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Since August 2025, Air Force Major General Vincent Breton has been in charge of École de guerre, which trains senior officers in the French armed forces and defence services, as well as foreign officers. Prior to this, he spent 3 years running the Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrines and Experiments (CICDE), a military think-tank reporting to the Armed Forces General Staff, after serving as General Officer for Military Foresight and Strategy on the same staff.
A graduate of the École de l'Air and a qualified transport pilot, General Breton has a total of 6,500 flying hours (on Airbus A310, A340 or C160 Transall aircraft), including 378 hours over hostile zones during 132 war missions. He was an auditor at the Centre des Hautes Études Militaires (CHEM) and the IHEDN in 2014-2015, as well as the Higher Command and Staff Course (HCSC) and the’Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze (ISSMI).
FOUR YEARS AFTER THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE, THE GENERAL PUBLIC IS AT A LOSS TO UNDERSTAND HOW THE CONFLICT HAS DEVELOPED. WHAT HAVE BEEN THE MAIN STAGES SO FAR, AND WHAT IS THE STATE OF PLAY TODAY?
Overall, there were four phases in this war of Russian aggression.
The first phase began on 20 February 2014, with the military occupation and then illegal annexation of Crimea. It continued in March 2014 with a destabilisation operation in the Donbass and the takeover of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions by Russian special forces and armed groups dressed in demarcated uniforms, but under Moscow's control.
Then, for 8 years, Russia carried out numerous hybrid attacks in Ukraine, often of high intensity (terrorism and sabotage), designed to undermine the cohesion of the population, discredit the government and encourage subversion. At the same time, low-intensity fighting is continuing in the Donbass. Moscow set up a virtual blockade of the ports on the Sea of Azov.
The second phase began on 24 February 2022 with the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. Once again violating its international commitments, Russia seized around 30% of the country. It believes that Ukraine will fall like a «ripe fruit». But the decision to launch this invasion was based on biased intelligence. Russia underestimated Ukraine's resistance and the transformation of its armies since 2014. Conversely, it has overestimated its influence in Ukraine and the effects of its long strategy of subversion.
In addition, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (FAFR) were ill-prepared and poorly commanded. They were surprised by the defence in depth of the Ukrainian armed forces (FAU), who saved Kiev and its region, halted Russian advances in the Kharkiv region and counter-attacked to retake most of this region in September 2022 and then Kherson on 11 November 2022. Russia now controls only 18% of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea.
The third phase (November 2022-September 2023) marked a stabilisation of the front. Russia retreated to a solidly defended, multi-layered defence line, the Surovikin Line, which transformed the conflict into a war of attrition and stifled the Ukrainian offensive that began in June 2023. However, Russian supremacy in the Black Sea was undermined by Ukrainian naval strikes and drones, which succeeded in transforming this area into a no-fly zone for Kiev.
«FOUR YEARS ON, RUSSIA'S RECORD IS CALAMITOUS».»
The fourth phase (September 2023 to the present day) is characterised by a laborious advance by the FAFR and a steady increase in Russian strikes in depth, using missiles and drones. low cost long-range missiles. Russia will gobble up around 5,000 km² of Ukrainian territory in 2024 and the same amount in 2025. In two years' time, this represents the surface area of just two French départements the size of Ariège.
Four years after the start of the large-scale offensive, the results are calamitous for Russia, which will probably never achieve the strategic objectives it had set itself by military means alone. It has failed to capitalise on its theoretical military superiority and will never be able to take over Ukraine, where it controls less than 20% of the territory, including Crimea.
This war was very costly in terms of human lives. A recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimates that, since February 2022, the FAFR has suffered around 1.2 million casualties (killed, wounded and missing). Based on verified public sources, Mediazona and the BBC have counted 177,433 names of Russian soldiers who died in Ukraine on 13 February 2026. They estimate the actual number of Russian deaths at around 219,000.
Moscow had also set itself the goal of moving NATO away from its borders. Here too, the Kremlin failed miserably, as Sweden and Finland - which had always insisted on maintaining their neutrality - joined NATO in 2023 and 2024, increasing the line of contact between Russia and NATO by 1,300 km.
AT THE OUTSET, SPECIALISTS PREDICTED A BLITZKRIEG. FOUR YEARS LATER, SOLDIERS ARE IN TRENCHES, REMINISCENT OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR. IS THIS CONFLICT «FROZEN»?
Indeed, even the most astute observers could not have imagined such a long war, which has already lasted longer than the First World War. The Russian offensive in eastern and south-eastern Ukraine is set to be one of the longest in military history.
