{"id":40131,"date":"2023-06-01T15:25:06","date_gmt":"2023-06-01T14:25:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/?p=40131"},"modified":"2024-02-19T10:33:48","modified_gmt":"2024-02-19T09:33:48","slug":"trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/en\/notre-selection\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\/","title":{"rendered":"Three possible scenarios for a Ukrainian counter-offensive"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t

Both are specialists in military and operational issues, Philippe Gros<\/span><\/strong> is a senior researcher at the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS), while Vincent Tourret<\/strong> <\/span>is a research associate at the FRS and a doctoral student at the Universit\u00e9 du Qu\u00e9bec \u00e0 Montr\u00e9al (UQAM). They are the authors of the note entitled \"War in Ukraine: analysis and outlook<\/a><\/strong>published on 6 April by the FRS on the basis of a study carried out between December 2022 and March 2023, which looks in particular at the capabilities of the Ukrainian army in the run-up to the counter-offensive announced by Kiev. For the IHEDN, they update their work on the various avenues and consequences of this operation.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t

\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t

AFTER THE OVERALL FAILURE OF THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE AND UKRAINIAN PREPARATIONS, WHAT IS THE CURRENT BALANCE OF POWER?<\/h4>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t

First of all, we must remain extremely cautious, as there are still many uncertainties about the state of the forces of the two belligerents. They are particularly numerous where the Ukrainian forces are concerned, as they have been since the start of this war. However, it is fair to say that the balance of power is currently in Ukraine's favour.<\/p>

In terms of force levels, the Russian force deployed is thought to be less than 400,000 men, which is consistent with the figure of around 500,000 men lent at the start of the winter offensive, reduced 5 months later by around 100,000 casualties according to the Americans - a fairly credible figure.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t

\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t

However, this force structure masks major disparities. The operational order of battle can only be approached with a great deal of approximation: the leaked American slides show that at the end of February American intelligence counted 544 melee battalions (infantry and tanks), around half of which were from the regular army, which also includes most of the artillery and support units, and the other half from the PMCs (starting with Wagner), the Donbass militias and above all the territorial regiments. However, most of Wagner's units, as well as a majority of the regular army's most capable battalions, have been put out of action by the offensive (already 40% of regular units were out of action at the end of February, according to these plates).<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t

\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t

At present, the Ukraine Control Map<\/a> lists around 140 infantry regiments or brigades and 20 tank units for the whole of the Russian army and confirms the American data according to which nearly 90% of these forces are in Ukraine. Only around twenty units remain unaccounted for, in reserve or being reconstituted, notably in Belarus. A Ukrainian analyst<\/a> had around 115-120 deployed melee regiments (or perhaps 450 battalions). However, the number of genuinely operational units in this order of battle is unknown, but it is undoubtedly much lower given the losses and the difficulty of compensating for them with new fighters in this timeframe. It therefore appears that the most operational forces that will face the Ukrainian offensive are mainly territorial, even less well equipped and trained than the regular army units.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t

\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t

CAPACITIES AND EQUIPMENT SEEM TO BE TO UKRAINE'S ADVANTAGE<\/h4>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t

For its part, the Ukrainian army probably has a certain numerical superiority. Although its losses have been heavy, they have been less than those of the Russians, and have been compensated for by the reinforcement of its capabilities. The forces deployed, which absorbed the Russian offensive, include 34 large joint brigades, 13 artillery brigades from the regular army and 27 brigades from the territorial defence forces.<\/p>

Above all, the Ukrainian army seems to have succeeded in building up this famous manoeuvring mass of 12 new joint brigades, 9 of which were trained by the allies (to which must be added at least three artillery brigades and several support brigades). To these must be added the 9 new, smaller infantry brigades of the national guard.<\/p>

All in all, then, the Ukrainian army can now be estimated to have between 350 and 400 melee battalions compared with the Russians, units that are generally much larger than their Russian counterparts, including around a hundred fresh units at full strength.<\/p>

