France's space power: assets to become a driving force once again

Published on :

25 August 2025
In a detailed report published this summer, the Institut Montaigne takes stock of the weaknesses and "exceptional expertise" of France and Europe in this area, and makes recommendations for "restoring a truly strategic ambition for space". Interview with its authors, Arthur Sauzay and Raphaël Tavanti.
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As the government prepares to unveil a renewed national space strategy in the coming months, the Institut Montaigne, France's leading liberal think tank, published a 300-page "action note" in June entitled "Space power: France's awakening (read more its presentation or its summary).

Its authors, Raphaël Tavanti, project manager for economic issues at the Institut Montaigne, and Arthur Sauzay, partner at A&O Shearman and contributor to the think tank on space issues, interviewed around thirty experts, including Jean-Marc Astorg, director of strategy at the Centre national d'études spatiales (CNES), Stéphane Israël, CEO of Arianespace until the end of 2024, and Captain Béatrice Hainaut, space policy researcher at the Institut Montaigne, These included Jean-Marc Astorg, Director of Strategy at the Centre national d'études spatiales (CNES), Stéphane Israël, CEO of Arianespace until the end of 2024, and Captain Béatrice Hainaut, a researcher in space policy at the Institut de recherche stratégique de l'École militaire (IRSEM).

Detailing the strengths, but also the dependencies and capability gaps, of Europe and France in the defence space sector, which they deem to be "too weak", the authors consider that in the event of American disengagement, we would be "not up to the demands of a high-intensity conflict".

They therefore stress the strategic importance of the European IRIS² programme (Infrastructure for Resilience and Secure Interconnection by Satellite), which they fear could be threatened by German and Italian reluctance, and recommend in particular achieving complete autonomy in optical observation, breaking our dependence on Starlink and GPS and, for France, maintaining its leadership in the launcher segment.

In this interview with IHEDN, Arthur Sauzay and Raphaël Tavanti discuss some of their findings and recommendations.

YOU EMPHASISE THAT OUR COUNTRY, AS EUROPE'S LEADING SPACE POWER, "HAS SOME GOOD ARGUMENTS". WHAT ARE THEY?

Arthur Sauzay : To fully understand the challenges we face, we have set out in this note to provide an overview of the current situation, and our country's strengths and weaknesses. On the strengths side, France still has capabilities in all the major space segments: a high-capacity launcher with Ariane 6, a capacity for construction and a fleet of various civil and military satellites (observation, communication, etc.), a dense fabric of companies of all sizes, and finally public research institutions (CNES, ONERAThe country also has world-class research facilities and university laboratories. Above all, France has a large pool of talent, which is still insufficiently mobilised to meet today's challenges.

This makes France Europe's leading space power, but there is no guarantee that it will remain so. We point out in the note that Italy and especially Germany have been showing renewed ambitions in the space sector for several years now. Our neighbour to the other side of the Rhine has a number of advantages, including public finances that are much more favourable than ours, while investment needs in the space sector run into billions.

But beware: our research shows that a revival of French space power is meaningless without a sufficiently coordinated European strategy, including the European Union and the European Space Agency (ESA). Both the United States and China have space budgets several times greater than that of Europe as a whole.

TO REDUCE OUR STRATEGIC DEPENDENCE, THE FIRST MEASURES YOU RECOMMEND IN THE MILITARY FIELD CONCERN OBSERVATION, COMMUNICATION AND NAVIGATION. CAN FRANCE ACHIEVE AUTONOMY IN THESE AREAS?

Raphaël Tavanti: It all depends on what you mean by autonomy which can be assessed according to a wide range of factors. For the sake of brevity, let's assume that we are talking about the ability to act without depending on others. In absolute terms, France could pursue a strategy of almost complete autonomy - it would still be dependent on electronic components or raw materials - in the areas you mention, but it would have to spend several billion euros a year on them, a target that would be impossible to achieve as things stand. A coherent and realistic strategy must therefore recognise the key competencies in certain areas, but also the interdependencies, and the capabilities that need to be pooled.