On the other hand, the conflict is not frozen, as the deadly fighting continues and Ukrainian towns are constantly being shelled by Russian strikes in the Ukrainian depths.
In addition, the use of trenches has greatly diminished. The front line has given way to a grey area that roughly separates the FAFR and the FAU, a no man's land 20 km wide, in which it is very dangerous to operate, due to the omnipresence of observation drones, bomber drones and kamikaze drones. First Person View (FPV). Each of the belligerents consumes around 10,000 drones a day.
WITH THIS PERMANENT SURVEILLANCE (DRONES, SATELLITES), HAS STRATEGIC SURPRISE BECOME IMPOSSIBLE? HOW ARE THE TWO ARMIES ADAPTING THEIR DOCTRINE TO A CONFLICT WHERE, IN SHORT, ANYTHING THAT MOVES CAN BE DETECTED AND DESTROYED?
The battlefield has become almost totally transparent in the grey area I've just mentioned. It is very difficult to hide there because of the proliferation of intelligence sensors, starting with drones. ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance).
As a result, most troop movements and all concentrations of forces are detected. The solution lies in the discretion, mobility and dispersal of forces, as well as in the broad-spectrum targeting of the enemy's rear. In the grey zone that now surrounds the front line, movements take place at night, in small groups, often on motorbikes, and at this stage there are virtually no successful breakthroughs or associated exploitation. Supplies are delivered by drone bombers that have been reconfigured to drop food and ammunition. Command posts are hidden in basements in urban areas or are broken up into small teams in vehicles that are constantly on the move.
«BETWEEN 2022 AND 2025, RUSSIAN STRIKES INCREASED 12-FOLD».»
The battlefield was transparent at the tactical level, but less so at the strategic level, because it was sometimes difficult to perceive the adversary's intentions. In the weeks leading up to 24 February 2022, concentrations of Russian resources were visible on the Ukrainian borders. Some Western intelligence services were divided. Were these the beginnings of an attack or a show of force in support of the ongoing Russian-American negotiations? Or was it an attempt to create a diversion with a view to stepping up the attacks in the Donbass? Or are these military manoeuvres, as Russia claims, accusing those who warn that it is about to invade Ukraine of paranoia?
BOTH SIDES ARE NOW STRIKING FAR BEHIND THE FRONT LINE. IS TODAY'S WAR BEING FOUGHT IN FACTORIES AND FUEL DEPOTS RATHER THAN ON THE BATTLEFIELD?
We need to remember some of the main principles of the art of war. Firstly, war remains a confrontation of wills and moral forces.
There are many ways of influencing the adversary's will and, indeed, long-range strikes in the depths of the Ukrainian theatre are playing an increasing role in the war in Ukraine. On average, between 2022 and 2025, Russian strikes increased 12-fold, with regular peaks of over 700 strikes per day in 2025 and a record of 823 strikes on 7 September 2025. These strikes are carried out by missiles but above all, at more than 90%, by long-range drones which behave like cruise missiles. low cost. They are targeting arms factories, command centres, but above all, at the moment, the Ukrainian energy infrastructure to deprive the Ukrainian population of electricity and heating and thus break their spirit of resistance and lead them to capitulate.
Secondly, money remains the sinews of war. The Russian war effort is financed by oil and gas revenues, which contribute around a third of the federal budget. So Ukrainian long-range strikes, although far fewer in number than Russian strikes, very often target refineries and fuel depots in Russia. They also seek to affect arms factories and logistics warehouses. But Russia has a considerable advantage that protects it more from the threat of deep strikes: its territory extends over 11 time zones and is 28 times larger than that of Ukraine, which is nevertheless the largest European country.
RUSSIA SEEMS TO HAVE STABILISED ITS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, DESPITE THE SANCTIONS. COULD UKRAINE, WHICH IS DEPENDENT ON FOREIGN AID, MAINTAIN THE BALANCE OF POWER IF WESTERN STOCKS WERE TO FAIL?
Today, I think there is a certain military parity in the military resources committed by the two belligerents. Ukraine's strategic depth lies in the massive budgetary support from the Europeans. Western arms transfers are significant, but now almost half of the FAU's military equipment is produced in Ukraine. Ukraine is holding out thanks to the determination of its people, who are fully mobilised behind the FAU, but also thanks to its capacity to adapt and innovate in terms of techniques, tactics and procedures (TTPs).
