WAR IN UKRAINE: LESSONS LEARNED ONE YEAR ON

Published on :

20 February 2023
"War in Ukraine: one year on, what lessons can be learned? This was the title of the conference organised on 16 February at the École Militaire by several organisations, including the IHEDN and the IRSEM. Opened by Lieutenant General Benoît Durieux, Director of the IHEDN and Higher Military Education, and closed by Army General Thierry Burkhard, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, it brought together specialists from a wide range of civilian and military disciplines, researchers, doctors and officers from the three services, who shared their analyses of the lessons to be learned from the conflict.
IHEDN | Le GCA Durieux : “Il faut réfléchir à la guerre en Ukraine, pour éviter d’être surpris par une nouvelle bascule du monde”

DOCTOR ZIMA: "SINCE THIS CONFLICT, NATO'S ROLE HAS BEEN OVERVALUED".

Amélie Zima is a researcher at the Strategic Research Institute at the École Militaire, specialising in NATO and European security. Her talk analyses NATO "between re-legitimisation through enlargement and the failure of partnerships".

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is at the centre of the conflict, which pits two countries with partnership programmes with it against each other on its eastern flank, on the borders of several of its member states, and one of them, Russia, places it at the heart of a "false narrative".

Ukraine's membership of NATO is presented as one of the reasons why Russia invaded its neighbour. For Amélie Zima, this is "a completely erroneous idea. NATO never included Ukraine in its pre-accession programme. The Ukrainians thought they would be included in this pre-accession strategy in 2008, at the NATO Bucharest summit, but this was refused. It hasn't been on the table since". The Russian partnership, launched in 1997 to help "build a more stable, peaceful and undivided Europe", has been violated by Russia on three occasions, according to NATO (Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014 and in 2022).

Another Russian falsehood concerns NATO's alleged "promise" never to enlarge. "NATO never made that promise", the researcher points out. There were oral discussions in the 1990s, but oral discussions are not binding on an organisation.

As a defensive organisation for its member states, NATO cannot undertake armed intervention in a third country, such as Ukraine, without the approval of the UN Security Council. "This explains why NATO was unable to respond positively to requests from the Ukrainian government to set up a no-fly zone at the start of the conflict. If NATO were to do so without a mandate from the UN Security Council, it would become a party to the conflict."

"Since this conflict, NATO's role has been overvalued", especially in comparison with that of the European Union, which is generous with its funding. But the Alliance's legitimacy has been strengthened by the membership applications from two neutral countries, Sweden and Finland.

COLONEL BOURDELOUX: "THE TWO SPACE COALITIONS ARE NEUTRALISING EACH OTHER".

Air and space colonel Guillaume Bourdeloux, head of military space operations at Space Command, wonders to what extent Ukraine could be the first theatre in space. At least that's what some people are saying. think tanks US, pitting a Western coalition against Russia. The colonel notes a fundamental change in this conflict: our dependence on space, "an environment that remains largely unregulated" in all sectors, both civilian and military:

"We are now dependent on space, and this dependence will continue to grow. We were a little dependent before, but we are also dependent on space for military purposes, and we will be increasingly so. We are dependent on space for reasons of mobility, in relation to GPS for example, precision, synchronisation of effects and coordination, because we need to be able to communicate, and a lot of our communications go through space, for anticipation and intelligence purposes, because we need to be able to observe and understand what is happening in any given theatre. This goes hand in hand with the digitisation of weapons systems and the accentuation of connectivity on all fronts, and relies heavily on space."

For Colonel Bourdeloux, "there are two complete space coalitions in this war, in almost head-on opposition. In a way, they are neutralising each other. Given that all the belligerents are modern nations, and their dependence on space, no one has an interest in a major conflict that would have catastrophic consequences in space". Paraphrasing World War II US General Montgomery, who was talking about the air, he says: "If we lose the war in space, we will lose it, and we will lose it fast."

DOCTOR LIMONIER: "MANIPULATION OF INTERNET ARCHITECTURE FOR STRATEGIC ENDS

Dr Kévin Limonier, lecturer in Slavic studies and geopolitics at Paris VIII, specialist in Russian-speaking cyberspace and deputy director of Geodeexplains "how Russia is manipulating Internet routes" in order to extend its territorial control.

It's not just a question of classic cyber attacks, such as the destruction of infrastructure, but also wider cyber manoeuvres. Since 2014, with the annexation of Crimea, "Russia is the first country in the world that has thought of manipulating the architecture of the Internet for strategic and geopolitical purposes in a context of control and territorial occupation outside its borders", by disconnecting Crimea's autonomous systems from those of Ukraine, only to reconnect them with Russia.

It is therefore pursuing this strategy in Ukraine. Since February 2022 and the censorship of channels not aligned with the position of the Russian regime, these appropriations of the networks are beginning to have a concrete effect on the population: "If you are today in a territory occupied by the Russian army, you are in fact placed on the other side of the large digital border posts that the Russians are building to filter absolutely everything that enters and leaves their networks". But this digital battle is also a priority for Ukraine: when Kherson was liberated, engineers immediately came to re-route the Internet network to Kiev.

GENERAL GIVRE: "IT'S AN ALL-OUT WAR, NOT A TOTAL WAR".

Major General Pierre-Joseph Givre, Director of the Centre de doctrine et d'enseignement du commandement, analyses the breaks and continuities on the battlefield. In his view, this war seems to be a continuation of what has been observed since the beginning of the 21st century, with an amplification and an accumulation of new technologies, new capabilities and new modes of action.

In particular, he sees it as "an integral war, not a total war": "What is an integral war? It's the war of the M2MC, multi-milieu and multi-field, before the war actually breaks out, and when it breaks out in the sense of physical confrontation. The war in Ukraine began in Africa, with Wagner, with disinformation, and France was targeted in particular. It began with cyber attacks at a strategic level against European countries, against France, and with disinformation campaigns."

General Givre also highlights the innovative capacity of the Ukrainians, who "have understood the advantages of using civilian technologies and applications for military purposes". For example, "the Shazam of the drone", in reference to the consumer application that can recognise any music being played: "They put the application in front of the drone because Shahed drones make a lot of noise, it gives them the altitude, speed and distance, the information immediately passes to the effectors in the sector, and one of them will hit it. It's extremely intelligent."

GENERAL BRETON: "THE BATTLE FOR INFORMATION IS ABSOLUTELY DECISIVE".

Air Force Major General Vincent Breton, Director of the Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrines and Experiments, provides an overall strategic and operational analysis. Highlighting the return of high-intensity warfare in Europe, in seven fields and areas of conflict (land, sea, air, space, cyber, information and electromagnetic), he also notes the return of nuclear rhetoric.

He places particular emphasis on the field of information: "The information battle is absolutely decisive in this war, and Ukraine is very impressive in this respect and is teaching us a lesson. The Ukrainian communication strategy is absolutely remarkable and targets three very specific audiences.

Firstly, it targets the Ukrainian people and their soldiers to galvanise them and strengthen what are known as moral forces. Secondly, it targets Western public opinion to reinforce empathy and ensure massive support from the West, which is decisive. Finally, it targets the Russians, in particular to demobilise their soldiers. The Ukrainians are very good at making fun of Russian soldiers on social networks, to make them look like poor soldiers and so make them lose confidence.

As far as Russia's communications strategy is concerned, it is such a failure in the West that it is so outrageous, but that is probably not the point. On the other hand, Russia's strategy of influence is highly effective vis-à-vis the rest of the world. I would remind you that the leaders of more than 50 % of humanity support or refuse to condemn Russia. It is clear that the world is not allied under the West and does not think like us, and we must be fully aware of this."