Virginie Saliou, a political science researcher specialising in maritime governance, holds a doctorate on the government of the sea. She combines a high-level academic career with experience as a strategic advisor to government ministries. She holds the chair of "Mers, Maritimités et Maritimisations du Monde" at Sciences Po Rennes, and teaches the geopolitics of maritime spaces and the law of the sea at ENSTA Brest and the Ecole navale.
For IHEDN, she deciphers the geopolitical impact of the melting ice in the Arctic, a region now at the heart of international rivalries. In particular, she analyses the new dynamics of competition between the major powers, and the key role of players such as the European Union, NATO, Russia and China in this race for resources and influence.
How is the melting ice in the Arctic fuelling geopolitical competition between the major powers?
It is essential to stress that competition in the Arctic is often overestimated. Although the melting of the ice is real and is accelerating, this development is frequently exaggerated, particularly as regards the opening up of shipping routes and rivalry in the region. Some routes are being partially opened up, but this does not necessarily lead to significant time savings or a major transformation in international maritime trade. However, this is not stopping regional and extra-regional players from taking an interest. Russia, for example, is keen to develop these routes, particularly for trade in its hydrocarbons, which are mainly destined for China and Asia. However, these routes are not intended to become transit routes for international trade, but rather specific destination routes.
Furthermore, the States bordering the Arctic Ocean respect the Montego Bay Convention and have been officially committed to implementing it in the Arctic since 2008, resulting in a clear distribution of maritime resources. As a result, there is no real conflict over exclusive economic zones (EEZs), with each state having rights over the resources located in its own EEZ.
As for the extension of the continental shelf, states can request additional rights over resources if the geological continuity of their land shelf towards the sea is proven. These claims are often simultaneous, and a bilateral agreement is required to validate the extension, which has led to cooperation rather than conflict, as shown by the agreements between Norway and Russia or Denmark and Canada. The only real dispute that remains concerns the maritime delimitation between the United States and Canada. In 2024, the United States announced its claim to an extended continental shelf in the Arctic, overlapping the claims of its neighbours and potentially becoming a bone of contention.
Some states "wish to limit freedom of passage".
The opening up of maritime routes has also created a dispute over the status of the ships that would use them: should there be total freedom of navigation, as called for by the United States and the European Union (EU), or strict control, as preferred by Canada and Russia? Environmental concerns, in particular the increased risk of accidents linked to the difficult sailing conditions, are prompting the latter to want to limit passage and exercise control.
Under international law, responsibility for search and rescue zones lies with coastal states, which gives Russia and Canada a central role. As the States directly affected by any maritime accident on their coasts, it is they who should deploy the necessary resources for rescue operations. In this context, Canada and Russia wish to limit the freedom of passage in these zones and exercise a certain control over maritime routes, in order to better manage the risks and protect their interests. In addition, Article 243 of the Montego Bay Convention allows shipping restrictions to be imposed in polar zones for environmental reasons, thus supporting the concerns of these countries.
"From a military point of view, the Arctic is crucial for Russia".
In military terms, the Arctic is crucial for Russia, not only for its hydrocarbon exports, but also for its strategic objectives. Around 12 % of Russia's GDP comes from this region, and 80 % of its hydrocarbons are extracted there. This justifies the need, in Russia's view, to secure this area. The Arctic is also the only strategic crossing point for the Russian fleet, giving it access to the world ocean without negotiating with other states. Its Northern Fleet is therefore of vital importance, particularly for submarines and nuclear deterrence. Russia's Arctic strategy is based on reinforced defence, the use of deterrence and strict control of access. Since the 2000s, Vladimir Putin has undertaken a gradual remilitarisation of the region, reinforced by the establishment of military bases and jamming zones.
To what extent is the reconfiguration of the balance of power in the region increasing the risk of escalation, and what challenges does this raise?
Russia wanted to reinvest in the Arctic for economic and military purposes, which led to reactions from other players. This has led to initiatives such as the reactivation of the US 2nd Fleet and an increase in US political declarations, making the Arctic a strategic zone to be reinvested in. Canada, for its part, announced the reinforcement of its fleet of icebreakers, although this commitment remained rather symbolic, with no concrete follow-up. There has been a verbal escalation, with some players asserting the strategic importance of the region, but the operational impact of these declarations remains uncertain.
In Russia, although announcements have been made to reinvest in the Northern Fleet, these promises have not been fully realised, largely because of the war in Ukraine. Neighbouring players are observing that a defensive spiral seems to be developing, with the arming of one leading to the arming of others. However, this dynamic remains contained for the time being. The Arctic is a mirror of international tensions, without generating any real competition for the region itself.
"An indirect battleground in the Sino-American competition
Another player has emerged in this area: China, which is causing increasing concern. In the early 2000s, China considered the Arctic to be an international space, with no special rights for the riparian states. Over time, however, it has signed economic and scientific agreements, particularly with Russia in the hydrocarbons sector.
In 2013, China became an observer on the Arctic Council and announced the "Polar Silk Roads" in 2018. It then declared itself a "Near Arctic State" and more recently a "Stakeholder State", reinforcing its interests in the region. Although China's military presence is limited, its economic interests are perceived as a threat by the United States, turning the Arctic into an indirect battleground in Sino-American competition, particularly over Greenland.
"NATO continues to conduct regular exercises there".
NATO, for its part, has continued to conduct regular exercises in the Arctic since the end of the Cold War, mainly involving the littoral states, notably Norway. These exercises, which involve extreme operational conditioning as well as demonstrations of force, show Russia's interest in the area. Russia also responds with similar exercises. Recent political tensions, such as those generated by the Trump administration, have had no impact on operational activities in the region.
In this context, what role can the European Union and France play in promoting a multilateral and sustainable order in the Arctic?
The European Union, although not an observer member of the Arctic Council, has on several occasions expressed its desire to join this body. However, this limits its capacity for direct influence. The EU is seeking to invest in the Arctic issue and has an ambassador for the Arctic, but its position on the Arctic is slow to be precisely defined and its role remains limited. Some of its Member States are, however, involved in governance bodies for this region. The EU has, however, taken a stance on environmental and maritime security issues, and more recently through its "Strategic Compass", where these subjects are addressed. However, its position is still evolving.
France, for its part, is more clearly committed to the Arctic. It has been an observer on the Arctic Council since 2000, and plays an active role in the work of this body. In terms of defence, France uses shipping in the region to maintain the Arctic as a zone of freedom of movement. It also intends to contribute to international cooperation in this region, by promoting its polar strategy and through its dedicated ambassador. By supporting regional initiatives and defending the application of the Montego Bay Convention, France could strengthen its role in this area.
To find out more, see two IHEDN fact sheets:
The Arctic, a new arena for international rivalries?January 2025.
The Arctic : strategic resource issuesFebruary 2025.
