L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes études de défense nationale https://ihedn.fr/en/ Official website of the IHEDN under the supervision of the Prime Minister. Sun, 17 May 2026 22:05:26 +0000 en-GB hourly 1 https://ihedn.fr/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/IHEDN-logo-favicon-150x150.png L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes études de défense nationale https://ihedn.fr/en/ 32 32 L’IHEDN, un moteur du rapprochement des cultures stratégiques en Europe https://ihedn.fr/en/lundis-de-lihedn/lihedn-un-moteur-du-rapprochement-des-cultures-strategiques-en-europe/ Sun, 17 May 2026 22:05:26 +0000 https://ihedn.fr/?p=60014 To mark Europe month and 90e anniversary of the IHEDN, focus on its historical and current role in structuring a European strategic culture. This dimension, which has been present in our training courses from the outset, has continued to grow: today, the Institute designs and organises numerous training courses for European state and institutional partners, contributing to collective reflection on security and defence issues.

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In 2026, European strategic issues will be studied by all the Institute's auditors, during Europe Month as well as the rest of the year: regional sessions, cycles Jeunes and en intelligence économique, national session... each auditor will be required to grasp the many aspects of the European security and defence system, in its political, economic and industrial dimensions. At the same time, the Institute organises dedicated international sessions.

After the Second World War, the rebirth of the IHEDN in 1948 took place against a backdrop of the gradual structuring of European security, illustrated that same year by the signing of the Brussels Treaty. At the first post-war session, after the opening address, the audience listened to a speech on «The Brussels Pact, its purpose, current achievements and future prospects».

Subsequently, the Institute's links with the future European Union and also with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), founded in 1949 and headquartered in Paris since 1950, continued to strengthen. In the autumn of 1951, the IHEDN was joined in its premises in the Pavillon de l'Artillerie at the École Militaire by the NATO Defence College, created by the Director of the IHEDN, Vice-Admiral André Lemonnier, on the model of the French institute.

Admiral Lemonnier was responding to a request from the Supreme Commander of the Atlantic Alliance in Europe, the American General Dwight Eisenhower, for whom he was also naval deputy. When France left NATO's integrated command in 1966, the College moved to Rome and the organisation's headquarters to Brussels.

Later, in the 2000s, France and Germany supported the creation of a European security and defence training capability. The idea originated with the European session of the IHEDN, the first of which was held at the end of 1988. Until its demise in 2004, it trained 469 students from 35 countries across the continent, including those from the former Soviet bloc from 1993.

A STRUCTURING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE COLLEGE

Created in 2005, the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) is now a central framework for training in security and defence issues at European level. The IHEDN has represented France from the outset on its governance and pedagogical council. As the College's director, Fergal Ó Regan, points out,

«The relationship between the CESD and the IHEDN is all the more unique in that, through its own institutional structure and the close links with French security, defence and diplomatic bodies that stem from it, the IHEDN's involvement with the CESD has always reflected France's dedication to the College's project.»

Each year, the IHEDN actively contributes to the design and implementation of training courses covering a wide range of contemporary strategic issues, in partnership with a number of European institutions: BAKS (Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, Germany), the Egmont Institute (Belgium), CASD (Centro Alti Studi per la Difesa, Italy), CSDA (Cyprus Security and Defence Academy, Cyprus), IDN (Instituto da defesa nacional, Portugal), the Intelligence College in Europe, and others.

The choice of topics reflects the ongoing dialogue between the ESDC, the IHEDN and the Member States on the emerging strategic and security issues facing the European Union. Director Ó Regan sums up the concrete contributions of this work:

«It's not just the length of IHEDN's involvement with the ESDC that counts, it's above all its quality: over the two decades of the ESDC's existence, IHEDN has contributed to our development through excellent training, always at the cutting edge of current affairs, with a strategic reading of the political issues that dominate the field of security and defence.»

In 2026, the IHEDN is organising 9 courses under the aegis of the CESD:

  • Courses Cyber Diplomacy (Advanced) in January in Brussels
  • Senior Strategic Course - module 1 in February in Brussels
  • Maritime Safety Issues course in Nicosia in March
  • Senior Strategic Course - module 2 in March in Berlin
  • Courses Challenges of Space for CSDP and the EU in April in Brussels
  • Senior Strategic Course - module 3 in May in Rome
  • Hybrid Threats Challenges in June in Brussels
  • Courses Drone Security in October in Brussels
  • The EU Intelligence Framework in Paris in December
  • Hybrid Threats Challenges in December in Brussels

THE MANY FACETS OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE IN THE FRENCH AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT

Auditors trained on CESD courses are of 27 nationalities from the Member States. With an average of 40 auditors per session, a total of approximately 250 European auditors are trained each year by the IHEDN as part of the CESD courses ( Senior Strategic Course is divided into three modules).

Fergal Ó Regan would like to emphasise the importance of IHEDN's educational contribution to these various courses:

«IHEDN brings a great deal of added value to the CESD's teaching model. Thanks to its institutional anchorage and its perspective combining research and practice, IHEDN approaches training from the same prism as CESD. This is evident not only in the choice of subjects covered in the activities organised jointly with the ESDC, which are always highly relevant to Europe, but also in the quality of their preparation and implementation.

Indeed, the IHEDN regularly makes available to the CESD its professionalism, the fruit of 90 years of experience, as well as a network of civilian and military contributors of exceptional quality, covering the many facets of security and defence, whether in the French or European context».»

Represented in Brussels, as close as possible to the institutions of the European Union and NATO, the IHEDN brings together high-level speakers from the European institutions, Member States, the defence industry and the private sector. think tanks like our partner IRSEM Europe. These training courses and activities organised in Brussels give participants direct access to European decision-making mechanisms and contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of cooperation in the field of security and defence.

In addition to the CESD courses, IHEDN regularly organises study visits to Brussels for students in the 5 majors of the national session. These trips enable direct exchanges with European institutions: the European Parliament, the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Council of the EU.

THE EUROPEAN SESSION OF HEADS OF DEFENCE, A MAJOR EVENT FOR 37 YEARS

In addition, the IHEDN organises seminars such as the one on the future of the European strategic compass in December 2025 in Brussels, and bipartite sessions in partner states, such as the one in Moldova in February 2026 for the Armed Forces General Staff and the Ministry of Defence's Directorate General for International and Strategic Relations.

Another major continental event for the IHEDN is the Session européenne des responsables d'armement (SERA), an annual training course bringing together nearly 80 auditors from EU countries, as well as the UK, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and organisations such as the European Commission, the European Defence Agency, the European Investment Bank and the OCCAr (Organisation conjointe de coopération en matière d'armement).

Initially initiated by the CHEAr (Centre des hautes études de l'Armement), this course has been run by the IHEDN since 2010. The 37e edition kicked off in Paris in March on the theme of « Innovate, finance, scale up: building urgently Europe's defence of tomorrow ".

Armaments Engineer Caroline Salahun, President of SERA (and head of the IHEDN national session department), explains the contribution of this session:

«The SERA is an excellent forum for exchanges between high-level European officials in the armaments sector, from both government and industry, providing a better understanding of European defence issues, sharing experience and collectively reflecting on the best ways to strengthen European capabilities.

The links forged during the session are likely to facilitate cooperation and contribute to the development of a common culture, which is particularly useful in the current context of European rearmament and the growing importance of EU initiatives on these issues.»

As noted by Ambassador Aurélia Bouchez, Head of the Europe and International Affairs Department at the IHEDN, «the Institute's European commitment has been gradually strengthened to support the development of the European Union in terms of security and defence, in close collaboration with its institutions and partners».

BRING NATIONAL STRATEGIC CULTURES CLOSER TOGETHER THROUGH HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE BETWEEN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY DECISION-MAKERS

This commitment will primarily benefit the training of auditors," says the diplomat:

«The European dimension of IHEDN courses is a major asset for its students, giving them a practical understanding of decision-making mechanisms, institutional balances and the dynamics of cooperation at European level. By exposing its students to high-level contacts from European institutions, NATO and the Member States, IHEDN helps to train decision-makers capable of operating in an increasingly integrated strategic environment.»

The presence of an IHEDN representation to the EU and NATO in Brussels also strengthens links with the Alliance and fosters exchanges between these two essential frameworks for Euro-Atlantic security, while contributing to a better understanding of their complementarities.

Ultimately, therefore, it is Europe's collective security that benefits from the Institute's actions at continental level, as Ambassador Bouchez sums up:

«For several decades, the IHEDN has been fully involved in the European dimension of defence and security issues. Both in Brussels and in the Member States, it helps to bring national strategic cultures closer together and to structure a high-level dialogue between civilian and military decision-makers».»

