export of weapons systems

The technological aspect was the subject of two complementary presentations highlighting the central role of artificial intelligence in modern power.

Committee 5 of the POLDEF major: In a context where the power of states is also measured by the innovations that emerge from them – either directly or through a private sector whose creativity they are able to stimulate – what strategy can the French state adopt to consolidate the position of ’Team France« in Europe and around the world?

With the advent of generative agent-based AI, the committee recommends drawing on the European open-source ecosystem and safeguarding the independence of national champions such as Mistral AI in order to rebuild sovereign operating systems. It also advocates the creation of a Digital Sovereignty Foundation to attract the best talent in the face of Big Tech.

Committee 2 of the AED degree programme: What strategy should France adopt regarding the export of weapons systems incorporating AI?

The aim is to position France, by 2030, as the world’s leading partner for the controlled export of AI-enabled weapons systems. The strategy proposes the creation of user groups to centralise feedback from foreign customers and the agile integration of this data by the DGA to train our sovereign algorithms.

4. The war for talent and the increasing proportion of women in science-related fields

Committee 4 of the POLDEF major: The «brain drain» is a cause for economic, social and political concern. What strategy should be adopted to ensure that talented French people are keen to help shape the future?

The committee highlighted a major structural problem: the decline in standards in mathematics and the critical under-representation of women in research (only 30 % at present). Drawing inspiration from the major US education reform following the «Sputnik shock» of 1957, the recommendation aims to rebuild a culture of science from secondary school onwards. The aim is to reach 40 women in the % programme in the preparatory classes for the grandes écoles by 2030, making gender diversity a driver of national strength.

STRATEGIC PRIORITY No. 3: RESOURCES AND ORGANISATIONS

In the face of rapid geopolitical and technological changes, France must fundamentally rethink the organisation and agility of its defence and security apparatus. Whether it be a question of territorial management, adapting regulatory frameworks or integrating disruptive technologies, government action remains the essential cornerstone of this modernisation. This process requires skilful navigation through a Europe of variable geometry, conceived as a space for coalitions of convenience.

To address these operational challenges, six committees have presented their findings with a view to reconciling the ideal of sovereignty with the reality of our interdependence.

1. Mastery of the maritime domain and data fusion using AI

Committee 1 of the ESM degree programme: How can we capitalise on current and future geopolitical upheavals to implement a maritime, industrial and port strategy that, amongst other things, enables the integration and coordination of civilian and military fleets and vessels in order to enhance the strategic autonomy of France and the European Union?

As it is impossible for the State to provide systematic protection for every vessel, the main recommendation is to move towards an understanding of the maritime domain (Maritime Domain Awareness) powered by AI through the expansion of the MICA Centre (Maritime Information Cooperation and Awareness Center). This strategy is based on three key elements: the deployment of a fleet of European maritime drones, the mobilisation of the civilian operational reserve, and the transition to active self-defence by merchant ships in the face of hybrid threats.

2. Sovereign command and control (C2) for missile defence

Committee 3 of the AED degree programme: What strategy should France adopt in the field of missile defence?

To prevent European partners from automatically aligning with US or Israeli technologies, the committee recommends the development of a sovereign and modular C2 system. This major financial investment involves the launch of a national demonstrator before integrating the early warning capabilities of willing partner countries, thereby ensuring complete decision-making autonomy.

3. Building a Cyber BITD through a «coalition of volunteers»

Committee 3 of the POLDEF degree programme: As our societies, our armed forces and our governments move towards ever-greater digitalisation, what strategy should we adopt to ensure that cyber is not merely seen as a vulnerability, but as a driver of resilience and growth?

In view of Europe’s dependence on non-European software, the committee recommends the formation of a coalition ad hoc European countries willing to foster the emergence of industrial leaders in critical technologies (cryptography, quantum computing, AI). Success depends on the imposition of mandatory common standards in public procurement and strict capital controls to prevent foreign takeovers, thereby enabling the development of an industrial and technological base for cybersecurity (BITC).

4. Dual-track robotics and targeted technology partnerships

Committee 3 of the SNC degree programme: What strategy should France adopt to accelerate the digital transformation of its public administration, given the expectations of industry representatives and decision-makers and the changing nature of disputes?

France must implement a proactive strategy centred on dual-use (civilian/military) robotics in order to address the demographic decline in the public sector and meet the needs of the armed forces.

To enhance agility and consolidate a capability base that enables the State to free itself from certain technological dependencies and, furthermore, to be able to take action immediately, the recommendation proposes prioritising alliances with key partners (Belgium, Italy, Spain) and to expand targeted alliances with India or Singapore.

5. Export controls as a tool for offensive intelligence

Committee 3 of the DSE degree programme : Resources and organisation: What strategies can be adopted to equip European economic security policies with more powerful, proactive, operational and effective tools?

The Wassenaar Arrangement^[2] With the system currently paralysed, the committee’s radical proposal is to transform the defensive mechanism for controlling dual-use goods into a strategic and offensive intelligence tool. By carefully analysing data from licence applications, the state can map competitors’ supply chains in real time.

6. Safeguarding national cohesion and regulating digital addiction

Committee 7 of the POLDEF major: French public opinion is currently receptive to alternative narratives that could undermine national cohesion. Whilst avoiding the pitfalls of rewriting a ‘national narrative’ or establishing a ‘Ministry of Truth’, what strategy should be adopted to tackle this threat?

Given that foreign interference exploits social media algorithms to destabilise society, the committee is tackling this challenge from a mental health perspective. The flagship solution is the introduction of a «digital Évin law»: a ban on access to social media for those under 15, automatic log-out for minors after 45 minutes, and heavy financial penalties (up to 6 % of global turnover) for platforms that breach the rules.

Furthermore, this French bill is intended to become an instrument of the European Union.