Equipment is also to the Ukrainians' advantage. Three months ago, an American intelligence slide counted just over 400 Russian tanks and less than 3,000 armoured vehicles in the theatre, compared with 800 Ukrainian tanks and over 3,500 armoured vehicles, half of which were supplied by the allies (with around 100 Western tanks and over 500 Western armoured fighting vehicles, technically superior to Russian equipment). The gap has inevitably widened since then, insofar as the pace of Russian reinforcements, timed by the restoration of their stockpiles, has shown that it is not keeping pace with combat losses and operational wear and tear. Even in terms of artillery, Kiev is now outnumbered by Moscow, with 2,300 guns compared with 1,200. American figures, indicating that more than 2,700 Russian guns are \"in garrison\", support our reasoning on the level of wear and tear reached by Russian artillery.<\/p>

The lack of Soviet ammunition has silenced two-thirds of the Ukrainian artillery, which can only rely on the 900 Western guns in service.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t

\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t

\"THE RUSSIANS CAN ONLY ACHIEVE DESTRUCTIVE EFFECTS ON SMALL SECTIONS OF THE FRONT LINE\".<\/h4>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t

The only area in which Moscow still has the upper hand is in terms of the volume of ammunition. However, both belligerents are drastically rationed in terms of their traditional operational practices. The Russians can only achieve destructive effects on small sections of frontline. If deliveries from American stocks are forthcoming, the Ukrainians will have a short window of a few weeks during which they will have sufficient minimum firepower for the majority of planned tactical tasks.<\/p>

Finally, in tactical terms, the clear failure of the Russian offensive shows that, at least in defensive terms, the Ukrainian army has clearly demonstrated an advantage over the Russian forces. However, a new study by the British RUSI, based on Ukrainian sources, shows that the Russian army continues to adapt to its shortcomings, more to survive than to generate new solutions for superiority. For example, fire-supported assault infantry techniques have received a lot of publicity, but with a paradox: Russia is trying to compensate for its technical and material deficiencies with poorly trained infantry, while it continues to suffer from a structural lack of human capital.<\/p>

We know that Russian electronic warfare poses serious problems for the Ukrainians. It is also managing, as yet unsystematically, but within its best trained and motivated forces (VDV, Spetznaz, Wagner), to set up better integrated reconnaissance-fire complexes that are sufficiently mobile and responsive to limit Ukrainian counter-battery fire. But can these innovations be generalised, in terms of equipment and training, to the rest of the Russian troops? It's not at all obvious.<\/p>

On the Ukrainian side, the uncertainties are even greater. The factors of fragility highlighted at Bakhmut have certainly not disappeared by magic. They are largely due to the difficulty of achieving a syncretism between Soviet heritage, NATO culture and local operational practices, and are reflected, for example, in the heterogeneity of its units and their command structures. In addition, many questions remain about the completeness of its resources for the offensive, for example concerning engineering resources and above all logistical support, the depth of its ammunition stocks, the maintenance of its equipment, and so on.<\/p>

A final uncertainty concerns the air environment: will the regular low-intensity strikes carried out by the Russians sufficiently deplete the Ukrainian surface-to-air missile stockpile, which is now known to be dangerously low? If so, do the Russian air forces have the resources to try and use interdiction or close air support to hinder the Ukrainian offensive? Given their lack of pilots and their probable wear and tear, this seems doubtful, but it cannot be ruled out.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t