L’article L’IHEDN, un moteur du rapprochement des cultures stratégiques en Europe est apparu en premier sur L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes études de défense nationale.

]]> La conception japonaise de la sécurité économique https://ihedn.fr/en/fiches-actualite/la-conception-japonaise-de-la-securite-economique/ Wed, 13 May 2026 07:55:30 +0000 https://ihedn.fr/?p=60006 This fact sheet looks at Japan's approach to economic security. It begins by highlighting the way in which the country has succeeded in structuring a dedicated institutional ecosystem in recent years, then analyses the benefits and some of the limitations of this construction. It concludes by looking at the prospects for the development of Japanese economic security arrangements in a context of change at national and international level.

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Summary

  • Japan has long faced risks and threats to its critical supplies, and in recent years has become a pioneer in economic security, developing a range of dedicated institutional structures;

 

  • Japan's economic security policy is clearly directed against China, in particular because of the country's heavy dependence on it for supplies. The system has many benefits for Japan, in terms of government efficiency, awareness and deterrence;

 

  • The constant evolution of risks and threats is forcing Japan to constantly readjust its economic security instruments; particularly at a time when, in addition to China, the United States now seems to want to make economic coercion a key element of its strategy, including towards its traditional allies.
Background - A pioneering country in economic security

Economic security can be defined as «the ability of a nation to protect and maintain the stability and growth of its economy by strengthening its resilience in the face of both internal and external threats».»[1]. To insist on this concept is to recognise that global economic exchanges can be both a source of shared prosperity and a source of coercion and weaponisation. Japan has recognised this for several years. One event in particular marked the country's growing awareness of economic security. In 2010, following the arrest of a Chinese trawler captain who had collided with a Japanese coastguard vessel near the disputed Senkaku Islands, China decreed a halt to exports of rare earths to Japan for several months. Subsequently, other disruptions to global supply chains reinforced the Japanese authorities' awareness of the importance of economic security: the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

These events were the catalyst for an overhaul of the institutional landscape dedicated to economic security. While Japan had long been implementing policies that could be likened to economic security, it now felt it necessary to integrate these measures into a coherent strategy. While promoting the idea of an open international order based on free movement, and alongside a change in its general defence posture[2], Tokyo is setting up pioneering bodies to ensure the resilience of its economy.

There are a number of non-exhaustive examples. In 2020, the National Security Secretariat, which coordinates the government's diplomatic and security policies, will set up a unit responsible for economic security. In 2021, the government will appoint a minister specifically dedicated to this area, a world first. A Council for the Promotion of Economic Security, chaired by the Prime Minister, was set up the same year.

In 2022, the Japanese Parliament passed a law on the promotion of economic security. The law codified the powers, rights and obligations of government and private players, and focused on four key areas: the supply of essential raw materials, the security of critical infrastructures, the development of cutting-edge technologies and the introduction of a secret patent system. In 2025, the government will designate twelve product categories as critical, such as semi-conductors, batteries and aeronautical components, opening up opportunities for public subsidies to companies working in these areas.

Also in 2022, the new national security strategy fully enshrines Japan's focus on economic security, which it defines as the policy area that aims to «guarantee Japan's national interests, such as peace, security and economic prosperity, by implementing economic measures».»[3]. The strategy includes efforts to combat economic coercion by third countries.

Japan is therefore extending the concept of economic security to many of its public policies. Generally speaking, Japan's strategy is based on two complementary pillars. The first is the’autonomy which aims to reduce the country's critical vulnerabilities. The second is the’indispensable strategy, which aims to ensure that the country is a source of essential technologies and materials for its partners.

In concrete terms, protection and support measures have been put in place in recent years. On the protection front, Tokyo is strengthening its procedures for monitoring foreign investment, particularly in critical technologies. On the support side, the government is convincing the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited (TSMC) to set up in Japan via massive subsidies. The government also grants substantial financial aid to Rapidus Corporation. Founded by eight major Japanese companies, including Toyota Motor or Sony Group, This company aims to produce next-generation semiconductors locally. Public funding covers more than a third of the capital costs of Rapidus. By diversifying where semiconductors are produced worldwide, the government hopes to make its supply chains more robust in an area where it once held a dominant position.

Finally, Japan is leading an international effort to adopt economic security measures with its partners. For example, the subject was promoted at the G7 summit in Hiroshima in 2023, at the end of which the leaders adopted the declaration «Economic resilience and economic security».

Analysis - An identified threat, and tangible benefits

The institutional focus on economic security seems to be a strategic necessity for Japan, and is aimed primarily at China. Beijing is Tokyo's biggest trading partner. There are many examples of strong dependence. The first concerns critical minerals, an area in which Japan's dependence on China is estimated at more than 50 % of its needs. For rare earths in particular, China accounts for a very large proportion of global production, as the graph below shows, and Tokyo is therefore heavily dependent on Beijing.

China's share of global rare earth production

Dependence on China is not limited to minerals. Japan, for example, is also heavily dependent on pharmaceutical products.

As in the military sphere, Japan's economic security policy is therefore aimed directly at Beijing. The national security strategy expressly notes that an international order in which China becomes dominant would be problematic. This is all the more the case as China does not hesitate to weaponise the dependencies it enjoys. The 2010 dispute mentioned above is a textbook example of China's desire to use its dominant positions in certain value chains to exert political pressure on other countries. In January 2026, Beijing is once again introducing restrictions on the export of rare earths to Japan, in the wake of Japanese statements on the defence of Taiwan.

The Japanese government's promotion of economic security has a number of advantages for the country in a context of heightened global economic competition. Firstly, and very prosaically, the creation of dedicated organisations increases the coordination of previously scattered policies, particularly in the industrial sector, thereby strengthening the coherence of government action in this area. While the fragmentation between bodies focused on security and others focused on the economy is a source of inefficiency for inter-ministerial issues, clarifying responsibilities can only be a source of increased efficiency. It can also lead to greater adaptability of tools to changing risks and threats. Whether it's because of the increase in climatic disasters or the exacerbation of Sino-American competition - phenomena that have a strong impact on global supply chains - a country like Japan must constantly develop its economic security tools. Centralising action means we can adapt more quickly and effectively.

A second benefit may relate to raising awareness internally. Making economic security a political and institutional issue in its own right enables the government to make the country's businesses more aware of the risks and threats. By their very nature, businesses are profit-driven, without, for example, always taking into account certain dangers emanating from state competitors. In particular, small and medium-sized businesses are not necessarily aware that their intellectual property can be critical and therefore a source of covetousness. Japan's policy, which includes the creation of a dedicated ministerial post, can therefore serve as a vehicle for putting economic security issues on the agenda, reinforcing collective awareness and therefore resilience. As economic security becomes the subject of public debate in Japan, more and more companies are creating positions or departments to deal with these issues. One example is Hitachi, which has created an Economic Security Office within its External Relations Division.  

A third benefit relates to a communications approach aimed at several external audiences. From the point of view of deterrence, having dedicated organisations and therefore effective response tools can discourage Tokyo's adversaries from taking coercive economic action. Alongside its military rearmament, this may enable Japan to assert a more robust posture on the international stage. What's more, Japan's economic security policy may inspire other partner and allied states, reinforcing a form of "global security". soft power Japan by disseminating a political model.

Nevertheless, the country is walking a fine line in this area. If the quest for economic security leads to excessive State interventionism in the economic sphere, this could be perceived by certain third countries as contradictory to the position of economic openness and defence of free trade promoted by Tokyo on the international scene. Japan must therefore strike the right balance between interventionist measures deemed necessary in the current context and the need to avoid alienating potential partners, and possibly encouraging retaliatory measures that could be harmful to its own economy.

Outlook - A constant need for reassessment

Economic security is a daily battle. As risks and threats evolve, so must the tools. At a time of rapid technological change and heightened global tensions, governments must strike a balance between the desire for openness and the need for economic protection. Japan, for example, is constantly developing its dedicated mechanisms, with the aim of correcting identified shortcomings. One example of a revision took place in the wake of an incident in 2023. Following a cyber-attack on the port of Nagoya that brought operations to a standstill for three days, port transport companies were added to those covered by the 2022 law's critical infrastructure protection system.