STRATEGIC PRIORITY No. 4: RESILIENCE AND NATIONAL COHESION

The changes we are currently experiencing present an opportunity for France to build its resilience – that is, society’s ability to withstand external shocks, to hold firm and to bounce back. This resilience is already the focus of a national strategy, which is by its very nature inter-ministerial and places demands on both institutions and individuals. From this perspective, strengthening national cohesion and promoting civic engagement contribute to a genuine «moral rearmament», which is essential for collectively facing the uncertainties of the modern world.

Through this annual theme, the IHEDN is continuing the discussions begun two years ago, which examined the restructuring processes currently underway – in particular the consequences of the return of high-intensity warfare and the strategic shifts taking place. Now, faced with these phenomena, which are imposing themselves upon us through their duration and complexity, it seems essential to take some form of initiative once again. In other words, what role can and must France play in harnessing these disruptive phenomena in order to derive the greatest benefit from them?

This theme is available in Year 5^e The national session will focus on the following issues: what strategic opportunities do the shifts in the contemporary world present? How can we identify them accurately, and under what conditions can we capitalise on them? With which partners, and with what vision for the future?

To address these issues in a way that is as closely aligned as possible with the realities on the ground and hybrid threats, the committees working on this priority area have structured their findings around the three pillars of public action: concrete civic engagement, the territorial organisation of competences, and the security of the information and digital space.

1. Financing the war economy without budgetary leeway: the choice of strategic efficiency

Committee 4 of the Armaments and Defence Economy (AED) major: What strategy should France adopt to secure funding for an economy preparing for war?

France must fund an economy that is preparing for war without having any budgetary leeway. The committee considers that a «turning point» strategy (modelled on Germany’s ‘Zeitwende’ post-2022), which would involve a massive increase in the defence budget, would pose significant crowding-out problems and might not be socially acceptable. The committee has therefore focused on a strategy aimed at maximising the strategic, industrial and financial returns of the Military Planning Law (LPM) and, more generally, of the state budget, by using levers capable of amplifying its effect without replacing it: capital, exports, European instruments, regulatory adaptation to ease the burden of standards on the defence sector, and the building of sustainable social and financial acceptability. Finally, the committee proposes testing innovative instruments, notably the National Defence Lottery.

2. The Citizen’s Resilience Passport and the «FERMENTS Exercises»

Committees 6 and 2 of the POLDEF and ESM degree programmes: At a time when war is returning, what strategy should be put in place within French society to rally people’s efforts? / With the major challenges taking on a new shape, how can France’s strategy contribute to a better distribution of resources for the benefit of its overseas departments and regions (DROM-COM)?

In light of the lack of visibility surrounding community engagement initiatives and the absence of real-time mapping of skills, these committees are calling for the creation of a single national resilience portal. This one-stop shop would enable citizens, businesses and organisations to register their skills and logistical resources (lorries, buses), which could be mobilised by public decision-makers in the event of a crisis. This citizen pathway would be marked by three compulsory training sessions (at ages 25, 45 and 60), leading to the award of a Citizen’s Resilience Passport. At the same time, the committees are proposing the roll-out of the FERMENTS exercises (Strengthening and Fostering Resilience, Mobilising and Empowering Local Communities) to provide regular training for mayors, prefects and the local business community.

3. Digital sovereignty: regulated pseudonymity and the criminal liability of platforms

Committees 8 and 4 of the POLDEF and DSE degree programmes: Faced with the risks of society becoming increasingly fragmented, what strategy can be put in place to restore the social contract? / Societal resilience: what strategy can be adopted to strengthen the nation’s moral fibre and ensure its resilience under non-European digital domination?

Massive dependence on US and Chinese tech giants exposes the public sphere to algorithms that polarise opinion and amplify disinformation under the guise of anonymity. To address this, the recommendation proposes two key measures: firstly, the introduction of a regulated pseudonym system, requiring any user posting from France to link their pseudonym to their real identity via an independent trusted third party (such as FranceIdentity) without the platform having access to them. Furthermore, legislative measures going beyond the DSA, aimed at holding tech executives personally criminally liable in the event of repeated breaches of moderation standards.

4. Reliability of public data and the establishment of the National Data Authority

Committee 4 of the SNC degree programme: What strategy should France adopt to strengthen the resilience of its democratic institutions in the face of the challenges posed by disinformation and cyber threats?

The erosion of trust in institutional discourse poses an existential threat to democracy. To guarantee the integrity and provenance of public data, the committee proposes bridging the gap between DINUM, ANSSI and the CNIL by establishing a National Public Data Authority. This coordinating body will be tasked with mapping the Republic’s information assets, classifying and certifying information, and validating the security of its storage. The authority will issue a Certified Public Data Label, guaranteeing citizens access to government information that is reliable, inviolable and secure.

CONTEMPORARY GEOPOLITICAL SHIFTS: A UNIQUE CATALYST FOR INNOVATION IN FRANCE

At the end of this 5th^e At the national session, the work of the IHEDN trainees powerfully demonstrates that contemporary geopolitical upheavals, whilst posing systemic risks, represent a unique catalyst for innovation in France. Whether it is a matter of reinventing our international alliances, safeguarding our industrial sectors through strategies to build up our capabilities, or adapting administrative organisations to disruptive technologies, strategic initiative now requires foresight and bold, proactive action.

Finally, this line of thinking serves as a reminder that a nation’s power is not measured solely by the sophistication of its weapons, but by the strength of its moral fibre. By placing territorial connectivity, local civic engagement and digital sovereignty at the heart of resilience, France is equipping itself with the essential tools to preserve its national cohesion and face the future with confidence and sovereignty.

[1] A group comprising the defence ministers of the continent’s five largest military powers: France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Poland.

[2] The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), the first multilateral arrangement on the export control of conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, was endorsed by the 33 founding countries in July 1996.

TO FIND OUT MORE

Committee reports from the national session: coercive diplomacy, industrial sovereignty, advanced nuclear deterrence…

L’article Clôture de la 5^e session nationale : trouver des opportunités stratégiques dans les crises mondiales est apparu en premier sur L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes études de défense nationale.