\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t

WHAT SHAPE MIGHT THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE TAKE? WHERE MIGHT IT TAKE PLACE? IN WHAT WAYS?<\/h4>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tIt is now clear that the shaping phase is well under way, including in the field of information, in order to maintain the element of surprise both geographically and in terms of time, which explains the increase in diversionary actions and the contradictory statements about the deadlines for Kiev's main action.\n\nMuch has already been said about the Russian defence lines, and the inter-army manoeuvres required to breach them and then exploit them behind the lines. But this is just the micro-tactical scale. Let's zoom out a little: the operational scale first of all, that at which operations are combined in time and space to achieve the strategic goals set, is not the least vague. The political aim is clearly to retake all the areas conquered since 2014, including Crimea. Are the Ukrainians banking on a single large-scale decisive operation? Are they planning several simultaneous operations and\/or a sequence of successive operations over several months? It's impossible to say. It should be noted, however, that the amount of manoeuvre at their disposal, although appreciable, hardly makes it possible to envisage vast campaigns on this scale.\n\nThe General Milley<\/span><\/strong>the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff has well summary of the situation\u00a0<\/a>: \"\u00a0Ukraine's strategic objectives are to liberate the whole of Ukraine occupied by Russia. There are several hundred thousand Russian soldiers in the occupied territories of Ukraine. This objective can be achieved militarily, but probably not in the near future.<\/em>\u00a0The Ukrainian Defence Minister, Reznikov, himself estimated that the capabilities of this counter-offensive are \"... very limited\".\u00a0overestimated worldwide<\/em><\/a>\u00a0<\/em>\"This suggests that the Ukrainians are aware that they will not achieve their strategic objectives on this operation alone... Unless there is a systemic collapse of the opposing system.\n\nThis comment refers to the \"high\" tactical level, to the nature of the defeat mechanisms that can be used. Generally speaking, there are two families of offensive modes of action:\n
    \n \t
  • the direct approach, employing mechanisms of defeat, annihilation or attrition, that of trench warfare, used by the Russians since the spring of 2022 ;<\/li>\n \t
  • the indirect approach, a manoeuvre in depth exploiting vulnerabilities in the adversary to advance towards a centre of gravity, the aim of this manoeuvre being to cause the physical dislocation of the adversary's system, the demoralisation of its forces and the loss of the enemy's strength. in fine<\/em>the disintegration of its military system. This can be envisaged locally (as was the case in Kharkiv last September) or on a theatre-wide scale.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
    \nA number of principles or guidelines for military action are generally respected in order to hope for a successful operation. Firstly, the principle of freedom of manoeuvre means building up a sufficient reserve (i.e. of several brigades), and secondly, the principle of surprise means creating credible diversionary manoeuvres. These requirements reduce the number of brigades that can really be used for the offensive. Because of the limited resources available, the direct approach can no doubt be ruled out as the main mechanism.\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
    \n\t\t\t\t\t\t
    \n\t\t\t\t\t
    \n\t\t\t
    \n\t\t\t\t\t\t
    \n\t\t\t\t
    \n\t\t\t\t\t

    WHAT SHOULD THE UKRAINIANS CHOOSE AS THEIR MAIN FOCUS?<\/h4>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
    \n\t\t\t\t
    \n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t
    \n\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
    \n\t\t\t\t\t\t
    \n\t\t\t\t\t
    \n\t\t\t
    \n\t\t\t\t\t\t
    \n\t\t\t\t
    \n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t

    The principle of concentrating forces meant that sufficient superiority had to be achieved on the main axis or axes of effort. It is also logical to think that the Ukrainians will choose to stagger their forces: a first echelon of breaching, then a second echelon of exploitation but also of flank-guarding the penetration. In short, an indirect approach seems only applicable to one or two axes of penetration. It is even perfectly conceivable that a diversionary operation could be transformed into a major axis of progression. This is the art of control, of rapid adjustment to the context.<\/p>

    The location of the main axis of effort is the subject of much speculation on social networks. Another factor here is the Ukrainian intelligence and planners' assessment of Russia's centre of gravity. The most obvious is the land bridge between Russia and Crimea, the famous M14 road, the disruption of which would jeopardise supplies to the whole of the Zaporijjia\/Kherson region. Two options are therefore generally discussed:<\/p>

    • The option of taking Melitopol, which is most often put forward, has the advantage of a terrain well-suited to manoeuvres and less dense defences than in the Donbass. However, it would come up against the 58e<\/sup> army (perhaps one of the most effective in the Russian army and one of the most spared by the winter offensive), as well as to the reserves to the rear, on the 4e<\/sup> Kherson front. What's more, this option would be tantamount to simply flanking the entire Russian system, which would not necessarily be the most destabilising.<\/li>
    • The Mariupol\/Berdiansk axis option is more difficult in terms of terrain and closer to the battlefields of the Donbass, reducing the time needed to switch any Russian tactical reserves. However, it would have the advantage of attacking the hinge between the zones of the two army groups of Zaporizhia and Donbass (thus complicating the coordination of the Russian forces), in the shallowest zone of the occupation, and would have a much greater systemic leverage effect on the dislocation of the occupying forces. What's more, tucking in the Sea of Azov would increase the options for striking the Russian rear in the Rostov region, which is one of the crucial rear bases of the Russian war effort in Ukraine. If the Ukrainians feel strong enough, this would be the most logical axis;<\/li>
    • The other options, in particular the breakthrough of the Kremina\/Svatove line in Lugansk, seem less profitable, forcing an extension of the Ukrainian position on its north-eastern borders with Russia on difficult terrain. An offensive would also come up against the densest and most easily resupplied Russian position, even if the state of the forces there is very uneven, some having paid a heavy price for the winter offensive on Bakhmut and Kremina.<\/li><\/ul>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\"Ordre\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t
      Partial Russian order of battle and possible axes of progression for a Ukrainian counter-offensive on the southern front (source: Maciej Korowaj, 7:41 AM - May 15, 2023)<\/figcaption>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/figure>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t\t\t