The arrival in power of Sanae Takaichi reinforces Tokyo's interest in economic security. The new Prime Minister, who was Minister for Economic Security from 2022 to 2024, announced in her inaugural speech in October 2025 that Japan must now focus on this area, and in particular on infrastructure resilience. Takaichi asked his cabinet to study the possibility of revising the law on the promotion of economic security in the light of developments in the international situation. In particular, the government wants to provide closer support in this area for Japanese companies involved in projects abroad. Japan is also planning to strengthen foreign investment control with the creation of a new dedicated body. Tokyo also wants to create a think tank specifically dedicated to the challenges of critical supply chains.

Prime Minister of Japan Sanae Takaichi

Faced first and foremost with China, Japan now seems aware of the impossibility of defining economic security instruments in isolation, apart from its economic partners in North America, Asia and Europe. Although national definitions, strategies and objectives vary, international cooperation is essential to reduce the country's vulnerability.

One of the key issues for Japan today, however, is the United States' increasingly unfavourable stance on free trade, and a new willingness on the part of the US administration to resort to economic coercion against its allies. Tokyo has not been spared the threat of tariffs since Donald Trump returned to the presidency for a second term. Alongside China's ambitions, US volatility in terms of economic openness will certainly be one of the structuring factors for Japanese economic security policy in the years to come. In this respect, Japan seems to largely share the constraints, and therefore the concerns, of the countries of the European Union (EU). So there may well be opportunities for greater cooperation.

1] Economic security in a changing world (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2025), 9

[2] See the News sheet 36 for an analysis of the evolution of Japan's defence posture

[3] Mathieu Duchâtel, Economic Security: The Missing Link in EU-Japan Cooperation (Institut Montaigne, 2023), 11

To find out more

 

 

 

Bibliography

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L’article La conception japonaise de la sécurité économique est apparu en premier sur L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes études de défense nationale.

]]> Elsa Vidal : « Dans les élites russes, le parti du silence est majoritaire » https://ihedn.fr/en/lundis-de-lihedn/elsa-vidal-dans-les-elites-russes-le-parti-du-silence-est-majoritaire/ Mon, 11 May 2026 06:24:24 +0000 https://ihedn.fr/?p=59840 A quarter of a century after Vladimir Putin came to power, what do Russians think of his governance, the state of their country and the war in Ukraine? Elsa Vidal, a specialist in the former USSR, answers this question in a rigorous and well-documented essay that looks behind the Kremlin's official communication and the clichés common in the West. Interview.

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Currently an international politics columnist on BFM, Elsa Vidal was previously editor-in-chief of the Russian-language editorial team at Radio France Internationale, director of the Europe and Central Asia office of Reporters Without Borders, head of mission for Médecins du Monde in Russia and director of Oxfam in that country, among others.

Educated at Inalco, Sciences Po, Keio University (Japan) and the Russian University of Social Sciences (RGGU) in Moscow, where she later became a research assistant, she has lived and worked in the Russian Federation on several occasions since 1990, including three years in Chechnya.

In his essay «What do the Russians think?»,published in February by Gallimard in the «En attendant le réel» collection, Elsa Vidal rigorously unravels the preconceptions about Russia that prevail in Western Europe, drawing on numerous interviews and references. She reminds us that «several Russias exist side by side, Slavs and non-Slavs, cities and countryside, and they are much closer to us in terms of morals than the positions of Russian leaders would lead us to believe».

In fact, the Russian Federation today has a population of 146 million divided into 89 administrative entities (including 5 occupied Ukrainian entities) and more than 190 national groups speaking 25 official languages - out of a total of 277 idioms still spoken. Taken as a whole, she says, «Russian society, in many ways an industrialised, secularised, individualistic society, is more like our own than the mythical version of the Rus traditional, promoted and vaunted by the authorities».

AT PRESENT, THE WAR IN UKRAINE SEEMS TO BE GENERATING MORE WEARINESS THAN OPPOSITION IN RUSSIAN SOCIETY. OVER TIME, COULD THIS WEARINESS TURN INTO OPPOSITION?

This seems possible to me, provided that the war once again breaks into the daily lives of the majority of Russians, disrupting them in a large number of homes, as the announcement of the partial mobilisation in September 2022 did.

In this respect, the increasingly frequent internet blackouts carried out by the Russian security services, with the autonomy they now have, are likely to crystallise opposition - if not to the war itself, at least to its consequences for the population. In the past, the authorities have come up against mobilisations of this type, i.e. on a socio-economic basis. In 2018, for example, on the issue of reforming the retirement age for women, the government had to back down, and President Putin himself distanced himself from the bill, so that his popularity would not be affected by the protest.  

Social issues are those for which the citizens of the Federation feel the most legitimate to mobilise, and they are doing so. That's why there is a real risk in trying to impose Internet blackouts on the population. All the more so in a country where digital life and digital services are highly developed for the most day-to-day aspects, but also for relations with administrations, the authorities, family life, etc.

FOR RUSSIAN CITIZENS, WHAT DOES THE DIVISION BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DISCOURSE MEAN, PARTICULARLY IN RELATION TO THE WAR IN UKRAINE?

If you have grown up and lived in France - or in any other democracy - for most of your adult life, you have had the opportunity to experience speech that is free of consequences for your safety. The things you say in your bedroom, at the Sunday dinner table, in the metro, at work or even on television are not likely to cost you your job or, worse still, land you in prison.  

The same cannot be said for the people of the Russian Federation. Especially since the authorities equipped themselves with a repressive arsenal at their disposal to crush citizens who protested against the start of the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to OVD Infos, more than 20,000 people have been repressed for expressing opinions hostile to the war. Some were arrested for standing in the street with a sheet of paper as a placard - a sheet of paper without a slogan!

YOU DESCRIBE THE «NETWORKED SOLIDARITY» THAT WEAVES ITS WAY THROUGH RUSSIAN SOCIETY. COULD OPPOSITION TO THE WAR BENEFIT FROM THIS?

Yes, and it is already benefiting from them, but this type of solidarity action cannot be turned into a mass mobilisation to stop the war or change the regime. The networked solidarity I am talking about is driven by an affinity of values, a rejection of the bureaucratic and institutionalised world - even that of NGOs, which are also suspected of being nothing more than career tools for their founders - and a focus on human beings caught up in tragic situations.

It's almost like an underground world, parallel to the so-called political world, which sets itself up as an alternative to it. Politics and institutions have been deeply devalued, after several decades of Soviet power claiming to bring happiness to humanity through crimes and mass repression. Solidarity chains are therefore built at a sub-national level and do not take the form of a party with a programme for the future of the entire nation.

YOU SAY THAT POLITICIANS ARE VERY AWARE OF THE GAP BETWEEN OFFICIAL RUSSIA AND THE REAL COUNTRY. TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD THE KREMLIN TAKE PUBLIC OPINION INTO ACCOUNT?

It is these mistakes that remind politicians that the «paper country», created and portrayed through reports, conferences and state media, has little in common with the «real country». To complicate an already sensitive situation, the real country is extremely diverse (Russia has more than 190 national groups, several languages are spoken, etc.).  

For example, the presidential administration had not anticipated the profound rejection that the partial mobilisation in September 2022 would engender in the population. Several hundred thousand young Russians left the country in reaction to its announcement, and the most frequent query on the internet was «how can I break my arm at home? But this alarm rekindled the vigilance of the Presidency.

In fact, it is the presidential administration that commissions the most opinion polls and surveys in the country: more than 400 a year on average. In my opinion, this reflects two things: firstly, the need to know the state of opinion in the Federation in order to adapt political action, and secondly, the intransigence of the authorities. All this stems from a pessimistic vision of politics and a vision of power that is far from omnipotent. Hence the emphasis on seeking consent. To achieve this, we need to know the expectations, the basic needs and the fundamental fears of the people we serve. Not to serve the population, but to «know how far to go too far».

WHAT CONSEQUENCES COULD THE RECENT BAN ON TELEGRAM AND VPN HAVE FOR THE REGIME?

We mentioned it at the start of this interview: along with the rise in consumer prices - and in particular the price of cucumbers, a more than common consumer good - this is the main risk hanging over the regime and its war economy policy.

Taking away the opportunity for Russians to live their lives as citizens of the developed and connected world, and handing them over to the arbitrary decisions of the security services whose impact intrudes on the daily organisation of their lives, is certainly a major danger. I would be inclined to say that if this policy is pursued, even greater repression will result. Perhaps the decision has already been taken, or it is the wish of institutions such as the FSB. [The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for internal security.].

The FSB is the main beneficiary of this war, in the sense that it has considerably increased its power and influence in the political arena, but also in the economic sphere. In August 2025, Dmitri Kozak, Vladimir Putin's diplomatic adviser at the time, asked the Russian President to entrust him with the role of defending the rights of entrepreneurs.