Rapports de comité de la session nationale : diplomatie coercitive, souveraineté industrielle, dissuasion nucléaire avancée…

Coline Dassonville — Fri, 19 Jun 2026 14:11:14 +0000

IHEDN Mondays are now available in audio format!

Click below to listen:

00:00 / 00:00

Alongside conference-style debates and study visits, committee work forms one of the pillars of the three-pronged educational approach on which IHEDN’s training programme is based, regardless of the session.

Back in 1936, when it was known as the Collège des hautes études de défense nationale, each student submitted an individual report; it was following its re-establishment as the Institut des hautes études de défense nationale in 1948 that Participants work in groups comprising people from a variety of backgrounds (civilians from the public and private sectors, military personnel, members of parliament, etc.)

Since 1936, The best reports produced in this context are intended to inform the deliberations of public authorities. With this in mind, students are invited to draw up a strategy for France in a specific area: They set out a clear strategic objective and carry out a forward-looking analysis that leads to operational recommendations.

They do so from a specific perspective, that of the French State: close attention must be paid to the ways in which the State acts. The topics proposed to the committees are centred on the annual study theme of the 5th^e IHEDN national session, «Strategic opportunities». Organised into four cross-cutting sub-themes (alliances and partnerships, industrial and technological sovereignty, resources and organisationsand resilience and national cohesion), and then discussed within each committee, they help lay the foundations for an overall strategy.

Strategic thinking is thus placed at the heart of the collaborative work carried out within the committees. Defined by the British historian Lawrence Freedman as «the art of creating power», strategy reflects the relationship between objectives and means with a view to making the most of a complex situation.

The strategy combines three dialectics:

the temporal nature of the action, between the present and the future; ;
the clash of wills between the characters; ;
the use of resources (human, material, financial, etc.).

At the IHEDN, the strategy is defined more precisely as the art of coordinating actions of different kinds over time to achieve a political objective with limited resources in a context of competition or conflict.

By its very nature, strategy is fluid and closely linked to the context in which it is developed. It is neither a mere action plan nor a dogma. In his *Introduction to Strategy*, published in 1963, General André Beaufre states right from the outset that it is a genuine « a way of thinking that enables events to be categorised and prioritised, and then the most effective approaches to be selected ".

A few days after the close of the 5th^e Following the IHEDN’s national session, we provide below the executive summary of a committee report for each of the five major fields of study and, at the end of the article, a link to more concise summaries of all 23 committee reports from this session.

MAJOR ARMAMENTS AND DEFENCE ECONOMY: ADVANCED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Committee 1 of the AED degree programme examined the question: «What strategy should France adopt in the field of deterrence at European level?»

La nuclear deterrence is a cornerstone of national defence and the ultimate guarantee of the protection of the nation’s vital interests. Based on political, technical and operational credibility, French deterrence has historically enabled France to preserve its strategic autonomy whilst contributing to the stability of the European continent. However, the deterioration of the international situation – marked by the return of high-intensity warfare in Europe, the persistent Russian threat, uncertainties surrounding US commitment and the rise in nuclear proliferation – is now leading to to rethink the European dimension of this stance.

Against this background, the committee sought to stimulate discussion on the implementation of the «advanced deterrence» strategy», introduced by the President of the Republic in March 2026. This strategy aims to strengthen France’s contribution to European security by deepening cooperation with its partners on deterrence issues, whilst upholding the inviolable principle of national sovereignty over the use of nuclear weapons.

The committee recommends that to organise bilateral strategic dialogues with European partners in order to develop a common culture of deterrence and strengthen a shared understanding of threats. It also recommends that’gradually open up certain French nuclear exercises to willing allies, with a view to fostering cultural integration, mutual trust and demonstrating credibility to strategic competitors.

It is also proposed that to build a genuine conventional European pillar capable of supporting French deterrence through coordinated investment in the fields of missile defence, intelligence, military mobility, cyber capabilities and deep-strike capabilities. This enhanced cooperation must, however, be conducted with absolute respect for France’s sovereignty over its deterrent force.

At the same time, in the face of an increase in disinformation campaigns and influence operations, The committee recommends safeguarding democratic support for deterrence by developing a shared strategic culture among the public, decision-makers and opinion leaders. The effectiveness of a deterrent posture depends as much on its military capabilities as on its political and societal acceptability.

Finally, the committee proposes to bolster the credibility of the archipelagisation of French strategic forces in Europe. The the controlled deployment of certain military assets within the territory of willing partners would help to reassure our allies, make it more difficult for the enemy to assess the situation, and ensure that the European dimension of France’s vital interests is taken into account more effectively.

MAJOR ECONOMIC DEFENCE AND SECURITY: HARNESSING OUR STRENGTHS

Committee 2 of the DSE major examined the following question: «Industrial and technological sovereignty: what proactive strategies can the European Union deploy to address dependencies and thereby put a form of economic deterrence into practice?»

For too long, Europe believed that interdependence guaranteed peace. The result: it has become economically dependent, handed over its markets and sold off its expertise at rock-bottom prices. China has secured a stranglehold on rare earths. The United States has turned the dollar into a weapon. Russian gas is no longer flowing. As for Europe, it looked the other way. Those days are long gone. The diagnosis is clear-cut. Farrell and Newman set out their theory as early as 2019: In any global network, whoever controls the «choke points» dictates the terms. Washington does so through its extraterritorial laws. Beijing controls 85 % of rare-earth refining and dictates its terms. The GAFAM companies have turned European economies into digital colonies. Europe, for its part, has remained on the defensive.

However, Europe is a force to be reckoned with, though it may not realise it. It has a market of 450 million consumers, who are among the wealthiest in the world. It sets global standards; the «Brussels effect» is effectively imposed on anyone wishing to sell there. It holds a strong position in civil aviation, the nuclear industry, the luxury goods sector and the speciality chemicals sector. Copernicus, its agricultural satellite constellation, is made available as open data to its competitors without any compensation whatsoever. Every year, 300 billion euros of European savings go towards funding its strategic rivals. These imbalances cannot be allowed to continue without being seriously scrutinised. We must turn our strengths into weapons – that is, exploit them to our advantage wherever they can create dependency and thus vulnerability. Asymmetries then become tools of power.

