IHEDN Mondays are now available in audio format!
Click below to listen:
Secretary General for Defence and National Security since 26 March 2025, diplomat Nicolas Roche was previously France's ambassador to Iran. After graduating from the Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA), he was posted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he held a number of positions on the borderline between diplomacy and defence, often in connection with nuclear proliferation and disarmament: Counsellor for politico-military affairs at the French Embassy in the United States, with particular responsibility for defence policy, NATO, proliferation, deterrence and nuclear issues, he later became diplomatic adviser to the Minister of Defence, then Director of Strategy at the Military Applications Directorate of the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA).
Before being appointed to Tehran in 2022, he was Director of Strategic Affairs, Security and Disarmament at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then Chief of Staff to Jean-Yves Le Drian, Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs.
In his new role at the SGDSN, one of his first tasks was to finalise the updating of the National Strategic Review (RNS).
HOW WAS THE PROCESS OF UPDATING THE RNS CARRIED OUT, AND WHICH STAKEHOLDERS WERE INVOLVED IN ARRIVING AT THE 567 MEASURES ANNOUNCED?
In his greetings to the armed forces on 25 January, the President of the Republic asked for two things: the SGDSN to update the National Strategic Review, which dated from 2022; and the Minister for the Armed Forces to reflect on defence, its industrial and technological base, and the impact of new technologies, to feed into this updating work.
The following week, the SGDSN brought together the ministries for a meeting to launch the work. Insofar as this was an update and not a return to the tabula rasaWe started from the organisation of the 2002 version and adapted it. We have thus designed a document in three parts: a situation report that takes account of changes in the geostrategic context since 2022; the expression of an updated national ambition, looking ahead to 2030, supported by appropriate resources; the third part is devoted to the ways and means of achieving this ambition.
However, while there is a real link between the work of 2025 and that of 2022, there are significant differences. In 2022, the deadlines were extremely tight. In 2025, the President of the Republic gave us time for broad consultation. Once the first draft was ready, it was presented to the standing committees of the parliamentary assemblies responsible for defence. The senators and deputies also contributed in writing to the drafting of the Review, which is a guarantee of quality. The document was also presented to the parliamentary intelligence delegation and to a group of researchers and specialists.
In a less usual way, we approached the associations of regional, departmental and local elected representatives. This was a first and we were very well received. On the administrative side, we gave a greater role to the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Higher Education and Research and other civil ministries. This contribution has led us to create a strategic objective no. 11, devoted to scientific and technological issues.
Finally, we consulted our British and German partners. All in all, we will have worked roughly speaking six months and consulted a hundred or so key figures.
COMPARED TO THE PREVIOUS UPDATE IN 2022, WHAT ARE THE MAIN NEW ACTIONS PROPOSED TO ADAPT OUR DEFENCE TO THIS DEGRADED ENVIRONMENT?
What is striking about the past three years is the deterioration in relations between states and in all international regulatory frameworks. This is the tipping point mentioned by the French President at the opening of the update. The possibility of a new Russian aggression against a friendly country is credible. The transatlantic relationship raises questions. The Middle East is shaken by a series of potentially destabilising events, from Gaza to Tehran. China is increasingly assertive. Cyberspace and the information field are being undermined by evil-doers of all kinds...
The update reflects these dangerous developments. It affirms the need - a central one - to be able to deal with a high-intensity conflict in Europe, alongside our allies, while at the same time dealing with harmful enemy action on our own territory. This hypothesis is structuring in several ways. High intensity means the need to withstand both the shock and the long term - this is the challenge of the announcements made by the President of the Republic on 13 July on defence resources - and hostile action on national territory - sabotage, cyber attacks, manipulation of information, etc. - means having the moral strength and resilience to withstand it individually and collectively.
Until recently, from a European perspective, we were still in the cosy period of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the peace dividend. We had achieved a form of world peace, a triumph of liberal democracy and a golden age of regulation of international relations. Trade was globalised and international exchanges had reached an all-time high. Technological innovation and progress benefited everyone, thanks in particular to the development of information technologies. Of course, we had our setbacks, such as 9/11, the war in Afghanistan, the situation in Iraq, the toughening of economic competition, the massive use of espionage by certain states, the instrumentalisation of the law... but Europe was an oasis.
Russian aggression in Ukraine, following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, is a giant leap backwards. Faced with an aggressor who turns war into a competitive advantage, we need to reinvent the means and reflexes of defence. Compared with Review of 2022, the 2025 update involves our country, its people, its neighbours and its allies in a long-term effort that affects all our societies. That's the real difference.
IN HIS FOREWORD, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC CALLS FOR A "STRATEGIC REVOLUTION". HOW CAN FRANCE BETTER CONTRIBUTE TO ITS OWN SECURITY, AS WELL AS THAT OF EUROPE AND THE WORLD?
France's contribution to global security will take several forms. There is the security it owes to its citizens, in France and overseas; the security of its neighbours and that of its allies and partners.
The nation's vital interests are safeguarded by deterrence. The update reminds us that our vital interests have a European dimension. This deterrent is backed up by conventional forces that can intervene in support of our neighbours, for example in a conflict in Europe. France has the capabilities to be the framework nation for such a commitment.
Further afield, France can support its allies and strategic partners in various ways. But in all cases, our country will always prefer peaceful settlement to armed force, and will never shirk its responsibilities. Si vis pacem, para bellum.
