{"id":62178,"date":"2026-08-07T11:14:17","date_gmt":"2026-08-07T10:14:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/?p=62178"},"modified":"2026-08-07T14:59:31","modified_gmt":"2026-08-07T13:59:31","slug":"episode-2-lecole-de-la-strategie","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ihedn.fr\/en\/lundis-de-lihedn\/episode-2-lecole-de-la-strategie\/","title":{"rendered":"Episode 2: The School of Strategy"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Raymond Aron, \u00abPolitics and Strategy\u00bb, 4 November 1952<\/h4>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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French National Archives, reference number 20100024\/16<\/em><\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t

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Philosopher, journalist, political scientist, sociologist, historian\u2026 The liberal thinker Raymond Aron (1905\u20131983) exerted a considerable influence in his fields of study, particularly in the areas of international relations and strategy \u2013 we owe him, for example, Reflections on War, Clausewitz<\/em> (Gallimard, 1976).<\/p>

Between 1952 and 1976, he gave four lectures to students at the IHEDN, whilst teaching successively at Sciences Po, the University of Paris, the \u00c9cole pratique des hautes \u00e9tudes and then the Coll\u00e8ge de France, all the while contributing editorials to the Figaro<\/em>.<\/p>

His first talk therefore focuses on the relationship between politics and strategy. He bases his argument on examples drawn from the recent history of the two world wars, but also from earlier periods, including the Romans, the Persians and, in particular, the Peloponnesian War (431\u2013404 BC):<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t

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\u00abThe Peloponnesian War remains the finest war story in the world because it offers, in a striking distillation and within a limited geographical scope, all the problems we are trying to unravel on a global scale, so that everything is more human, more intelligible, more perfect in the Peloponnesian War. One element of this perfection is the passage of time, which makes us forget the horrors.\u00bb<\/p>

In his view, \u00abconstantly intervening in the conduct of military operations for political reasons is a mistake that Clausewitz condemned long ago. Ignoring the primacy of politics over strategy is another mistake\u00bb.<\/p>

He cites two counter-examples from the Second World War: US President Roosevelt, a civilian who \u00absaw only military victory and nothing beyond\u00bb, and German Chancellor Hitler, another civilian (since he had never risen above the rank of corporal), \u00abconvinced of the primacy of politics over strategy\u00a0\u00bb.<\/p>

Aron analyses the relationship between politics and strategy amongst the various belligerents in the two world wars, before turning his attention to the dynamics of alliances, which he classifies into two categories: temporary allies and lasting allies.<\/p>

Speaking off the cuff, he comments on the context of the early days of the Cold War, with two political systems \u00abin total rivalry\u00bb, \u00abin contact across virtually the entire globe\u00bb, each with \u00aba dominant power whose margin of superiority is immense\u00bb: the United States and the USSR.<\/p>

After citing numerous real-life examples illustrating different types of warfare and strategy (the Balkans, Serbia in 1914, the remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 1936, German strategy in 1914\u201318 and 1939\u201345, etc.), he turns his attention to alliances: he urges \u00abevery country within an alliance\u00bb to retain \u00abthe greatest possible scope to act in accordance with its own interests within the coalition\u00bb.<\/p>

Hence the \u00abmost difficult problem\u00bb, that of the \u00abEuropean army\u00bb:<\/p>

\u00abIs it possible for France to be part of a continental coalition with countries that have no obligations outside the continent? I am not offering an answer.\u00bb<\/p>

According to Raymond Aron, \u00abone must be aware of the limits of French power, but guard against both defeatism and vanity: these are the two dangers\u00bb.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t

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