The proposed strategy represents a break with the past, in which France must take the lead in Europe. The aim is to show our neighbours which tools can be used, and to encourage the continent to adopt them. It is also a question of establishing them as standard, flexible instruments for regulating international relations, rather than as measures so dissuasive that they lose their credibility.

We are proposing six proactive measures, with expected outcomes by 2035 :

MIGA is turning the internal market into a weapon of geopolitical coercion, making access to 450 million consumers conditional, and endowing the EU with an economic war prosecutor.
CEASE subjects the export of our intangible assets (patents, algorithms, know-how) to a state veto: no more transfers without a geopolitical quid pro quo.
PASE manufactures asymmetric interdependencies in collaboration with selected partners (Canada, Japan, the Gulf, India) to collectively organise dependencies.
GREEN is establishing European decarbonisation standards as a global necessity.
AGRO aims to make Europe what China is to rare earths: a technological and seed monopoly.
KILL SWITCH is implementing a digital deterrent.

All of these instruments are designed to provide Europe with a credible capability for the development of its own defence capabilities, based on reciprocity and the management of dependencies.

This strategy requires political courage. Pulling these levers means accepting retaliation. It means prolonging deadlines, losing contracts and alienating partners. Within the EU, it also means putting in place compensation mechanisms between Member States to ensure that the unity of the Twenty-Seven holds firm in the face of adversity. No offensive doctrine will be credible without a shared narrative capable of winning over European public opinion. In a brutalised world, weakness attracts predators. Europe must shake off its passivity, show its determination and make it clear that it will respond in kind, by taking on the risk and sharing the cost.

MAJOR MARITIME CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES: THE «RESSAC» STRATEGY IN THE FACE OF HYBRID MARITIME THREATS

Committee 3 of the ESM degree programme examined the question: «In order to capitalise on current geopolitical changes and safeguard our sovereignty over maritime areas, how should we adapt our maritime strategy to counter hybrid threats posed by state actors (dark fleet, IUU fishing fleets, trafficking of all kinds, information warfare)?»

Protecting France’s maritime areas is a challenge that is as vast as it is complex. With an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) covering 11 million km², 97 % of which lies overseas, France has a fragmented territory that is difficult to monitor. At the same time, the National Strategic Review identifies a proliferation of «hybrid» threats» and multifaceted, primarily targeting the maritime sector. These attacks are carried out across five key areas: cyber, information manipulation, the weaponisation of the law, the economy, and military and space operations and infrastructure.

The definition of France’s strategy is based on the identification of two critical variables:

The Russia–China axis: Their increasing hybrid activities, whether coordinated or not, directly undermine French maritime sovereignty as well as its democratic and economic foundations.
The erosion of the international order: International law is giving way to the law of force, and traditional alliances are revealing their limitations. This reality means that France must urgently strengthen its strategic autonomy.

In light of the critical situation facing the overseas territories, The overriding policy objective is to safeguard the integrity of maritime areas. From a strategic perspective, France aims, within twenty years, to be in a position to detect, attribute, prevent and counter any hybrid threat affecting its trade flows, infrastructure and interests on the high seas.

To achieve this, the committee proposes to introduce the strategy «RESSAC». Symbolising the forceful rebound of a wave against an obstacle, it aims to repel attacks and impose a deterrent cost on adversaries.

It centres on Six recommendations for implementing a «total defence» strategy» :

Gaining a better understanding: strengthening the management, sharing and use of France’s maritime data
Faster decision-making: strengthening governance of the State’s maritime operations (AEM)
Working to strengthen the country’s economic resilience: expanding and «maritimising» the OIV network to establish an operational maritime cluster
Raising national awareness: refocusing some of the government’s communication campaigns to foster a spirit of defence and a seafaring spirit
To impose a deterrent cost on the offender by denying them access to French and European public procurement markets
To apply this comprehensive defence strategy to the overseas archipelago.

Although it is a long-term strategy, the RESSAC strategy is expected to deliver tangible results as early as 2027/2028, subject to immediate decisions.

Designed within a tight budgetary framework, the plan sets out reasonable financial trade-offs to ensure it remains sustainable. Finally, The effectiveness of this response depends on a cultural shift: re-establishing a strong bond between the land, the sea and the public in order to foster a genuine awareness of France’s maritime identity. The year 2026, marking the 400th anniversary of the Navy, has been identified as the right time to begin this transition.

MAJOR DEFENCE POLICY: COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

Committee 2 of the POLDEF major worked on the question: «The displays of power by Israel and the United States in the Middle East in the spring of 2025 can be interpreted as a resurgence of coercive diplomacy through the use of aerospace military power. France’s capabilities and expertise in this field have been mobilised in the past. What strategy should France adopt to capitalise on these opportunities?”

In an environment characterised by the escalation of power struggles, the normalisation of actions falling short of armed conflict, and the weakening of multilateral frameworks, Committee 2 has focused on to define the strategy France should adopt in the face of competitors who have fully incorporated coercion into their standard modes of operation.

Coercive diplomacy – the coordinated use of diplomatic, economic, military, informational and legal means of pressure to achieve a lasting political outcome without a full-scale armed conflict – is now practised by all the major powers. Russia combines acts of sabotage, disinformation and energy blackmail; China exploits economic and technological dependencies whilst stepping up its military pressure in the Indo-Pacific; and the United States, even towards its allies, exercises an unapologetic global capacity for coercion across all domains.

The committee carried out a SWOT analysis from The French position: real strengths – nuclear deterrence, a permanent seat on the Security Council, a world-class defence industrial and technological base (BITD), a global diplomatic network – but serious vulnerabilities : technological and energy dependencies; conventional capabilities under strain; domestic political polarisation that can be exploited by foreign actors.