So it's not so much a question of France being completely autonomous as of reducing its many dependencies. Observation, communication and navigation are all part of space-based support for operations, which is becoming increasingly important, as the conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated on several occasions.support seems to us to be outdated. Capabilities in these three areas are now a strategic prerequisite for waging war, a fortiori high intensity. 

"THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE REVEALS THE CRITICAL NATURE OF SPACE CAPABILITIES".

The conflict in Ukraine therefore highlights both the critical nature of space capabilities and the vulnerability that comes with being too dependent on a third country. For this reason, we recommend increasing our efforts in these three areas. Of course, some of these will require greater investment, in the same way as other areas of armed forces capability. This is particularly the case in observation, where France has remarkable tools but still too few or too undiversified, or in early warning, where we have the skills but no real operational applications.

But these efforts cannot simply be embodied in a "Father Christmas list". They must be accompanied and articulated by renewed political determination and greater cooperation on a European scale. In short, we need to give France a genuine space diplomacy that will enable us to rally Europeans around a new space project. The French President has announced that a space summit will be held in 2026, an ideal opportunity to cement a genuine autonomy strategy, provided that it is well prepared.

WHY DO YOU SUGGEST APPOINTING PERMANENT "SPACE" REPRESENTATIVES TO OUR DIPLOMATIC POSTS?

Raphaël Tavanti: As we saw earlier, space is becoming more conflictual and weaponised, and is once again becoming an arena for confrontation and the expression of power. However, it remains an unparalleled arena for diplomacy and cooperation, particularly in the fields of science and exploration.

CNES already has representatives in several French diplomatic establishments. These are mainly located in the major space powers, such as the United States, Russia, Japan and Germany. These posts are clearly useful at a time when the Franco-European space model is still largely geared towards cooperation. For France, space is therefore a tool for soft powerIt can also be used as a diplomatic tool, particularly for countries wishing to embark on the space adventure, whose ambitions sometimes come up against very high entry costs, which France can help to lower. 

Our note therefore suggests that CNES should be given the means to increase its presence throughout the world by opening new diplomatic representations, including in countries where organisations with space programmes are still in their infancy. We give a few examples in the note (Nigeria, Brazil, Philippines), notably along scientific, economic and sometimes security lines, but the reasoning can extend well beyond that. 

AS FAR AS CIVIL SPACEFLIGHT IS CONCERNED, WHY DO YOU THINK IT IS NECESSARY FOR FRANCE AND EUROPE TO REMAIN CAPABLE OF MANNED SPACEFLIGHT AND LUNAR EXPLORATION?

Arthur Sauzay : This is a key point in the report, and one on which there is no consensus in France or Europe today. We began by showing that, with the International Space Station (ISS) due to be shut down by 2030 and the American Artemis programme renationalised, Europe is running a very real risk of seeing its astronauts grounded, or condemned to buying very expensive seats from governments or companies, with a high risk of rejection by the public. Sophie Adenot, who is flying next year, could be our last real astronaut for a very long time.

On this basis, we have attempted to show the extent to which manned flight and lunar exploration are certainly based on scientific interest, but in reality constitute a fundamental tool for image, influence and soft power. This is true at an international level: the nations that can send their astronauts into space (whose numbers are growing, with the imminent arrival of India) will write the future rules of space and, at least in practice, will arrogate to themselves growing areas of influence in the Earth-Moon zone and beyond. But this is also true in terms of the image of innovation, risk-taking and exploration that is attached to these programmes at international level, and also in terms of the image that Europeans have of themselves: leaving the game would further reinforce the image of an 'old Europe' that is out of the race.

Finally, we have shown that, thanks to Europe's achievements in this area and the companies developing new capabilities, staying in this adventure does not require a major financial effort: for manned flight, for example, going from the current 300 million euros (5 % of European space spending) to 500 would already offer very interesting margins for acquiring autonomous capabilities by 2035.