      WHAT SCENARIOS DO YOU ENVISAGE FOR THIS OFFENSIVE? WHAT WOULD THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS BE?<\/h4>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t\t
      \n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t

      Based on these findings and observations, we can draw up at least three scenarios.<\/p>

      The first, optimistic scenario was that of a cascading collapse of the Russian front. The offensive achieved its objectives on the major axis of penetration, generating a parallel collapse in Russian morale and several breaks in other parts of the front. The recapture, more rapid than anticipated, of a major part of the occupied zone made the Russian position untenable and opened the way to a new offensive effort, this time decisive - for example towards Crimea. This scenario would be likely to provoke a rapid political decantation in Moscow, the consequences of which would be unpredictable. Either the Kremlin gives up, agrees to withdraw its forces, disguises its failure with propaganda and prepares its weapons for future revenge. Or it does not give up, mobilising conscripts in a hurry, for example, stepping up its efforts on other battlefields (naval, for example), stepping up its escalation plans, including nuclear, in the event of maximum stress. Or it cracks under the pressure, triggering a crisis unprecedented since 1991: a palace revolution, or even a breakdown in the power system, or even civil war, and so on.<\/p>

      The second scenario is that of an indisputable Ukrainian tactical victory, again recovering significant portions of territory. However, the Russian forces put up enough resistance. What's more, the Ukrainian army is not as effective or supported as expected. As a result, the Ukrainian army squandered its resources after just a few weeks. It would achieve a success that would equal or even surpass those of last autumn, but which would still fail to destabilise the entire Russian force system. This would automatically lead to a reduction in the intensity of the fighting as a result of the belligerents' exhaustion and to the famous \"conflict freeze\", at least temporary, which the West is anticipating and Putin and his henchmen are hoping for.<\/p>

      The third scenario is the failure, even tactically, of the Ukrainian offensive. Given the difference in the balance of power, it seems by far the least plausible. In any case, it would lead to the same freezing of the conflict as the previous scenario.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

