"Today, we know a great deal about the mechanisms of informational interference, but we know much less about its effects": this reflection by Laurent Cordonier, doctor in social sciences and director of research at the Descartes Foundationat the start of his speech at the École Militaire on 26 November, points to a grey area in the current debate on disinformation.
So that's what led to the annual survey from this foundation dedicated to the analysis of disinformation, entitled "The penetration of foreign accounts of contemporary conflicts in France", which was presented that day at a conference in partnership with the IHEDN.
The choice of subject came from a simple observation: "The parties involved in an international conflict systematically develop a narrative aimed at legitimising their involvement in the conflict as well as the actions they take". With this in mind, " what factors influence sensitivity to different narratives? "asks Laurent Cordonier.
To answer this question, the researcher began by talking to "players in the international news business and specialists in international relations and the phenomena of disinformation and foreign information interference: journalists, members of government departments responsible for vigilance and protection against foreign digital interference, general officers in the French armed forces, French diplomats, researchers in French and European strategic and geopolitical research institutes".
18-49 YEAR-OLDS MORE SENSITIVE TO RUSSIAN, HAMAS, MALIAN AND CHINESE STORIES
Following this preparatory work, it chose to focus on the French public's perceptions of the different narratives concerning four contemporary conflicts or tensions: the Russia-Ukraine war, the Hamas-Israel conflict, "tensions between the Malian junta and France concerning operations Serval and Barkhane" and the China-Taiwan crisis. It then drew up a questionnaire containing "three central elements" from the accounts of the two protagonists in each conflict or tension, to which 4,000 people "making up a representative panel of the major French population" responded last August.
These "central elements" (the main statements) of the different narratives were identified in collaboration with researchers from the Strategic Research Institute of the École Militaire (IRSEM) and the Geopolitics of the Datasphere centre at Paris 8 University (GEODE). Laurent Cordonier points out that, since the opinion survey dates back to August, "it cannot be ruled out that the way in which the French perceive some of these stories may have changed somewhat since then".
In around a hundred pages, the study shows that sensitivity to one or other of the stories is "on average" linked to various factors, such as political opinion or age: "On average, people aged 65 and over (and, more broadly, retired people) are more sensitive than the rest of the population to Ukrainian, Israeli, French and Taiwanese stories, while overall they are less sensitive than others to Russian, Hamas, Malian and Chinese stories. The reverse is true for all age groups from 18 to 49".
PROFESSIONAL MEDIA OR SOCIAL NETWORKS: REVERSE INFLUENCE
One specific factor seems to "particularly influence the sensitivity of the French": whether they get their information from professional media or, conversely, from social networks:
"For an identical profile, a high frequency of information on international and geopolitical news via national or regional media is a factor of increased sensitivity to Ukrainian, Israeli, French and Taiwanese stories, whereas it is a factor of less sensitivity to Russian, Hamas, Malian and Chinese stories. Conversely, again with the same profile, high frequencies of information on international and geopolitical news via social networks, YouTube and instant messaging are factors in increased sensitivity to the Russian, Hamas, Malian and Chinese narratives".
On the other hand, no socio-demographic profile could be 'clearly' associated with one sensitivity or another. However, "the higher the respondents' household income, the more sensitive, on average, they were to Ukrainian, Israeli, French and Taiwanese stories, and the less sensitive they were to Russian, Hamas, Malian and Chinese stories". The correlation with other factors was also studied, such as geopolitical culture, confidence in the State and the scientific community, and perceptions of climate change and vaccines.
According to the study, "a majority of the population (62.1%) believes that the Russian and Chinese informational attacks targeting France represent a danger to our country and its democracy". But these narratives have little effect, and "Russian and Chinese information manipulations fail (so far, at least) to sway French public opinion in favour of the narratives they promote about the war in Ukraine and the status of Taiwan".
EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF MISINFORMATION, "A MATTER OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE".
In conclusion, the Descartes Foundation calls for better study of the effects of misinformation, as Laurent Cordonier writes:
"Assessing the nature and extent of the consequences of foreign interference with information on the French population is a matter of the utmost importance. Without such an assessment, which is currently largely lacking, it is impossible to properly calibrate the response of public authorities and the information industry to these manipulative operations. Under-reacting would expose the country to the risk of destabilisation.