They complain about the raids they suffer at the hands of the FSB, which, with the complicity of the local authorities, raids flourishing businesses in the war economy. To no avail. The President has taken the side of the FSB against his collaborator, whom he has released from his duties by presidential decree.

REGARDING THE RULING ELITES AND THEIR CHILDREN, YOU MENTION A «PATRIOTIC DOUBLE STANDARD», A «FASCINATION-REPULSION» FOR THE WEST. IS THIS ALSO THE CASE FOR VLADIMIR POUTINE AND HIS ENTOURAGE?

It's difficult to give a clear answer for Vladimir Putin, but the question is simpler for those around him. I believe above all that the position of the elites is not ideological, but dictated or influenced by the logic of the court. You have to realise that the Russian elites were fully integrated into a globalised way of life.

They have a foothold abroad, send their children to the best American or European schools (as is the case for the daughter of Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, or that of the Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Piotr Tolstoy, etc.), and spend their holidays outside Russia...

With the exception of a handful of men, the war has the support of none of the 200 families who run Russia, and all of them would be ready to resume relations with the West tomorrow if it were to end. They never wanted this war, even though very few people in the ruling circles have spoken out openly against it: an oligarch, a banker, a head of the secret services and Dmitri Kozak. The party of silence, which thinks no less, is in the majority.

«THE FIXATION ON RELATIONS WITH THE WEST IS A USEFUL LURE FOR THE RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES IN MORE WAYS THAN ONE».»

But if we come back to this fascination-repulsion for the West that you mention, it is quite structuring. I don't know whether Vladimir Putin subscribes to it or feels it personally, but he knows that mobilising this feeling is a powerful weapon. Because in this Russia-West link, the two terms are mirrored in a rivalry between equals that allows the imaginary of Soviet power to be revived.

This power, associated with Russia and not with all the former Soviet states - in a historic sleight of hand - de facto positions Moscow as Washington's alter ego, in a global condominium. This has the not inconsiderable corollary of concealing the fact that Russia is a regional power, now in the shadow of China.

This posture of defiance towards the West, in which Russia is always the victim rather than the aggressor, also helps to channel the attention of the public away from what Russian leaders fear, namely the possibility of Russia being governed democratically. Ukraine, presented as a sister country, is demonstrating this.

Now, if a democratic Ukraine free of Moscow's influence could exist, it would almost automatically mean that the Russians too could have a democratic destiny. This is what the Russians fear above all else. The fixation on the relationship with the West is therefore an illusion, useful in more ways than one for the Russian authorities.

L’article Elsa Vidal : « Dans les élites russes, le parti du silence est majoritaire » est apparu en premier sur L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes études de défense nationale.

]]> La transformation contemporaine de l’armée japonaise https://ihedn.fr/en/fiches-actualite/la-transformation-contemporaine-de-larmee-japonaise/ Thu, 07 May 2026 13:01:27 +0000 https://ihedn.fr/?p=59980 This fact sheet looks at the contemporary transformation of the Japanese army. It highlights the major increase in the country's military budgets in recent years, as well as the new desire to acquire offensive capabilities. It then analyses the reasons for and some of the limitations of these singular developments, before concluding with a look at the outlook for Japan, particularly with regard to its essential alliance with the United States.

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Summary

  • Japan has transformed its defence capabilities in recent years: relaxing certain constitutional constraints inherited from the Second World War, the country has increased its military spending and is now investing in offensive capabilities;

 

  • The transformation underway can only be understood in the context of increasing regional tensions - around Taiwan - and international tensions - in Ukraine; Japan's rise to military power remains constrained by a number of challenges, and the country remains highly dependent on its partnerships, particularly with the United States;

 

  • For the future, it is in Japan's interest to clarify the military responsibilities it wishes to assume individually and those shared in the event of a major conflict in East Asia, as well as to diversify its strategic partnerships.
Context - From self-defence to collective defence?

Heavily dependent on international trade - particularly maritime trade - for its economic development, Japan today sees itself as the promoter of an open Indo-Pacific region, governed by the principles of the rule of law, freedom of navigation and free trade, the defence of strong connectivity, and a deliberate commitment to peace and security.

Japan is often described as a «pacifist» country. This designation stems from its 1947 constitution, drafted after the surrender of September 1945 and in the context of the occupation of the country by the United States. Article 9 states that Tokyo «forever renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes».»[1]. In the immediate post-war period, the consequence was a complete renunciation of the possession of forces.

Nevertheless, the situation changed rapidly. Eager to have an ally in the region, the United States agreed to the creation of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (SDF) in 1954 following the Korean War. An interpretation of Article 9 then allowed Tokyo to build up sufficient forces to defend itself in the event of an attack, without being able to take offensive action. Three conditions authorising the possible use of force were set out in 1954: there must be a threat to national survival; no other means can avert the danger; and the use of force must be limited to the strict minimum. In return for this limitation, the United States promised to defend Japan by signing an alliance in 1960: the Treaty on Mutual Cooperation and Security.

This concept of the use of force based exclusively on self-defence dominated the decades that followed, including after the end of the Cold War. However, Japan's military stance hardened in recent years. Several constitutional restrictions were relaxed. Significant developments took place in 2014-2015. Reforms reinterpreted Article 9 of the Constitution to allow the right to self-defence, subject to certain conditions. collective. Even if the national territory is not targeted, the SDF can support partners under attack if Japan considers that its survival is incidentally threatened in this way. Japanese forces can also take part in combat missions abroad.

Three key documents published in December 2022 confirm the real increase in the power of the SDF, moving towards a more direct alignment of the country's economic and military powers: the National Security Strategy, the National Defence Strategy and the Defence Strengthening Programme. Tokyo is announcing a doubling of its defence spending. While the country had previously respected an unofficial ceiling of 1 % of GDP, it is committed to increasing its spending to 2 % by 2027. The graphs below show the evolution of Japanese military spending in recent years, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of national GDP.

Trends in Japanese military spending
The shift in 2022 is clearly observable. In 2024, Japan will have the tenth largest military budget in the world, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). In concrete terms, the increase in power is reflected in a number of ways. The first is an effort to rearm and develop new capabilities. Perhaps the most symbolic, and consequently the most controversial, of the changes in this area is the decision to acquire, in addition to anti-missile defences, retaliatory capabilities via long-range precision missiles capable of striking targets on the Asian continent. Tokyo is relying on the purchase of Tomahawk and local solutions. This ability to reach China and North Korea - a first since the Second World War - moves away from a purely defensive logic. Another area illustrating Japan's growing power is combat aviation. Tokyo plans to have 430 fighter aircraft by 2032, notably through the acquisition of 147 American F-35s: the largest fleet of F-35s outside the United States. Other sectors are also specifically targeted, such as building up ammunition stocks, correcting recognised shortcomings in cyber defence, strengthening the defence technological and industrial base (DTIB) and arms exports. Finally, Tokyo aims to strengthen the interoperability of its forces and its strategic partnerships with the United States and other countries sharing its objectives in the region. The election of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in October 2025 is unlikely to alter this move towards a more assertive military stance. As soon as she took office, the leader stated her intention to accelerate Japan's military build-up, declaring that the country would reach its target of 2 % of GDP before the scheduled date. A revision of the national security strategy was quickly announced. Moving from a defensive posture to one of «proactive pacifism» according to some[2], Tokyo is thus demonstrating its determination to make a more active contribution to maintaining peace and security in the Indo-Pacific.
Analysis - A response to the international context, but severe constraints

The ongoing transformation of the Japanese army certainly reflects a sense of vulnerability in the context of rising tensions both regionally and globally. Japan's strategic documents for 2022 state that «[the] security environment is more serious and complex than at any time since the end of the Second World War».»[3]. The texts expressly identify China's growing military capabilities - Beijing, which disputes certain islands with Japan, is designated as the greatest «strategic challenge».»[4] - and North Korea's nuclear and ballistic capabilities as direct threats to the country's security. More broadly, the documents point to Russia's invasion of Ukraine as a possible prelude to future regional conflict. «Today's Ukraine could be tomorrow's East Asia».»[5] A high-intensity war zone.

The strengthening of our defence capabilities is therefore aimed at dissuading China, Russia and North Korea from any destabilising actions at regional level. The fact that these nuclear powers are themselves strengthening their strategic partnerships probably only increases Japan's sense of vulnerability. One notable point today is the existence of a certain consensus in Japan on the need for a more robust defence capability. The main political parties and the population are overwhelmingly in favour of increasing defence spending. The threat - from China in particular - is therefore not only perceived at the level of the country's leadership, but is widespread within a society that has been recognised as anti-militaristic since the post-Second World War period.