      Interview with researchers Philippe Gros and Vincent Tourret, authors of a paper for the Fondation pour la recherche strat\u00e9gique (French Foundation for Strategic Research) which takes stock of the conflict and outlines some prospects. <\/p>","protected":false},"author":12,"featured_media":40132,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[208,171],"tags":[218],"class_list":["post-40131","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-defense-nationale","category-notre-selection","tag-guerreukraine"],"yoast_head":"\nTrois sc\u00e9narii possibles pour une contre-offensive ukrainienne - L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes \u00e9tudes de d\u00e9fense nationale<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/en\/notre-selection\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_GB\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Trois sc\u00e9narii possibles pour une contre-offensive ukrainienne\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Entretien avec les chercheurs Philippe Gros et Vincent Tourret, auteurs d\u2019une note pour la Fondation pour la recherche strat\u00e9gique qui dresse un bilan interm\u00e9diaire du conflit et trace quelques perspectives.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/en\/notre-selection\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes \u00e9tudes de d\u00e9fense nationale\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ihedn\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2023-06-01T14:25:06+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2024-02-19T09:33:48+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/4.png\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1280\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"720\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/png\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Ad\u00e8le Thoumieux\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:title\" content=\"Trois sc\u00e9narii possibles pour une contre-offensive ukrainienne\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:description\" content=\"Entretien avec les chercheurs Philippe Gros et Vincent Tourret, auteurs d\u2019une note pour la Fondation pour la recherche strat\u00e9gique qui dresse un bilan interm\u00e9diaire du conflit et trace quelques perspectives.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:image\" content=\"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/4.png\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@IHEDN\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@IHEDN\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Ad\u00e8le Thoumieux\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Estimated reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"14 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/notre-selection\\\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/notre-selection\\\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Ad\u00e8le Thoumieux\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/16d49c2bd0121499ea9b9023ce89826c\"},\"headline\":\"Trois sc\u00e9narii possibles pour une contre-offensive ukrainienne\",\"datePublished\":\"2023-06-01T14:25:06+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2024-02-19T09:33:48+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/notre-selection\\\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\\\/\"},\"wordCount\":3088,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/notre-selection\\\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2023\\\/06\\\/4.png\",\"keywords\":[\"guerreUkraine\"],\"articleSection\":[\"d\u00e9fense nationale\",\"Notre s\u00e9lection\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-GB\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/notre-selection\\\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/notre-selection\\\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\\\/\",\"name\":\"Trois sc\u00e9narii possibles pour une contre-offensive ukrainienne - L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes \u00e9tudes de d\u00e9fense nationale\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/notre-selection\\\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/notre-selection\\\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2023\\\/06\\\/4.png\",\"datePublished\":\"2023-06-01T14:25:06+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2024-02-19T09:33:48+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/notre-selection\\\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-GB\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/notre-selection\\\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-GB\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/notre-selection\\\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\\\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2023\\\/06\\\/4.png\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2023\\\/06\\\/4.png\",\"width\":1280,\"height\":720,\"caption\":\"Trois sc\u00e9narii possibles pour une contre-offensive ukrainienne\"},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/notre-selection\\\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Accueil\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Trois sc\u00e9narii possibles pour une contre-offensive ukrainienne\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/\",\"name\":\"IHEDN : Institut des hautes \u00e9tudes de d\u00e9fense nationale |\",\"description\":\"Site officiel de l'IHEDN plac\u00e9 sous la tutelle du Premier ministre.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/#organization\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-GB\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"IHEDN - Institut des Hautes Etudes de D\u00e9fense Nationale\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-GB\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2020\\\/11\\\/BLOC_RF_IHEDN_WEB.png\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2020\\\/11\\\/BLOC_RF_IHEDN_WEB.png\",\"width\":500,\"height\":237,\"caption\":\"IHEDN - Institut des Hautes Etudes de D\u00e9fense Nationale\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/ihedn\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/IHEDN\",\"https:\\\/\\\/www.instagram.com\\\/ihedn\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/www.linkedin.com\\\/school\\\/ihedn\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/fr.wikipedia.org\\\/wiki\\\/Institut_des_hautes_\u00e9tudes_de_D\u00e9fense_nationale\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/16d49c2bd0121499ea9b9023ce89826c\",\"name\":\"Ad\u00e8le Thoumieux\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-GB\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/64fc58d14679bdd185946349bcb229b06e37d30d6290c2bec15f1daa8f8e0ece?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/64fc58d14679bdd185946349bcb229b06e37d30d6290c2bec15f1daa8f8e0ece?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/64fc58d14679bdd185946349bcb229b06e37d30d6290c2bec15f1daa8f8e0ece?