Two strategies were assessed against two scenarios looking ahead to 2035. The committee ruled out «containing the effects of coercion» – a defensive approach deemed insufficient in the face of aggressive competitors – and opted for «fighting on the ground of coercion»: a measured firmness that makes it possible to impose costs on competitors and regain the initiative in grey areas.

Five operational recommendations set out this ambition:

In diplomatic terms, to develop a doctrine of selective and transactional alliances centred on key countries in Europe and the Middle East, transforming our partners into active channels of influence.
From an economic perspective, introducing a European preference in public procurement for critical sectors: cloud computing, energy, healthcare and semiconductors.
In military terms, to establish, under French leadership, modular European air and maritime groups centred on an inter-allied, drone-equipped amphibious helicopter carrier.
On the social front, national crisis preparedness days and the introduction, from secondary school onwards, of a culture of defence and geostrategy.
In terms of information, developing the capacity for public attribution and proportionate responses to make hostile campaigns costly.

Coercion is not the enemy of diplomacy: in a world of enduring conflict, it is now a prerequisite for diplomacy’s credibility.

DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY AND CYBERSECURITY: TOWARDS STRATEGIC DIGITAL AUTONOMY FOR THE STATE

Committee 3 of the SNC degree programme examined the question: «What strategy should France adopt to accelerate the digital transformation of its public administration in response to the expectations of industry and citizens, and in light of changing patterns of conflict?»

Since the early 2000s, the French government has introduced a series of reforms aimed at modernising its administration through digital technology. Based on the digitisation of administrative procedures and the simplification of public services, these policies have led to numerous IT projects and organisational changes. Despite real progress, the results remain mixed. A succession of reforms with shifting priorities, instability in governance models and budgetary constraints have often hampered the coherence of public policy on digital matters.

Committee 3’s report analyses this situation in the light of a profoundly changed international context. Since the war in Ukraine, geopolitical tensions have intensified and digital technology has become a key issue for sovereignty. The United States and China hold a strategic advantage in key areas such as artificial intelligence, cloud computing, quantum computing, robotics and electronic components. At the same time, public administrations have become prime targets for influence operations, espionage and destabilisation.

To address these challenges, The authors of this report carried out a forward-looking exercise based on two variables: the evolution of geopolitical threats and the pace of technological disruption. Two scenarios have been examined. The first envisages a return to a more stable environment following a period of severe turbulence. The second, by contrast, anticipates a sustained escalation of tensions, leading to a strategic weakening of Europe and increased dependence on foreign powers.

Based on this analysis, The report proposes a long-term strategy aimed at strengthening France’s strategic digital autonomy. The aim is to ensure that essential public services are secure and resilient, whilst reducing their dependence on non-European technologies. This ambition is underpinned by strengthened governance, capable of channelling resources towards priority projects and disruptive technologies.

The report also highlights the need to involve all the nation’s stakeholders in this transformation. Citizens, public authorities, businesses and the research community are called upon to contribute to the emergence of a French «core of digital trust» based on proven and independent solutions.

And finally.., This strategy is based on five recommendations:

strengthen the government’s digital governance; ;
to involve citizens more closely in the design of public services; ;
to strengthen national technological capabilities; ;
to incorporate the robotics revolution into the transformation of the civil service; ;
and develop national and European partnerships with a view to fostering the emergence of trustworthy, competitive and independently controlled digital solutions.

TO FIND OUT MORE

A summary of the findings from the 23 committee reports presented at the close of the 5th^e IHEDN national session

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Les trois États baltes – Estonie, Lettonie, Lituanie – dans le monde de 2026 : vision européenne, nouvelles menaces et défense globale

Coline Dassonville — Wed, 17 Jun 2026 13:01:35 +0000

As contemporary conflicts take on increasingly complex forms, this conference aims to provide a better understanding of the role and place of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the world of 2026.

On the front line of the geopolitical tensions sweeping across Europe, the three Baltic states offer a unique vantage point from which to observe new forms of conflict: hybrid conflicts, cyber-attacks, information warfare, digital influence and technological innovations applied to power strategies. Drawing on their experience, this event will provide insights into the threats that are currently reshaping the European security landscape.

The conference will then examine the responses developed by these three countries, particularly through the concept of comprehensive defence, which brings together the state, the armed forces, businesses, local authorities and citizens in a shared approach to resilience. Finally, looking beyond security issues, it will explore the European vision championed by the three Baltic states: their perception of the continent’s strategic challenges, their commitment to the European Union and NATO, and their contribution to discussions on the future of Europe in a rapidly changing international context.

Speakers:

Céline Bayou: An expert on the Baltic region, Russia and geopolitical issues in Eastern Europe, and a policy officer for Russia and Continental Europe at the Centre for Analysis, Forecasting and Strategy (CAPS) of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs.
H.E. Viljar Lubi: Estonian Ambassador to France.
H.E. Alise Balode: Latvian Ambassador to France.
H.E. Arnoldas Pranckevičius: Lithuanian Ambassador to France.
Pierre Lévy: French Ambassador, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the IHEDN.

At this conference, EuroDéfense-France will present the RDN Special Issue (Défense Nationale magazine) devoted to the Baltic region.

A book-signing session is also planned with:

Céline Bayou, for his book «The Baltic States: 100 Questions»
Pierre Lévy, for his book «At the heart of Russia at war»

To round off the evening, a cocktail reception will be held at La Rotonde at the École Militaire.

L’article Les trois États baltes – Estonie, Lettonie, Lituanie – dans le monde de 2026 : vision européenne, nouvelles menaces et défense globale est apparu en premier sur L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes études de défense nationale.