Takaichi's arrival in power exacerbated Sino-Japanese tensions at the end of 2025. The Prime Minister told the Japanese parliament that an attack by Beijing on Taiwan could be perceived as an existential threat to Japan, justifying armed intervention. Japan would in fact be in the front line of a conflict over Taiwan - Japan's most westerly island lies 110km from Taiwan - and Beijing's seizure of Taipei would leave Tokyo very isolated. China reacted violently to these statements by suspending certain imports and exports to Japan, advising its citizens against travelling there and stepping up its military exercises in the sub-region - a strategic signal.

Even so, Japan faces a number of challenges in its bid to regain military power. The first is financial. So far, the Japanese government has honoured its promises to increase military spending, but this has been achieved partly through an accounting trick. Expenditure such as that on the coastguard is now included in defence spending, which was not the case before. Some experts believe that it will be difficult to go any further given the constraints on the country's budget, which is already heavily in debt. The government is reluctant to raise the debt ceiling for current expenditure, while raising taxes or cutting other public spending would be politically costly. The depreciation of the Japanese yen is also weighing on foreign military purchases: the initial procurement strategy was based on an exchange rate of 108 yen to the US dollar, but this is now much more unfavourable for Japan.

The second challenge is demography. Japan has one of the lowest birth rates in the world and, as illustrated in the graph below, its population is falling every year.

Japan's demographic outlook
Against this backdrop, the SDF is currently unable to meet its recruitment quotas. In 2025, it will have missed its target of 247,000 soldiers, with a general shortfall of more than 10 %, rising to 40 % among the lower ranks. With the demographic problem only set to worsen in the coming years, the 2022 strategic documents cite various measures to address it, such as raising the retirement age and improving pay and working conditions for the military. Japan is also relying increasingly on automation and artificial intelligence (AI) to reduce its staffing requirements. With an unemployment rate of less than 3 %, the demographic challenge affects not only the military, but also the administrative staff of the armed forces and the DTIB, which is competing with the rest of the private sector for high-level engineers. The third challenge is the relative weakness of the Japanese DTIB. In line with its restrictive defence posture, Japan has long prohibited military exports, particularly of lethal weapons. These restrictions have weighed heavily on Japanese defence companies. Relying solely on domestic demand, and earning only small profits, the Japanese arms industry has lost nearly a hundred companies since 2002. Although the restrictions have now been largely lifted as part of a general drive to revitalise the arms industry, Japan still lacks a strong industrial capacity in the military field, particularly when it comes to cutting-edge production. There are exceptions - Japan is currently developing new-generation combat aircraft with the UK and Italy and selling frigates to Australia - but the country remains on the whole dependent on imports, particularly from the United States. This dependence is not just a question of capabilities. Japan, through its strategic documents, now recognises that it cannot defend itself alone. Although there are certainly concerns in Japan - as elsewhere - about the reliability of US support since Donald Trump's return to the presidency and the publication of the new US security strategy, Tokyo remains heavily dependent on its military alliance with the United States: the only real alliance the country has. Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Japan-US alliance is based on a fundamental asymmetry: the US is obliged to defend Japan, but not vice versa, with Japan only obliged to provide bases for the US military. Today, Japan is home to more American soldiers than any other country in the world, with around 55,000 garrisoned troops - particularly in ports and on large islands such as Okinawa. Initially intended as a deterrent to the Soviet Union, the American presence is now aimed at China and North Korea. Admittedly, the nature of the alliance is currently evolving as a result of Tokyo's rearmament, in the direction of a rebalancing of the roles of each party in the defence of Japanese territory. All the same, strategic autonomy is not a possibility in the short term. The United States is constantly encouraging Tokyo to invest even more in its own defence. In addition to the United States, Japan now cooperates with several countries that share its conception of international order. Tokyo, for example, has a «quasi-alliance» with Australia.[6], With its strong strategic links with the Philippines and its increasingly important connections with NATO and some of its members, the country is one of the alliance's «global partners». These efforts to establish a network of partnerships are now making it possible to moderate, if only, the impact of the EU's economic policy.’as a minimum, dependence on the United States.
Outlook - A need for strategic diversification?

While the Japanese government plans to review its main strategic documents in 2026, the country is likely to continue to strengthen its defence posture in the coming years, with an increase in military spending and a greater search for strategic partnerships.

For the future, Japan has every interest in clarifying the responsibilities that it wishes to assume individually, and those that will certainly be shared in the event of a conflict in East Asia. At a time when Japan's military capabilities are increasing, Tokyo and Washington would also benefit from harmonising their defence policies, by endeavouring, for example, to define a joint command structure capable of meeting the requirements of a high-intensity conflict through the possession of interoperable forces. The fact that Japan now possesses offensive weapons means that the control of any escalation vis-à-vis China or North Korea will no longer be the sole responsibility of Washington, requiring greater Japanese-American coordination.

Today, Japan is showing no signs of distancing itself from the United States. The new government is clearly counting on full American support in the future, and thus seems, by strengthening its defence posture, to wish to present itself as a reliable partner. Paradoxically, the stronger Japan becomes, the more the United States may consider that disengagement is possible, as it would have less impact and run counter to Tokyo's primary strategic interests.

Faced with the risk of American disengagement, Japan has every interest in continuing to diversify its partnerships, notably with Australia and European countries. Beyond this diversification, autonomy in terms of conventional defence seems to be an imperative for Tokyo. In a scenario where the United States withdraws completely, and the other partners are unable to compensate for this, Japan would have no choice but to assume responsibility for its own defence. In such a case, a nagging question would inevitably arise for the country: as the only country in history to have used the atomic bomb, should Japan nevertheless acquire nuclear weapons?

[1] Embracing Arms: Securing Japan in a “New Era of Crisis” (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2025), 3

[2] Sebastian Maslow, «Make Japan Strong Again: Sanae Takaichi's Plan to Transform Her Country's Military», The Conversation, 17 February 2026

[3] Embracing Arms, 1

[4] Jingdong Yuan, «Japan's New Military Policies: Origins and Implications», Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2 February 2023

[5] Embracing Arms, 1

[6] Embracing Arms

To find out more

 

 

 

Bibliography

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]]> La formation à l’armement, une contribution stratégique de l’IHEDN https://ihedn.fr/en/lundis-de-lihedn/la-formation-a-larmement-une-contribution-strategique-de-lihedn/ Fri, 24 Apr 2026 08:10:46 +0000 https://ihedn.fr/?p=59730 To mark the Institute's 90th anniversary and the 19th Entretiens Armement & Souveraineté, we focus on one of the major themes of the national session: Armaments and the Defence Economy. Bringing together engineers, officers, business executives and legal experts, it covers all aspects of this field, providing a crucial forum for sharing views in the context of high-intensity warfare.

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On 1 January 2010, the Centre des hautes études de l'armement (CHEAr), founded in 1964, merged with the IHEDN. Since then, the Armaments and Defence Economics major (AED) of the Institute's national session trains its auditors in the specificities of the defence industry sector.

«CHEAr's DNA has very largely integrated that of the IHEDN for the AED major,» says its head, the Engineer General of Armaments (in 2e section) Étienne Paris, himself an auditor at the 39e session of CHEAr. Every year, around fifty students opt for this specialisation. They come from the Direction Générale de l'Armement (DGA), the Ministry of Defence, the administration, industry and civil society, and work or have a close interest in armaments. In all its dimensions," says IGA Paris:

«The CHEAr's mission remains essentially the same as that of the CHEAr: to deepen knowledge of defence issues, foreign policy, armaments and the defence economy; to prepare senior civil and military managers, both French and foreign, in the field of defence. Its mission remains essentially the same as that of CHEAr: to deepen knowledge of defence issues, foreign policy, armaments and the defence economy; to prepare senior civil and military personnel, both French and foreign, for the exercise of their responsibilities; to promote and disseminate all useful knowledge in the field of defence and international relations».»

 

In particular, following this course - spread over 45 days from September to June - enables students to give meaning to the work of engineers and officers by reminding them of the military purpose and the «employment» dimension, but also to broaden the points of view of people who are often specialists in specific fields by giving them a cross-weapon, multi-sector and international vision of defence issues. The major incorporates aspects relating to technological breakthroughs, changes in the environment and the law, and raises awareness of economic security.

More broadly, this major enables students to acquire the main concepts in defence economics, and to gain a better understanding of NATO and the workings of European institutions. Finally, it trains its students in the challenges of industrial sovereignty.