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Ad\u00e8le Thoumieux\"},\"sameAs\":[\"http:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ihedn.fr\\\/en\\\/author\\\/thoumieux\\\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Three possible scenarios for a Ukrainian counter-offensive - L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes \u00e9tudes de d\u00e9fense nationale","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/en\/notre-selection\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\/","og_locale":"en_GB","og_type":"article","og_title":"Trois sc\u00e9narii possibles pour une contre-offensive ukrainienne","og_description":"Entretien avec les chercheurs Philippe Gros et Vincent Tourret, auteurs d\u2019une note pour la Fondation pour la recherche strat\u00e9gique qui dresse un bilan interm\u00e9diaire du conflit et trace quelques perspectives.","og_url":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/en\/notre-selection\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\/","og_site_name":"L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes \u00e9tudes de d\u00e9fense nationale","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ihedn\/","article_published_time":"2023-06-01T14:25:06+00:00","article_modified_time":"2024-02-19T09:33:48+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1280,"height":720,"url":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/4.png","type":"image\/png"}],"author":"Ad\u00e8le Thoumieux","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_title":"Trois sc\u00e9narii possibles pour une contre-offensive ukrainienne","twitter_description":"Entretien avec les chercheurs Philippe Gros et Vincent Tourret, auteurs d\u2019une note pour la Fondation pour la recherche strat\u00e9gique qui dresse un bilan interm\u00e9diaire du conflit et trace quelques perspectives.","twitter_image":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/4.png","twitter_creator":"@IHEDN","twitter_site":"@IHEDN","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Ad\u00e8le Thoumieux","Estimated reading time":"14 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/notre-selection\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/notre-selection\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\/"},"author":{"name":"Ad\u00e8le Thoumieux","@id":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/#\/schema\/person\/16d49c2bd0121499ea9b9023ce89826c"},"headline":"Trois sc\u00e9narii possibles pour une contre-offensive ukrainienne","datePublished":"2023-06-01T14:25:06+00:00","dateModified":"2024-02-19T09:33:48+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/notre-selection\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\/"},"wordCount":3088,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/#organization"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/notre-selection\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/4.png","keywords":["guerreUkraine"],"articleSection":["d\u00e9fense nationale","Notre s\u00e9lection"],"inLanguage":"en-GB"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/notre-selection\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\/","url":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/notre-selection\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\/","name":"Three possible scenarios for a Ukrainian counter-offensive - L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes \u00e9tudes de d\u00e9fense nationale","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/notre-selection\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/notre-selection\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/4.png","datePublished":"2023-06-01T14:25:06+00:00","dateModified":"2024-02-19T09:33:48+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/notre-selection\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-GB","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/notre-selection\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-GB","@id":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/notre-selection\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/4.png","contentUrl":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/4.png","width":1280,"height":720,"caption":"Trois sc\u00e9narii possibles pour une contre-offensive ukrainienne"},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/notre-selection\/trois-scenarii-possibles-pour-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Accueil","item":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Trois sc\u00e9narii possibles pour une contre-offensive ukrainienne"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/#website","url":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/","name":"IHEDN: Institut des hautes \u00e9tudes de d\u00e9fense nationale (Institute for Higher National Defence Studies)","description":"Official website of the IHEDN under the supervision of the Prime Minister.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/#organization"},"potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-GB"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/#organization","name":"IHEDN - Institute for Higher National Defence Studies","url":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-GB","@id":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/11\/BLOC_RF_IHEDN_WEB.png","contentUrl":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/11\/BLOC_RF_IHEDN_WEB.png","width":500,"height":237,"caption":"IHEDN - Institut des Hautes Etudes de D\u00e9fense Nationale"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ihedn\/","https:\/\/x.com\/IHEDN","https:\/\/www.instagram.com\/ihedn\/","https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/school\/ihedn\/","https:\/\/fr.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Institut_des_hautes_\u00e9tudes_de_D\u00e9fense_nationale"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/#\/schema\/person\/16d49c2bd0121499ea9b9023ce89826c","name":"Ad\u00e8le Thoumieux","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-GB","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/64fc58d14679bdd185946349bcb229b06e37d30d6290c2bec15f1daa8f8e0ece?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/64fc58d14679bdd185946349bcb229b06e37d30d6290c2bec15f1daa8f8e0ece?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/64fc58d14679bdd185946349bcb229b06e37d30d6290c2bec15f1daa8f8e0ece?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Ad\u00e8le Thoumieux"},"sameAs":["http:\/\/ihedn.fr"],"url":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/en\/author\/thoumieux\/"}]}},"publishpress_future_action":{"enabled":false,"date":"2026-05-06 21:26:46","action":"change-status","newStatus":"draft","terms":[],"taxonomy":"category","extraData":[]},"publishpress_future_workflow_manual_trigger":{"enabledWorkflows":[]},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/40131","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/12"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=40131"}],"version-history":[{"count":12,"href":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/40131\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":45953,"href":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/40131\/revisions\/45953"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/40132"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=40131"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=40131"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=40131"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}