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In the early 1960s, Breton fishermen, faced with dwindling stocks in the North Atlantic, expanded their fishing grounds southwards. They discovered waters particularly rich in fish and shellfish off the north-eastern coast of Brazil, on the continental shelf, at depths of around 100 metres.
The spark: a row over fishing grounds off the coast of Pernambuco
Alerted by local fishermen who complained of unfair competition and the plundering of their waters, the Brazilian authorities decided to intervene. In March 1961, the Brazilian navy boarded several French vessels, on the pretext that they were operating illegally within the country’s exclusive economic zone. This marked the start of an escalation that would involve the highest levels of government, from Brazilian President Jânio Quadros (and later his successor João Goulart) to General de Gaulle.
To justify the expulsion of the French vessels, Brasília invoked the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf (although Brazil had not yet ratified it at the time). This treaty stipulates that a coastal State has exclusive rights to the exploitation of the natural resources of its continental shelf, including living organisms belonging to sedentary species.
The legal conundrum: does a lobster walk or swim?
The crisis then veers into the realm of legal semantics that resembles a scientific farce.
The Brazilian position is that the spiny lobster is a sedentary animal. As it moves by walking along the seabed, it forms an integral part of the continental shelf belonging to Brazil. Catching a spiny lobster is tantamount to stealing a national resource.
Conversely, the French position is that the spiny lobster is capable of swimming to move around. It must therefore be regarded as a fish (a pelagic resource) living in international waters, which are freely accessible for fishing.
This anecdote is best summed up by the famous remark made by the Brazilian admiral and oceanographer Paulo Moreira da Silva:
«By the same token, if a lobster is a fish because it moves by hopping, then a kangaroo is a bird.»
From semantics to gunboats: the military escalation
What might have remained a dispute amongst experts quickly escalated under pressure from public opinion and concerns over national prestige. Faced with France’s refusal to back down during subsequent fishing seasons, Brazil massed troops in the north-east and mobilised its fleet.
In response, in early 1963, General de Gaulle’s France – which was at that time firmly asserting its strategic autonomy and naval power – dispatched a squadron escort vessel, the Tartu, to protect its fishermen. The aircraft carrier strike group Clemenceau is even sent across the Atlantic, off the coast of Senegal.
For several weeks, the South Atlantic became the scene of a naval war of nerves. Warships crossed paths, the Brazilian air force carried out reconnaissance missions over the area, and diplomatic tensions were at their height. Fortunately, diplomacy prevailed over direct confrontation, preventing any opening of fire.
Strategic lessons: the beginnings of the new law of the sea
Having subsided by 1963, the lobster dispute was finally resolved by an agreement signed in December 1964: France agreed to recognise Brazil’s sovereignty over these resources in exchange for a scheme granting temporary fishing permits to a limited number of Breton vessels.
Beyond its picturesque nature, this crisis is a textbook example of modern maritime geopolitics in several respects:
- The claims of coastal states: The lobster crisis heralded the major shift in the law of the sea that would lead to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 1982) and the creation of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). It illustrates the determination of countries in the Global South to protect their resources from the traditional maritime powers.
- The dialectic of power: It shows how a minor trade dispute can become a matter of national sovereignty, with naval projection serving as a tool for political communication.
- The importance of legal expertise: This crisis also serves as a reminder that modern conflict uses the law as a weapon (lawfare). The definition of a word or a biological behaviour can legitimise or delegitimise the use of force.
In short, this episode of «lobster diplomacy» demonstrates that, at sea, issues of sovereignty can blur the line between a minor incident and a high-intensity crisis.
The «Lobster War» as seen by two Brazilian and French researchers
In this joint interview, Vinicius de Carvalho, associate professor in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, and Frédéric Fogacci, director of studies and research at the Charles de Gaulle Foundation and lecturer at Sciences Po Paris, discuss the circumstances and lessons to be learnt from this diplomatic crisis between their two countries.