Le Royaume-Uni, pivot de la projection navale et des alliances technologiques contemporaines

Coline Dassonville — Tue, 16 Jun 2026 08:05:00 UTC

From 1^er On 5 June, students on the «Maritime Issues and Strategies » (ESM) at the IHEDN’s national session flew to London and Portsmouth, visiting key institutions and operational sites, such as the Ministry of Defence (MoD), NATO Maritime Command (MARCOM), the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), and the naval base in Portsmouth to board the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth.

The aim of this mission was to gain an understanding of the British perspective on the global balance of power, to analyse the depth of the bilateral Franco-British relationship in diplomatic and military terms, and to understand the priorities of the maritime industry regarding the development of the blue economy and the protection of critical subsea networks. This in-depth study demonstrates how modern maritime power now extends beyond the strictly military sphere to encompass the geo-economic, scientific and industrial dimensions of the bilateral relationship, charting a clear roadmap for the future of European security.

At a time when maritime areas are once again becoming the main arena for power struggles and the security of global supplies is being challenged on a daily basis, the British government has made freedom of navigation and the resilience of its maritime infrastructure a top priority. Faced with the return of high-intensity conflict, the country is modernising its strategic posture.

As the concept of Sea Power, a nation’s maritime power is not measured solely by the size of its fleet, but by its ability to integrate its military security with the protection of its trade routes and critical subsea infrastructure. This is one of the subjects covered in the ESM major, and an area in which the United Kingdom employs particularly agile approaches.

Geopolitical and Military Convergence in the Face of Global Challenges

This comprehensive approach to collective security is based primarily on the interoperability of the armed forces. An in-depth examination of the British Royal Navy’s military model, characterised by global projection capabilities and the maintenance of a sovereign nuclear deterrent, highlights a shared determination to respond to the clear escalation of threats. Discussions confirm that tactical integration and the sharing of experience between the French Navy and the Royal Navy now constitute an indispensable pillar for guaranteeing freedom of navigation.

This partnership is fully in line with the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. In the face of particularly rapid regional geopolitical developments, notably in the North Atlantic—the scene of a resurgence in high-tech underwater activity—and within the Indo-Pacific region, a shared understanding of geostrategic challenges strengthens the coherence of the Allies« collective posture. This complementarity is reflected in planning to counter access denial strategies, as well as in the development of coordinated responses to hybrid actions conducted in the »grey zone’.

This convergence also relies on the crucial role played by French diplomacy. The working sessions held at the French Embassy in London with Ambassador Hélène Tréheux-Duchêne, the naval attaché and the defence attaché have demonstrated their role as key influencers. In a post-Brexit environment, these services ensure the day-to-day coordination of France’s political and military interests, guaranteeing the continuity of high-level strategic dialogue. This work is complemented by briefings at the Ministry of Defence and in think tanks, where discussions under the Chatham House Rule allow for the comparison of respective strategic visions in the face of contemporary security challenges.

THE BLUE ECONOMY AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: NEW DRIVERS OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY

To underpin this operational approach, the UK is deploying three complementary strategies that combine regulation, technology and business resilience.

The first key area concerns logistical and industrial resilience. The auditors’ review of the strategic choices made by major British maritime and technology players, such as the giant BAE Systems, reveals a clear priority: securing strategic supplies. In the face of cyberattacks and the risk of covert sabotage, the focus is on the resilience of port infrastructure and the protection of transatlantic communication cable networks and interconnected energy flows.

The second driver is based on the development of the blue economy and the transition. Whether it be the sustainable and coordinated management of marine fisheries resources or the development of offshore wind farms, Franco-British cooperation is proving to be a driving force for prosperity. Discussions with the Regional Economic Service (SER) have confirmed that joint innovation, particularly in naval artificial intelligence and deep-sea robotics, enables us to maintain the autonomy of our defence industrial and technological base (BITD) in the face of increasingly aggressive global competition.

The third lever is regulatory and focuses on detailed risk management. The process involves the International Maritime Organisation and discussions with the Council on Geostrategy at the Risk Advisory Group (RAG) emphasised the importance of mastering the rule of law and anticipating asymmetric threats. Having effective response tools and robust regulations is now an essential prerequisite for deterring hostile coercive actions and ensuring Europe’s freedom of action at sea.

This fact-finding mission confirms that, in the face of future crises, military, economic and diplomatic cooperation with the United Kingdom is not an option, but a strategic necessity for France. Balancing operational imperatives with maritime economic realities, this bilateral partnership provides essential insights for preserving stability in oceanic spaces. The valuable insights gathered in the field directly inform the collective work of the trainees, reinforcing IHEDN’s role as a hub for European strategic thinking.

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Eurosatory 2026 : qu’est-ce que la « supériorité multi-domaine » ?

Coline Dassonville — Fri, 12 Jun 2026 16:05:01 UTC

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To understand this key concept in modern military doctrine, a simple analogy comes to mind: that of a large symphony orchestra.

Originally, the art of war was based on compartmentalised operations. Land, sea and air forces each operated according to their own plans. Coordination between the different branches of the armed forces, or between the armed forces as a whole, took place on a case-by-case basis.

Today, the emergence of new arenas of conflict (cyberspace, outer space via satellite networks, the information sphere on social media, etc.) has made strategic thinking and operational realities far more complex.

FROM ISOLATED ACTION TO A SYMPHONY OF COMMUNITIES

«Multi-domain superiority» involves precisely synchronising all these environments—both physical and digital—in real time. The success of operations now depends on comprehensive coordination and the synchronisation of effects between physical environments and equipment originally designed for their own specific environment.

In an article published in 2020 in the Revue Défense Nationale whilst he was a visiting student at the Centre for Advanced Military Studies (CHEM) and the IHEDN, Étienne Faury believed that «modern multi-domain warfare has its origins in the Soviet era and the doctrinal proliferation of the 1920s and 1930s».

He has since been promoted to Air Force Major General (and appointed at the end of 2025 Head of Nuclear Expertise for Defence and Security, Étienne Faury added that the modern version of multi-domain warfare emerged in the United States in the 2010s in order to «address the resurgence of symmetric threats from Russia and China whilst incorporating new conflict environments».

