{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"L&#039;IHEDN: Institut des hautes \u00e9tudes de d\u00e9fense nationale (Institute for Higher National Defence Studies)","provider_url":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/en","title":"A Major Pivot in Hamas Strategy - L&#039;IHEDN : Institut des hautes \u00e9tudes de d\u00e9fense nationale","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"QNhpwErMNl\"><a href=\"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/en\/veille-strategique\/a-major-pivot-in-hamas-strategy\/\">A Major Pivot in Hamas Strategy<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/en\/veille-strategique\/a-major-pivot-in-hamas-strategy\/embed\/#?secret=QNhpwErMNl\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"&quot;A Major Pivot in Hamas Strategy&quot; - L&#039;IHEDN : Institut des hautes \u00e9tudes de d\u00e9fense nationale\" data-secret=\"QNhpwErMNl\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script>\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n\/\/# sourceURL=https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/wp-includes\/js\/wp-embed.min.js\n<\/script>","description":"Ce document analyse les effets de la guerre d\u2019Ukraine sur les march\u00e9s de d\u00e9fense des Etats europ\u00e9ens. Ces d\u00e9penses ont connu une augmentation globale continue depuis 2014 qui s\u2019est m\u00eame acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9 suite \u00e0 l\u2019invasion de l\u2019est de l\u2019Ukraine en f\u00e9vrier 2022. Outre la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d\u2019armer l\u2019Ukraine, on semble assister \u00e0 une course aux armements qui se traduit par des besoins accrus et une modification en profondeur des march\u00e9s europ\u00e9ens de la d\u00e9fense."}