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How do you explain the fact that this conflict, which began as a mere fisheries dispute, has led to the mobilisation of both countries’ naval fleets, with even an aircraft carrier on each side?
Vinicius de Carvalho: This clearly illustrates how the absence of well-defined and widely respected multilateral protocols, together with the presumption of the use of force – so evident in current affairs – can exacerbate disputes between countries and lead to open conflict. Fortunately, this was not the case during the «Lobster War», as the event is known in Brazil.
In a sense, France opted for «gunboat diplomacy» whilst other diplomatic negotiations were under way and the arguments of traditional diplomacy did not seem to work in its favour in this particular case.
Frédéric Fogacci: People talk about «mobilisation», but we must keep things in perspective. In fact, it was more a case of mutual self-delusion than genuine mobilisation.
At the time, the French surface fleet had not yet undergone its major modernisation programme – the famous «Plan Bleu» – the vessels were rather ageing, and the main focus was elsewhere, primarily on deterrence.
Rather, it is a spiral of escalation that will arise from mutual intimidation and each side’s refusal to lose face.
What is interesting is that there has been a sort of information war from the very beginning. There are misunderstandings that are being exploited by the press in both countries. The symbolic dimension of the conflict was heavily exploited, particularly by the Brazilian press, to restore the nation’s reputation. Furthermore, the indirect role of American fishing companies (the peak of the lobster crisis occurred the year following the Cuban Missile Crisis) also came into play.
In France, there may be a «model’ Fachoda »In this conflict: the further away the conflict is, the more abstract it becomes, and the more it fuels fantasies. The Langouste conflict reached its peak in 1963, that is to say after the Algerian War and also after the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was, to some extent, a matter of national pride at stake.
Brazil responded with a major naval and air mobilisation, placing its troops on high alert. How close did we come to actual armed conflict, and what diplomatic channels were used to defuse the situation before the first shot was fired? Do you see this as a good example of «de-escalation»?
Vinicius de Carvalho: For Brazil, this was one of the few practical exercises in which it mobilised its armed forces with a view to a potentially robust external response following the Second World War. The Brazilian Navy mobilised almost its entire fleet, including the aircraft carrier Minas Gerais, destroyers, corvettes and submarines. The Brazilian Air Force also played an active role in detection and surveillance.
From Brazil’s perspective, the armed forces were prepared to respond to any act of aggression or violation of Brazilian territorial waters by French warships. In a sense, Brazil was asserting that it would not yield to gunboat diplomacy.
From a diplomatic perspective, numerous factors contributed to the de-escalation of tensions. These included the UN’s involvement in the negotiations and pressure exerted by the United States, which had no interest in this kind of conflict in the region.
For example, the United States intervened, reminding the Brazilians that the licences for the use of American military equipment employed by Brazil – such as the B-17 bomber – did not permit its use against US allies, such as France.
Furthermore, the progress made in discussions regarding the definition of what is permitted in terms of fishing on the high seas, and indeed the exploitation of marine resources, has helped to ease tensions on both sides.
Frédéric Fogacci: I’m not sure whether either side had really considered engaging the enemy. Apart from the cruiser Tartu, which had sailed towards the area, France did not deploy the resources required for a large-scale operation. The main course of action was to board the fishing vessels.
The Brazilians played a rather subtle game, constantly taking care to remain «below the threshold»: more «posturing» than actually launching engagement manoeuvres that might eventually have led to a genuine military dimension. For Brazilian President João Goulart, «baring his teeth» was also a way of defusing internal tensions with the army.
As for the French naval aviation group of the Clemenceau, which would have been deployed had there been a clash, remained off the coast of Senegal and did not cross the Atlantic. France merely gave a glimpse of what it might do to defend its claimed rights.
De Gaulle is deeply committed to France’s positions and the rights that flow from them. He demonstrated this during the war in Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, in Madagascar… He also possessed a skill for managing escalation, which he had already put into practice, notably with the Allies: pushing matters to the brink of a breakdown whilst exercising a highly sophisticated control over the levels of engagement. And once the territory was truly «marked», discussions would begin.
This episode will not have a major impact – at least in the long term – on Franco-Brazilian relations. The crisis came to an end in 1963, and the following year, in 1964, De Gaulle undertook a triumphant three-week tour of Latin America, which concluded in Brazil. In the meantime, Goulart had been overthrown in a military coup.
Another lesson to be learnt – a very Gaullist one – is that the balance of power can also foster healthy relations: it is only after managing the crisis and accepting the balance of power that a genuine discussion can begin.
In 1961, Charles de Gaulle’s France was in the process of asserting its global power. Sending a French Navy squadron (including the Clemenceau) to protect Breton fishermen seems disproportionate by today’s standards. To what extent was this conflict a show of diplomatic strength aimed at testing French influence in Latin America?