As with the other 4 majors in the national session, with which it shares a common foundation, the AED course is based on the IHEDN's pedagogical triptych: lectures, study missions and committee work.

ANY STRATEGIC REFLECTION MUST CONSIDER THE ASSOCIATED RESOURCES

Following the merger with the CHEAr, armaments became an inseparable part of IHEDN's broader strategic thinking, making the Institute a major meeting point for players in the Defence Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB). «Any strategic reflection must consider the associated resources», explains Étienne Paris:

«When it comes to defence and security, the question of armaments immediately arises, as soon as the issues of sovereignty, alliances and partnerships are addressed. Armaments are not «conventional» goods that can be bought easily. The logic of arms acquisition and support is specific. And we also need to consider the concepts of interoperability, industrial expertise and exportability.»

The dialogue between engineers, operational staff and civil society that is made possible by the original IHEDN model continues beyond the session thanks to the friendships forged and maintained over time by the elected president of the major. «In addition, the Institute is very committed to cross-generational dialogue with students from previous sessions, in particular through the AED/SNC-IHEDN association», explains IGA Paris.

Created in 1965 as an association of CHEAr auditors, the AED/SNC-IHEDN today brings together CHEAr auditors and those of the AED and Digital Sovereignty and Cybersecurity (SNC) majors of the IHEDN national session. Its chairman, Chief Armaments Engineer Géraud Brun, now with the DGA, was Director of Studies at CHEAr when it merged with IHEDN in 2010:

«The IHEDN has created a very interesting ecosystem by bringing together different groups, such as military engineers and officers, with industrialists from the defence sector and players from civil society, whether journalists, politicians or lawyers. This seemingly heterogeneous ecosystem works very well.»

THE "ENTRETIENS ARMEMENT & SOUVERAINETÉ", AN EMBLEMATIC ANNUAL EVENT

Among the activities of the AED/SNC-IHEDN, an emblematic event takes place every year, organised in partnership with the IHEDN: the Entretiens Armement & Souveraineté (EAS). La 19e was held at the beginning of April in Paris on the theme of «Sovereignty and competition», with round tables based on the work carried out throughout the year by Athena's Focus Groups.

«This year's edition focused on three main themes,» says Géraud Brun:

«The first was on deterrence: in view of geopolitical developments, we need to reflect on this subject. We also exchanged views on sovereignty issues, which we have been following for several years now, and on artillery, modern artillery, combined with the development of drones.»

As is the case every year, the issues addressed at the EAS resulted in a compendium of almost 300 pages containing analyses, forecasts and recommendations.

When it comes to armaments, as in other areas of national defence, IHEDN training and the subsequent commitment of its students are crucial. «Current events, particularly the return of high-intensity warfare in Europe, are a reminder of the importance of rapidly bringing our arms industry up to standard», analyses IGA Paris.

By integrating the heritage of the CHEAr into the original IHEDN model, the AED major is proving to be a tool that is particularly well suited to this context, as its head sums up: 

«By virtue of its interministerial nature and its missions to disseminate the spirit of defence and strengthen national cohesion, the IHEDN brings together a wide range of profiles: operational, governmental, industrial, academic, financial, legal, etc., all of which should enable us to collectively meet the challenge of industrial responsiveness. The IHEDN helps to develop a global vision, giving meaning to the spirit of defence in a way that goes beyond «local» professional and commercial interests.»

  • Watch our video interview with Chief Armaments Engineer Géraud Brun, President of the AED/SNC-IHEDN auditors' association:
  • To obtain a copy of the Entretiens Armement & Souveraineté 2026, write to the AED/SNC-IHEDN listeners' association via its site.

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]]> Europe, OTAN, ministères : comment le Service de santé des armées anticipe un éventuel conflit https://ihedn.fr/en/lundis-de-lihedn/europe-otan-ministeres-comment-le-service-de-sante-des-armees-anticipe-un-eventuel-conflit/ Fri, 17 Apr 2026 13:08:54 +0000 https://ihedn.fr/?p=59679 How can we prepare for what the military call a «major engagement scenario»? The field of health is a good example of this: in recent years, the French armed forces' dedicated service has been stepping up cooperation at national, European and international interdepartmental levels. Focus on a resilience project.

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«A resilient European population, equipped with medical capabilities and prepared to face and sustain a potential armed conflict with Russia, constitutes a means of deterrence». This declaration by Norwegian General Petter Iversen, Chairman of NATO's Committee of Chiefs of Military Medical Services (COMEDS), in January 2026 at the European Union (EU) Health Security Committee, reveals a major issue: health is an attribute of power and strategic credibility in its own right. A nation can no longer be prepared for armed conflict without a truly resilient health system.

THE MAJOR COMMITMENT HYPOTHESIS, A NEW AREA OF PREPARATION FOR EUROPEANS

The return of uninhibited conflict and high-intensity warfare in Eastern Europe means that France, like its partners in the Atlantic Alliance, must prepare for the Major Engagement Hypothesis (MEH). In other words, the scenario in which the operational commitment of the armed forces would be at its maximum. This preparation involves planning not only for the projection of a force abroad as part of a multinational coalition, but also for managing the consequences on national territory.

A major engagement in Eastern Europe would inevitably put a strain on France's vital functions. Health systems, both military and civilian, would be destabilised: heavy demands on health establishments, disruption of logistical flows including health products, organisation of a chain of evacuation of wounded and sick across Europe, etc.

«The scale and complexity of these challenges must be anticipated so that France can guarantee the best level of care for the population in general, and the military in particular,» says General Eric Czerniak, Head of the Operations Division of the French Armed Forces Health Service (SSA), a joint structure under the direct authority of the Armed Forces Chief of Staff.

This reflection must also take into account the fact that a major commitment is first and foremost part of a multinational coalition. The treatment of foreign patients (both military and civilian) in French medical facilities must therefore also be planned.

On the one hand, the concept of «host nation support» requires NATO nations to provide the required support - including medical support - to allied armed forces transiting or staying on their territory. On the other hand, the population movements generated by a conflict are likely to cause an influx of refugees on national territory, and therefore an additional burden on the healthcare system.

The cross-functional nature and the workload of the planning justifies the involvement of all government departments. Strictly military preparation of the healthcare system for the EHF cannot meet the nation's health and resilience challenges. It must therefore be part of an interministerial approach.

This need had already been demonstrated during the Covid-19 crisis. General Czerniak explains the lessons that were learned:

«Although the context is different, this exceptional situation has shown us that a health crisis can have consequences that go beyond the health sphere. In France, the economic and social impact meant that the actions of the various ministries (Health, Economy, Interior, Armed Forces) had to be coordinated. The EMH requires a similar methodology».»

COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES AND HEALTH MINISTRIES ACCELERATES

Dialogue between ministries is not new. Back in 2017, the Armed Forces, Health and the Budget institutionalised a working relationship by signing a multi-year protocol. By defining their relationship and mutual commitments, the three ministries are demonstrating their desire to better meet health needs and prepare for exceptional health situations, while safeguarding the resources required for the specific needs of defence. Renewed in 2022, the new protocol draws on the lessons learned from the Covid-19 crisis and reinforces the principle of complementarity in the event of a major event.

Aware of the need to continue this civil-military cooperation, in October 2025 the SSA and the French General Directorate for Health (DGS) signed a new charter for emergency preparedness. This ratifies the common objective of ensuring the resilience of the national healthcare system to be able to support the military effort in such a scenario.

Responsible for medical planning for the armed forces, the SSA's primary mission is to provide medical support to the French armed forces at all times and in all places. Accustomed to intervening in conflict zones, this service has been able to provide wounded and sick soldiers with an internationally recognised level of care since it was set up more than three centuries ago (in 1708).

«The SSA relies on a territorial network of medical facilities of varying sizes and functions, ranging from national army training hospitals (HNIA) to specialist rehabilitation and psychiatric facilities,» explains General Czerniak. However, it represents only 1% of the public health landscape in France.

In the event of a conflict breaking out in Eastern Europe, the armed forces would be deployed outside France. It would become necessary to treat, evacuate, monitor and trace injured and sick military personnel from the zone of operations to French hospitals. The national health system will therefore have to be able to mobilise, in conjunction with the ministries affected, such as the Interior.

This interministerial and national (or even international) response must be integrated into an efficient decision-making chain, which must be tested during implementation exercises. ORION 26, which includes an interdepartmental planning phase to protect the territory while supporting French and allied forces, is currently taking part in this process.

NATO AND THE EU, CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION FRAMEWORKS FOR HEALTH

The subject of medical support in the event of an EHF is now at the heart of discussions in all the nations of the Euro-Atlantic area. Their plans are based on the operational framework provided by NATO.