Overreacting, for example by adopting measures that restrict online freedom of expression too severely or by making certain points of view on international news completely invisible in the media, would be tantamount to damaging democratic life by seeking to protect it. It is therefore up to the authorities and the civil society players concerned to encourage and support scientific research into the effects of foreign interference in information".
While the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas conflicts receive a great deal of media coverage, the IHEDN has selected a few lessons from the study concerning the other two, which receive less attention in the public debate. For each conflict, "the narrative elements of both sides were presented to respondents in the same block of questions comprising six items (i.e. the three narrative elements of one side and the three narrative elements of the other side). Within a block, story elements from both camps were presented to respondents in random order.
CHINA-TAIWAN: THE FRENCH "NOT VERY RECEPTIVE TO THE CHINESE NARRATIVE
This part of the study analyses the penetration in France of the narratives developed by the protagonists of the the crisis between China and Taiwan over the status of Taiwan.
The questions were preceded by this introduction: "Today, Taiwan is de facto a separate state from mainland China, with its own institutions. However, China claims Taiwan as one of its provinces and does not rule out the use of force to assert its authority there.
We are going to present you with statements that reflect different points of view on this crisis. Please indicate to what extent you personally agree or disagree with each of these statements.
The three central elements of the Chinese story are :
- By supporting the Taiwanese government, the United States and other Western powers are illegitimately intervening in China's internal affairs.
- Taiwan is historically Chinese and is an integral part of Chinese territory.
- Only the Chinese government has the legitimacy to decide the future of Taiwan.
For the Taiwanese story, these are :
- It is up to the Taiwanese people, not the Chinese government, to decide freely and democratically on the future of Taiwan.
- As Taiwan is a democracy, its autonomy from China is essential for the defence of democratic values in Asia and around the world.
- Since Taiwan has never been under the authority of the Chinese Communist Party, when China speaks of "reunification" between Taiwan and China, it is in reality envisaging unification by force.
As with each of the other conflicts, the results vary according to the story elements submitted to respondents. But, on average, the French were "not very sensitive to the Chinese story" and "very sensitive to the Taiwanese story".
In terms of political opinion, "respondents close to the far left and, to a lesser extent, the far right are on average more sensitive to the Chinese narrative on Taiwan's status than the rest of the panel. Respondents close to the ecologists, the left, the right and, above all, the centre were more sensitive to the Taiwanese narrative than the others".
FRANCE-MALI: FRENCH PEOPLE "NOT VERY TO MODERATELY SENSITIVE" TO THE MALIAN STORY
The aim of this section is to assess the penetration in France of the narratives developed by the protagonists of the Tensions between the Malian junta and France on the interpretation of the aims and results of the Serval and Barkhane operations (French-led military operations in the Sahel region from 2013 to 2022).
Here's how the questions were introduced: "The Sahel region (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad) has long been affected by a security crisis caused by jihadist terrorists. From 2013 to 2022, France, along with other foreign countries, intervened militarily in the region. Since then, France has gradually withdrawn its troops from the Sahel.
We are going to present you with statements that reflect different points of view on this crisis. Please indicate to what extent you personally agree or disagree with each of these statements.
The three central elements of the Malian junta's narrative are :
- France's military interventions in the Sahel from 2013 to 2022 have never succeeded in curbing jihadist terrorism in the region.
- France's military interventions in the Sahel are a form of neo-colonialism: their real objective was to preserve France's interests and influence in the Sahel region, without regard for the interests of the local populations.
- In 2021, France abandoned Mali to its fate, without prior consultation, forcing Mali to turn to Russia to ensure its security.
Those in the French story are :
- The aim of French military intervention in the Sahel, which began in 2013-2014, was to help the countries of the region in their fight against jihadist terrorism.
- The French military interventions in the Sahel that began in 2013-2014 were carried out in support of the legitimate armies of the Sahel countries.
- The French military interventions in the Sahel that began in 2013-2014 were carried out at the request of the heads of state of the Sahel countries.
Here again, the results vary for each element, but on average, the French are "slightly to moderately sensitive to the Malian junta's story" and "fairly sensitive to the French story".
With regard to their political opinions, "respondents close to the extreme left were on average more sensitive to the Malian story than the rest of those questioned. Conversely, respondents close to the left, the right and, even more so, the centre were, on average, more sensitive to the French story than the others".