Frédéric Fogacci: From the Brazilian perspective, it was easier to test the French than to test the Americans; it was a way of asserting sovereignty that came at a lower cost.
On the French side, between 1961 and 1963, the situation changed. These were decisive years in terms of France’s assertion of its position: in 1961, the Algerian War was still raging, and France was pilloried by most Third World countries at the UN, where it was regarded as a colonial power.
By 1963, the Algerian War had ended, and France had asserted itself during the Berlin Crisis (1961) and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). Finally, for De Gaulle, October 1962 saw the successful referendum on the election of the President by universal suffrage. And finally, linking these three events, there was the ‘Gerboise effect’ [four nuclear tests carried out in the Sahara between February 1960 and April 1961, Editor’s note]. By 1963, even more so than in 1961, it was definitively established that France was a nuclear power.
For all these reasons, France was in a much stronger position in 1963 to exert influence and put forward its point of view than it was in 1961. It did not relinquish its role as a world power.
France remains an Atlantic power and continues to be a key player in the region. De Gaulle’s aim, through this kind of conflict – which is essentially symbolic in nature – is to drive home to the world that France will defend its interests. This paves the way for a policy of self-assertion, the main victims of which will be the Americans, who are targeted by this determination to defend France’s Atlantic identity.
At the heart of the dispute lay a crucial biological distinction: for Brazil, the spiny lobster crawls across the continental shelf and therefore belongs to it; for France, it swims in international waters. How did the legal experts of the time manage to turn a debate about the locomotion of crustaceans into a credible argument for territorial sovereignty before international bodies?
Vinicius de Carvalho : This chapter is almost an anecdote concerning the «spiny lobster war». During negotiations aimed at establishing the modus vivendi for this crustacean, France, regarding the lobster as a fish, would have the right to fish for it; conversely, if it were considered a resource of the continental shelf, that right would be denied.
France argued that the spiny lobster moved by leaping and should therefore be regarded as a fish rather than a resource of the continental shelf. It based its argument on the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, which laid down rules for fishing on the high seas. However, this convention did not come into force until September 1962. A Brazilian officer, Admiral Paulo Moreira da Silva, then remarked ironically: «By the same token, if a lobster is a fish because it moves by leaping, then a kangaroo is a bird.»
The argument is ironic, but clearly effective.
This conflict highlighted the shortcomings of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. How did this "lobster war" act as a catalyst for future negotiations on Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), which today define the world’s maritime boundaries?
Vinicius de Carvalho : The «lobster war» highlighted the fundamental importance of widely shared international standards. It is essential to recall that the first two decades following the end of the Second World War and the creation of the UN were marked by the development and gradual refinement of numerous multilateral regulatory frameworks. This war undoubtedly influenced subsequent debates on the definition of the appropriate use of the sea and its resources.
France argued that the spiny lobster moved by leaping and should therefore be regarded as a fish rather than a resource of the continental shelf. It based its argument on the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, which laid down rules for fishing on the high seas. However, this convention did not come into force until September 1962. A Brazilian officer, Admiral Paulo Moreira da Silva, then remarked ironically: «By the same token, if a lobster is a fish because it moves by leaping, then a kangaroo is a bird.»
The argument is ironic, but clearly effective.
What is the contemporary Brazilian perspective on this conflict, six decades on?
Vinicius de Carvalho : Unfortunately, this conflict is largely unknown in Brazil, at least amongst the general public. Apart from the military, diplomats and specialists in international relations, little is said about the «Lobster War». Yet this conflict held many lessons for Brazil. The first of these is the importance of coherence between diplomacy and defence. In Brazil’s case, the two sides acted in concert to safeguard the country’s positions.
From a military perspective, this episode provided some key lessons. Among these was the need to possess sufficient domestic technology so as not to be dependent on third parties for authorisation to use their equipment; the need to clearly define a naval aviation doctrine (even with an aircraft carrier, an internal dispute persisted between the Navy and the Air Force regarding the Navy’s air operations doctrines); the importance of the forces’ ability to respond to threats; and finally, the issue of the operational costs of an engagement on such a scale.
It is important to emphasise, however, that once the issue had been resolved peacefully and diplomatically, relations between Brazil and France continued as normal, without any resentment or bitterness.
And what is the contemporary French perspective?
Frédéric Fogacci: The conflict itself has largely been forgotten. What remains is a French tradition of commitment to the law of the sea.
Above all, we remain opposed to any access-denial strategies that certain powers might pursue. We are in favour of freedom of movement and, of course, of respect for our Exclusive Economic Zone, as established by the 1982 Montego Bay Convention.
The «lobster war»: when sovereignty is at stake on the continental shelf
In 1961, a dispute between fishermen off the Brazilian coast escalated into a major diplomatic and military crisis between Paris and Brasília. At the heart of the debate: does the lobster walk or swim? Behind this scientific dispute lies a pioneering clash over the law of the sea, the projection of power and the definition of maritime sovereignty.