Recognising the international impact of the health crisis caused by an EHF, since 2023 the Alliance has strengthened cooperation between its military and civilian bodies in the field of health.

To prevent this impact from becoming a limiting factor, NATO nations are working together to exchange best practice, strengthen their interoperability and develop an efficient chain of command.

In this context, the SSA and the DGS represent France in multinational bodies dealing with medical issues and resilience. At NATO, the Joint Health Group (Joint Health Group) and COMEDS are forums where civilian and military medical experts from 32 nations establish political and strategic guidelines in their fields.

This increased civil-military cooperation led to the adoption in 2025 of the Medical Action Plan plan. Co-drafted by the two Alliance bodies mentioned above, this plan identifies the actions to be taken to prepare the health systems of the Allies for the EMH. To support these efforts, the EU has also made a commitment by creating a working group dedicated to civil-military cooperation in health (TWG CIVMIL).

FRANCE PILOTS AN NATO INITIATIVE TO OPTIMISE MEDICAL LOGISTICS

Among the work carried out jointly by the SSA and the DGS, an NATO initiative aimed at optimising medical logistics within and between Alliance nations has been led by France since the beginning of 2026.

Named Critical Medical Initiative - Medical Logistics (CMI MEDLOG), this international initiative aims to coordinate the ministries of health of allied countries with a view to securing health product supply chains. The initiative aims to accelerate the development of civil-military interoperability at national, NATO and EU level, in order to provide a dedicated coordination framework. It is part of a context in which the long-term maintenance of medical logistics capabilities in the event of armed conflict is a major challenge, leading NATO to organise the coordination of civilian players in conjunction with existing military projects.

Other initiatives of this type are also being carried out by other partners under the aegis of NATO. They deal with patient evacuation and mass casualty management.

Carrying out this interdepartmental work, at both national and international level, is imperative in order to strengthen the national resilience needed to cope with a severe weather event.

«If it comes to fruition, this major commitment will certainly entail major adjustments, but the SSA and the DGS will have made an active contribution to preparing the healthcare world on a scale unseen in recent decades», concludes Dr Czerniak.

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]]> Renforcer l’esprit de défense dans l’enseignement supérieur francilien https://ihedn.fr/en/notre-actualite/renforcer-lesprit-de-defense-dans-lenseignement-superieur-francilien/ Tue, 14 Apr 2026 08:14:10 +0000 https://ihedn.fr/?p=59626 The Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale, the Île-de-France Academic Region and the Paris Defence and Security Zone have signed an ambitious partnership agreement to develop the spirit and culture of defence among students in the Île-de-France region. A joint commitment to forge lasting links between academia, the armed forces and young people.

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On 4 February 2026, at Les Invalides, Julie Benetti, Rector of the Ile-de-France academic region, Lieutenant General Loïc Mizon, Military Governor of Paris, and Prefect Nicolas Basselier, Deputy Director of the IHEDN, signed the «Defence culture and spirit in Ile-de-France higher education» agreement.

In an international context marked by a rapid deterioration in the security environment, the signatories wanted to raise students' awareness of defence and national security issues. This initiative is fully in line with the guidelines of the National Strategic Review 2025, which calls for building a united, resilient France capable of dealing with contemporary crises.

Developing a culture of defence at the heart of the university

The agreement aims to structure long-term cooperation between the armed forces, higher education and the IHEDN in order to :

  • develop a spirit and culture of defence among students and teachers; ;
  • strengthen citizenship and understanding of contemporary strategic issues ;
  • promote the values, missions and professions of the armed forces; ;
  • encourage commitment, particularly within the operational reserve.

 

The rectorat plays a coordinating role with universities and higher education establishments, while the Paris defence and security zone ensures the coherence of the influence of the armed forces in the regions. The IHEDN, for its part, contributes through its teaching expertise and its range of courses, accredited cycles and conferences dedicated to defence issues.

Concrete actions to bring together the armed forces and the academic world

The partnership provides for the implementation of structuring actions:

  • organisation of conferences, symposia, seminars and training courses on defence issues; ;
  • creation of an academic defence network in the Île-de-France region, in particular around the Defence and Security Education Advisers; ;
  • recognition of student commitment through ECTS credits, certificates or recognised diplomas; ;
  • support for university initiatives relating to cyber defence, artificial intelligence and strategic research; ;
  • bringing academics, students, researchers and the military closer together.

 

This cooperation will also promote the professional integration of young people, the dissemination of a culture of resilience and the development of the army-nation link within higher education.

Developing enlightened citizens and strengthening national resilience

Through this agreement, the partners are affirming a shared ambition: to place defence at the heart of the Paris Region academic world for the long term.

By raising students' awareness of strategic challenges, promoting commitment and encouraging dialogue between civilian and military institutions, this partnership is helping to train citizens who are aware of contemporary issues and involved in national cohesion.

This is a major step towards strengthening the spirit of defence and preparing future generations for the responsibilities of tomorrow.

L’article Renforcer l’esprit de défense dans l’enseignement supérieur francilien est apparu en premier sur L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes études de défense nationale.

]]> Un nouveau partenariat pour promouvoir l’égalité des chances et l’engagement citoyen https://ihedn.fr/en/notre-actualite/un-nouveau-partenariat-pour-promouvoir-legalite-des-chances-et-lengagement-citoyen/ Tue, 14 Apr 2026 07:48:39 +0000 https://ihedn.fr/?p=59595 The Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale and the Un Avenir Ensemble foundation have signed a partnership agreement designed to encourage the diversification of audiences and strengthen the civic commitment of young people. This cooperation is based on shared values: equal opportunities, national cohesion and a spirit of defence.

L’article Un nouveau partenariat pour promouvoir l’égalité des chances et l’engagement citoyen est apparu en premier sur L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes études de défense nationale.

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On 18 March, Lieutenant General Hervé de Courrèges, Director of the Institut des hautes études de défense nationale, and Army General (2S) François Lecointre, Chairman of the Un Avenir Ensemble foundation, formalised the signing of a partnership agreement aimed at bringing together the actions of the two organisations for the benefit of the younger generation.

A partnership serving committed young people

The Un Avenir Ensemble foundation has been working for several years to promote equal opportunities by mentoring and supporting deserving young people from a variety of backgrounds. For its part, the IHEDN, a public institution under the authority of the Prime Minister, has a mission to develop the spirit of defence, national resilience and cohesion in French society.

By pooling their expertise, the two institutions aim to make IHEDN courses more accessible to a wider range of profiles and encourage civic involvement in defence and security issues.

Concrete actions at the heart of the partnership

This cooperation is based on a number of operational priorities:

  • the inclusion of the foundation's young godchildren in the IHEDN's young people's courses in order to encourage the diversification of its student body; ;
  • the participation of Foundation alumni in the Institute's regional sessions, thus helping to enrich exchanges and collective experiences; ;
  • Presenting the Foundation's activities during training sessions, to raise participants' awareness of opportunities for civic involvement and mentoring.

 

The partnership is non-exclusive, respecting the ethical and educational principles of both institutions, and is based on long-term cooperation structured by a monitoring committee responsible for evaluating the actions carried out.

Strengthening national cohesion and the spirit of defence

In addition to training, this agreement reflects a shared ambition: to strengthen the link between young people, citizenship and defence.

By enabling more talented young people to discover contemporary strategic issues and become involved in serving the general interest, the IHEDN and the Un Avenir Ensemble foundation are helping to train a new generation of players who are aware of the challenges of security, sovereignty and cohesion facing the nation.

This partnership marks an important step forward in promoting a defence system that is open to society, inclusive and forward-looking.

L’article Un nouveau partenariat pour promouvoir l’égalité des chances et l’engagement citoyen est apparu en premier sur L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes études de défense nationale.

]]> Martial Foucault : « La mondialisation est de plus en plus perçue comme un espace de rivalité » https://ihedn.fr/en/lundis-de-lihedn/martial-foucault-la-mondialisation-est-de-plus-en-plus-percue-comme-un-espace-de-rivalite/ Fri, 10 Apr 2026 13:11:43 +0000 https://ihedn.fr/?p=59498 At a time when «states are pursuing strategic objectives using economic instruments», Martial Foucault, a political economy researcher and Director of the Strategic Research Institute at the École Militaire, puts the spotlight back on the notion of ’militarised interdependence« or the »weaponisation of globalisation«. Interview.

L’article Martial Foucault : « La mondialisation est de plus en plus perçue comme un espace de rivalité » est apparu en premier sur L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes études de défense nationale.