A DOCTRINAL REVOLUTION ACCELERATED BY THE RETURN OF HIGH-INTENSITY OPERATIONS

Here is how he defined this «revolution», which he described as both «indispensable and inevitable»:

«Modern so-called multi-domain operations involve integrating and combining the effects of new domains (information, cyber and space) into joint operations at the operational and tactical levels, with an accelerated decision-making cycle, in order to surprise, overwhelm or disrupt the adversary. […]

Whoever can make decisions and take action most swiftly to achieve the greatest combined effect thereby gains a military advantage: the element of surprise. […]

Some experts believe that this cross-sector synergy is inevitable in the long term, given the convergence of all sectors via digital tools. »

Six years on from these analyses, and in the wake of recent high-intensity conflicts, this synergy has become an operational reality. It is now firmly established within the French armed forces and the defence industrial and technological base, as evidenced by the creation of the Future combat command (CCF) of the Army in 2023, or that of the Defence Digital Commission (CND, reporting directly to the Minister for the Armed Forces) in 2025.

Another example is the decision to make multi-domain superiority the main theme of Eurosatory 2026. This theme aims to highlight «the integration of digital technologies, AI, cloud computing and C4ISR [Editor’s note: an acronym for «command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance»] and electronic warfare to enhance the forces» protection, coordination and information superiority.

THE SIX PILLARS OF MULTI-DOMAIN SUPERIORITY

Axis 1 will be developed through six thematic areas that define the current scope of multi-domain superiority:

C2 (command and control), sensor fusion and autonomous decision-making: collect and instantly cross-reference data from multiple sources to speed up decision-making;
Electromagnetic warfare and spectrum warfare: control and dominate the spectrum to ensure communications, detection and jamming;
Cyber defence and digital sovereignty: to ensure the security of critical systems and the continuity of operations in cyberspace;
Influence, disinformation and cognitive warfare: to protect or impose a narrative in the face of hybrid strategies and the manipulation of perceptions;
Defence cloud and tactical data: process and analyse data, which has become an operational resource in its own right;
Interoperability and broader alliances: ensure technical compatibility and seamless data sharing between allied forces.

On the exhibition stands, this development is radically changing the way equipment is presented. A tank or a drone is no longer displayed as a stand-alone piece of equipment, but as a hyper-connected component of a single network.

The aim of the live demonstrations and simulations on display at Eurosatory is to bring this concept to life: to show how information captured from space or the air by a drone or satellite is transmitted live to a soldier’s screen on the ground, guiding their immediate actions.

TO FIND OUT MORE

Eurosatory 2026, on the website of the Ministry of the Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs

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Le modèle suédois de Défense totale, un exemple d’innovation et de résilience pour l’Europe

Coline Dassonville — Fri, 05 Jun 2026 15:09:13 +0000

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At a time when Europe is going through the most serious security crisis since the Second World War, characterised by a grey area where the line between peace and war is becoming blurred, Sweden is emerging as an essential doctrinal and operational laboratory.

The country's accession to NATO definitively buries the historic policy of neutrality adopted in 1812. As a state bordering the Baltic Sea, Sweden brings to the Alliance its valuable strategic geography in Northern Europe, transforming the region into a highly secure and interconnected space.

This geopolitical shift is accompanied by the greatest evolution in national defence and security doctrine for two centuries. Through the concept of «Total Defence» (Totalförsvar), this kingdom of engineers is modernising a global model in which security is no longer the sole preserve of the armed forces, but a «team sport» involving the State, industry and individual citizens.

A MODEL ROOTED IN CONSENSUS, INNOVATION AND HISTORY

To understand the Swedish trajectory, it is necessary to identify the pillars of a nation of 10 million inhabitants that combines strong decentralisation, a deeply rooted culture of consensus and a historically autonomous and powerful defence industry. If relations with France are embodied in the historic figure of Marshal of the Empire Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, who became King of Sweden Charles XIV Jean in 1818, the two nations today share a major strategic partnership. Renewed in 2024, it structures their cooperation in civil nuclear power, space and emerging technologies (such as the links between Mistral AI and EcoDataCenter).

It is on this bedrock of technological excellence and social cohesion that Sweden is rebuilding its resilience. Historically non-aligned, the country developed a titanic civil protection system during the Cold War before dismantling it in the era of «eternal peace». Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2015, followed by the massive invasion of Ukraine, was the wake-up call for strategy. From now on, political will will be accompanied by massive financial resources, with NATO setting an ambitious investment course for the protection of critical infrastructures.

THE INSTITUTIONAL BACKBONE OF CIVIL RESILIENCE

At the heart of this overall architecture is an institution undergoing radical change: the new Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency. Recently attached to the Ministry of Defence - under the aegis of a newly-created Ministry of Civil Defence, a historic first - this structure of 1,500 staff visually and administratively materialises the merging of military and civil approaches.

Its mission is considerable: to coordinate a national ecosystem of around 1,000 key players (government agencies, prefectures, municipalities, businesses). The Swedish administrative model, characterised by small political ministries and large autonomous executive agencies, gives it remarkable agility.

The agency does not just operate on the home front; it deploys personnel around the world, particularly in Ukraine, a veritable forward observation post for modern warfare from which Sweden is learning important lessons.

The doctrine of this renewed civil defence is based on four fundamental pillars:

Maintaining essential social functions (energy, transport, health) in the face of Russian strategies to systematically target civilian infrastructure.
Direct support for military defence capabilities, NATO plans.
Protecting the population, This was based on a network of shelters capable of accommodating seven million people and on mass evacuation plans.
Defending cognitive space, The aim is to educate and protect the public against misinformation and to preserve the will to defend themselves.

THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND CITIZENS: SOLDIERS FOR ECONOMIC CONTINUITY

One of the most striking innovations of the Swedish model is its management of the security of supply (Security of Supply). Aware that the State can no longer finance or manage gigantic fixed public stocks, Sweden has chosen to rely on the creativity and flexibility of the private sector. Through an Industrial Advisory Council that brings together the heads of major strategic companies and the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the country organises economic resilience upstream.

Companies with more than five employees are subject to rigorous planning: in the event of a major crisis or conflict, they are legally obliged to be able to operate independently for a fortnight. This requires dependencies to be mapped out, business continuity plans to be drawn up and human resources to be carefully managed, anticipating the fact that certain key managers could be mobilised at the front.

At the same time, the citizen is put back at the centre of the system via the duty of total defence (Total defence duty), which stipulates that all residents of Sweden aged between 16 and 70 must serve their country in the event of a crisis. The country is thus relaunching civilian conscription on a massive scale, initially targeting the emergency services before including a civilian component in the conscription examinations for 18-year-olds from next year.

This popular involvement is underpinned by a culture of transparency. The famous «yellow brochure», a in the event of crisis or war« preparedness booklet» distributed to every household, has been reissued with a tone of unprecedented seriousness:

«If Sweden is attacked, we will never surrender. Any suggestion to the contrary is false.»

As a sign of the times and of NATO integration, this document now explicitly includes awareness of cyber attacks and the threat of nuclear weapons.

PLANNING FOR INFORMATION WARFARE AND CRISIS SCENARIOS

Cognitive resilience is Sweden's other major project, led by the Psychological Defence Agency. Faced with a Kremlin that uses history as an ideological battlefield to legitimise its imperial ambitions and deny its neighbours' right to exist, Sweden responds with factual counter-analysis and critical training. This information war, which targets the vulnerabilities of our democracies through social networks, the gaming or the recuperation of historical facts (such as Moscow's recurrent commemoration of the Battle of Poltava 1709), is closely monitored in direct bilateral cooperation with the French agency VIGINUM.

To provide a common compass for this general mobilisation, the Swedish army and civil defence co-wrote a remarkable reference document: the «Planning Assumptions for Total Defence». Exceptionally, this document sets out a framework for the resistance of three months in the event of armed conflict is entirely public and unclassified.

It sets out seven cardinal reference scenarios that determine the scale of the national effort:

Everyday hybrid threats ;
Support for the host nation (Host Nation Support), positioning Sweden as NATO's nerve centre for logistics and transit to Finland and the Baltic States; ;
A military attack in the far north ;
The defence of the highly strategic island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea; ;
Waves of long-range missile strikes across the country; ;
Two scenarios for collective intervention by NATO to secure the northern and Baltic flanks.

A CUTTING-EDGE DEFENCE INDUSTRY DRIVEN BY INNOVATION

The second pillar of the Swedish miracle is its industrial base, which is historically strong and technologically independent. Sweden devotes more than 3 % of its GDP to research and development (R&D), an effort that has been boosted to almost 70 % by private sector initiatives. This economic vitality is reflected in an exceptional concentration of high-tech start-ups: Stockholm now exceeds London and Los Angeles in the number of «unicorns» (companies valued at over a billion dollars) per inhabitant.

This excellence has a direct impact on the defence sector, where military investment has doubled in the space of just four years. Today, 43 % of the total defence budget is devoted strictly to equipment procurement. This positive overheating has led the military-industrial sector to hire 6,000 people in 2024, while the arms industry's turnover will jump by 55 % between 2023 and 2024.

The Swedish arsenal is based on world-renowned technological flagships:

Generation 4+ fighter aircraft Saab Gripen ;
High-performance armoured fighting vehicles ;
The artillery system Archer, a highly automated 155 mm gun mounted on an off-road truck chassis, co-produced by Bofors and Volvo ;
Advanced rocket launcher systems and cutting-edge electronic solutions.

To maintain this conceptual lead, the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) launched the Glimt. This strategic foresight tool uses probability calculations to anticipate technological and tactical breakthroughs on future battlefields.

UKRAINE AND GOTLAND: THE FRONT LINES OF STRATEGIC SOLIDARITY

The war in Ukraine is both the catalyst for the Swedish doctrine and its main field of application. Since the beginning of the conflict, Sweden has made a colossal financial and military effort of 8 billion euros of aid to Kiev. Recently, on 19 February, Stockholm announced a massive new tranche of military aid worth €1.2 billion, focusing mainly on air defence, the shipment of munitions and logistical support for combat platforms already delivered.

In addition to these transfers, Sweden is actively involved in a number of training missions for Ukrainian soldiers. Above all, its support strategy has evolved: for several months now, Sweden has been supporting Kiev without drawing excessively on its own military stocks. Swedish industries are now directly producing new equipment for the Ukrainian forces.

This long-term alliance reached a historic milestone in October 2025: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson signed a letter of intent to allow Saab to supply between 100 and 150 Gripen fighters to Ukraine, radically transforming the capabilities of the Ukrainian air force.

At the same time, Sweden is securing its own strategic locks. The island of Gotland, a veritable «unsinkable aircraft carrier» in the middle of the Baltic Sea, is of crucial importance. It is an integral part of the 17 key sites covered by the Defence Cooperation Agreement (Defense Cooperation Agreement - DCA) signed between the United States and the countries of Northern Europe. This agreement makes Gotland a new strategic hub, optimising both the logistics of aid to Ukraine and defence industrial cooperation between Washington and the Nordic capitals.

LESSONS FOR EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY

The Swedish case forcefully demonstrates that technological and military sovereignty cannot flourish without deeply shared civil resilience. By breaking down the silos between military planning and economic realities, by contractualising the role of companies and by making every citizen responsible, Sweden is not content to simply protect its territory: it is offering Europe an agile, transparent and modern «Total Defence» model.

Faced with the multidimensional threats of the 21st^e century, resilience is no longer a passive option. sine qua non democratic survival.

L’article Le modèle suédois de Défense totale, un exemple d’innovation et de résilience pour l’Europe est apparu en premier sur L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes études de défense nationale.