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Director of the Institut de recherche stratégique de l'École militaire (IRSEM) since 2024, and a university professor at Sciences Po Paris, Martial Foucault was previously director of the CEVIPOF (CNRS, Sciences Po's political research centre). An economist and political scientist by training, he was a professor in the political science department at the University of Montreal and director of the Centre of Excellence on the European Union (McGill University/Université de Montréal). He has worked as a consultant for the French Ministries of the Armed Forces and the Economy, the Agence Française de Développement, the Quebec Ministry of Public Finance, the Direction générale de l'armement and the European Commission.

In 2004, the IHEDN awarded a prize for his doctoral thesis in economics on the financing of European defence; the Institute then welcomed him as an auditor for the national session in 2024-25, in the Defence Policy major. End of 2025, he published in the Revue d'économie financière an article entitled «Militarised interdependence: the return of economic geostrategy». In this interview, he sheds light on this concept and its use by powers such as the United States and China, and summarises the challenges it poses for France and the European Union.

HOW HAS THE ECONOMY BECOME A WEAPON OF CONFLICT? WHEN DO YOU DATE THE CURRENT PERIOD?

The economy has always been a mainspring of national power. From the industrial revolutions of the 18th century onwardse In the 21st century, international competition also involves innovation, mastery of technological standards, productivity gains and, ultimately, economic domination.

For the current period, the changeover began in the second half of the 20th century.e In the 19th century, a new paradigm emerged: that of generalised economic interdependence (or a totally open economy). With the opening up of markets, the unprecedented intensification of the movement of capital, goods, technologies and, to a lesser extent, labour, powers can no longer rely solely on their internal resources. They have to secure global supply chains of raw materials, components, energy, data and skills.

Never before has international trade reached such a volume (+900% since 1980) and value in 2024 (33,000 billion dollars). Trade flows therefore serve the ambitions of economic power.

But the corollary of this development is the emergence of increasingly conflictual relations, confirming what the American essayist Edward Luttwak described in 1990 as the «logic of war in the grammar of trade». States are now pursuing strategic objectives using economic instruments: the United States through tariffs and technological controls, China through its central role in the refining of many critical minerals and in certain industrial chains, Taiwan through its decisive role in advanced semi-conductors, and the Gulf monarchies through their ability to influence energy markets.

Because this interdependence not only produces prosperity, the economy becomes a weapon of conflict when the survival of a national model depends on resources, flows or technologies controlled elsewhere. In other words, the more interdependence there is, the more dependence can become an exploitable weakness.

WHAT DOES THE NOTION OF MILITARISED INTERDEPENDENCE MEAN?

The notion of militarised interdependence is based on a simple observation: globalisation is no longer perceived as a positive-sum game, in which everyone gains from openness, but increasingly as an area of rivalry, where the gains of some can translate into the losses or vulnerability of others.

There are two reasons for this change. Firstly, because the rules of the game appear to be less stable than they used to be: the World Trade Organisation no longer has the same capacity for arbitration or supervision as it did at the height of its power in the 1990s.

Secondly, because economic openness has revealed the other side of the coin: by multiplying dependencies, it has also exposed states to new forms of pressure and weakened their sovereignty.

«IN A NETWORKED WORLD, THE STATES THAT CONTROL THE CENTRAL NODES CAN TRANSFORM THIS POSITION INTO NEGOTIATING OR COERCIVE POWER».»

It is in this context that political scientists Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman developed, in 2019, the concept of weaponized interdependence, which can be translated as «militarised interdependence» or «weaponisation of globalisation». Their idea is as follows: in a networked world, states that control the central nodes - financial, technological, logistical, informational - can transform this position into negotiating or coercive power. However, two important phenomena need to be distinguished.

The first is that globalisation has not dispersed power; it has often concentrated it. International networks rarely operate horizontally. They are structured around central points, according to a logic of the following type hub-and-spoke (star network). Those who control these centres can monitor, block, punish or exclude.

The second is the emergence of the fragmentation paradox: the more states seek to increase their security by fragmenting the global economy (by forming trading blocs or repatriating value chains to their own shores), the more they generate economic costs, increase global vulnerability and, paradoxically, reduce collective security.

This is exactly what is happening today between the United States and China. The two powers are seeking to reduce their dependence in sectors deemed critical, whether electronic chips, batteries, rare earths or cutting-edge technologies. But this quest for autonomy comes at a price: it raises production costs, accentuates block logics and reduces the benefits expected from interdependence.

YOU WRITE THAT ECONOMIC GEOSTRATEGY IS RECONFIGURING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. IN WHAT WAY?

Yes, because since 1945 the international order has been implicitly based on a compromise. The United States guaranteed part of collective security, while a relatively open economic order promoted growth, the expansion of trade and, more broadly, the stability of the international system.

In this context, interdependence was often seen as a factor for peace. The idea, in essence a very classic one, was that trade reduces the incentives for conflict. Montesquieu summed it up in a famous phrase: «trade softens morals». For several decades, this intuition served as the intellectual compass of the liberal order.

But this pattern breaks down when American hegemony is challenged and new powers seek to reshape the rules of the game. From then on, global trade flows were no longer just vehicles for prosperity; they also became levers for rivalry. States increasingly used sanctions, embargoes, technological restrictions, offensive industrial policies and trade discrimination as instruments of power.

«THE CHALLENGE IS NO LONGER JUST TO TRADE, BUT TO KNOW WHO YOU DEPEND ON».»

Globalisation, far from reducing conflict, is exposing countries to critical dependencies: energy, health, minerals, semi-conductors, electronic components, food, shipping and data. The challenge is no longer simply to trade, but to know on whom we depend in order to continue to produce, treat, travel, defend ourselves or innovate.

This is reconfiguring international relations in three ways.

  • Firstly, because the hierarchy of powers is becoming more fluid. Power is no longer measured solely in terms of military divisions or GDP, but in terms of the ability to control a bottleneck: a technology, a metal, an infrastructure, a currency, a network.
  • Secondly, because we are seeing the emergence of more fragmented groupings: a Western bloc itself shaped by divergent interests, an Indo-Asian area structured by the rise of China and India, and a global South seeking to take advantage of the rivalry between the great powers.
  • Finally, because interdependence does not always reduce the risk of war; it can sometimes increase it. The case of semiconductors is illuminating. Taiwan accounts for more than 90 % of the world's production of the most advanced chips. This concentration creates a systemic dependence for other economies. If this vital capacity is threatened, certain states may be tempted to act preventively to protect their own economic security.

In reality, interdependence is being challenged more and more explicitly by managers who are no longer prepared to bear the costs and prefer to deploy a strategy of pressure or rupture.

DO YOU THINK FRANCE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ARE EQUIPPED TO FIGHT ON THIS GROUND?

Europeans are in for a rude and painful awakening. The delay in achieving strategic autonomy is forcing the European Union to rethink from top to bottom its international relations, the solidity of its economic partnerships, the reliability of its alliances and, more broadly, its ability to defend its interests in a more conflict-ridden world.

For a long time, Europe thought that openness was enough to produce stability. Now it is discovering that uncontrolled openness can also lead to vulnerability. The COVID-19 crisis provided a glimpse of the damaging dependencies, but the war in Ukraine was a major wake-up call in this respect: energy dependency, industrial weakness in certain sectors, lagging behind in critical technologies, exposure to decisions taken elsewhere.

In concrete terms, when Europe accepts the new American tariff policy without much opposition, it is agreeing to pay the United States (more than in the past) in exchange for protection in terms of security. This is the return of an old strategic fact: protection is never free. Such a choice, which has not been debated by national or European democratic bodies, raises two questions.

«HOW CAN WE REGAIN POWER WITHOUT GIVING UP OPENNESS, SECURE OUR DEPENDENCIES WITHOUT IMPOVERISHING OURSELVES?»

The first is sustainability: is such a geo-economic compromise tenable in the long term for economies already facing competition from China, the energy transition and public finances under strain?

The second is democratic: can such a compromise be accepted in the long term if it is neither clearly debated nor genuinely accepted?

In the past, France and the EU may have adopted a wait-and-see attitude and abandoned strategic industrial policies, but there is little alternative to thinking at European level, given the critical size of this economic area, and to developing a common security policy that is less aligned with that of the United States.

The success of this shift will depend on the answers to the following three questions: how to regain power without giving up openness, how to secure our dependencies without impoverishing ourselves, and how to conduct this strategic reorientation without bypassing democratic debate.

L’article Martial Foucault : « La mondialisation est de plus en plus perçue comme un espace de rivalité » est apparu en premier sur L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes études de défense nationale.

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