Russia is not wavering either. Four years after the start of the large-scale invasion, sanctions and the state of its economy are putting a heavy strain on it, but not enough at this stage to dissuade it from continuing the fight at a high level of intensity. The military-industrial complex (MIC) is affected by sanctions, labour shortages, high inflation and, more recently, budget cuts. But the FAFR are still being supplied with the equipment they need to prolong the war of attrition, thanks in particular to indigenous production of drones, imports from North Korea (ammunition and explosive charges) and soon from Belarus, as well as support from China, which continues to buy Russian oil and supplies many dual-use goods that compensate for the lack of Western components.
However, in the long term, this war will have very serious economic consequences for Russia. Political power has tipped over into totalitarianism, which is detrimental to economic prosperity. The defence effort is considerable. It is estimated to account for 40% of the Russian Federation's budget, at the expense of other areas of public spending (education, health, infrastructure) and the economy in general (low levels of investment, research & development and innovation). The budget deficit may appear modest, but it is unprecedented for Russia, which cannot borrow on the international financial markets. This deficit can be financed, but at the cost of some of the highest real interest rates in the world.
If we combine the human losses suffered with the macro-economic consequences, this war is a catastrophe for Russia. Russia is in a situation of zugzwang All options (prolonging the war or not) are bad for the country. The end of the militarised economy would deprive national industry of vital outlets because civilian production is not competitive due to its Chinese or Western substitutes. But maintaining the priority given to the CMI exacerbates existing vulnerabilities and could also create social instability.
For Ukraine, the human and economic loss caused by the war is also dramatic, but tomorrow, once the fighting has stopped, it should still be able to count on the support of the Europeans and Americans.
SMALL DRONES COSTING 500 EUROS EACH CAN DESTROY TANKS COSTING MILLIONS. HAVE TANKS BECOME OBSOLETE?
This is a very difficult question to answer, because there is indeed some doubt. Today, in Ukraine, tanks, but more generally all vehicles, can no longer operate in the no man's land surrounding the front line. They are very vulnerable to the threat of drones.
But does this mean that tanks have become definitively obsolete? I don't think so. The war in Ukraine remains a static war for the moment, but in a war of movement tanks can still be indispensable. They are still very useful in asymmetrical conflicts, against opponents who are militarily inferior. In Gaza, for example, tanks and armoured vehicles were decisive in making progress in the urban battles.
AT THE BEGINNING OF 2026, HAS THE WESTERN AVIATION SUPPLIED TO KIEV BEEN ABLE TO CHALLENGE RUSSIAN AIR SUPERIORITY OR IS IT JUST ANOTHER DEFENCE TOOL?
Neither side has air superiority, otherwise this war would be over. The Western aircraft handed over to Ukraine are very useful for carrying out strikes on the edge of the front line or for intercepting long-range drones. They are much more efficient than the Soviet aircraft that Ukraine had before. But they are not a game changer. Their impact is limited by the lack of pilots and, above all, by the logistical difficulties involved in maintaining them and their ammunition.
HOW DO YOU ASSESS THE MORAL AND PHYSICAL WEAR AND TEAR OF THE COMBATANTS AFTER FOUR YEARS? DOES THE RUSSIAN DOCTRINE OF MASS MOBILISATION PREVAIL OVER THE UKRAINIAN MODEL?
On paper, the human balance of power is much more favourable to Russia than to Ukraine. But history teaches us that this is far from enough to determine the final winner.
There is a great deal of moral and physical wear and tear on both belligerents. But at this stage, this wear and tear does not affect their will to continue the war.
The Ukrainian fighters are exhausted and their moral strength is under great pressure, but they are holding out thanks to national cohesion and patriotic motivation, which are not weakening. The Ukrainian people are experiencing a serious humanitarian crisis as a result of the strikes on their energy infrastructure, but their will to resist, which is existential in nature, is intact. Ukraine's resilience is admirable.
Russia has a much larger pool of forces. Its population is 3.6 times greater than that of Ukraine, and it is far less affected by the war. But the Russian mobilisation model is also showing signs of running out of steam, as evidenced by the increasing use of African soldiers sent to the front against their will. Moscow is less and less able to replace the 30,000 or 40,000 wounded or killed soldiers it loses every month.
In a Russian population where fear is internalised and passivity encouraged, popular support for the war and for Russian combatants is tinged with mistrust and indifference. Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine are often perceived as delinquents and mercenaries attracted by high salaries, which are tending to decrease because of budgetary difficulties. But it is not the Russian people who will decide the outcome of the war; their will and their word have been taken away from them.
WHAT ARE THE MAIN LESSONS WESTERN ARMIES SHOULD LEARN FROM THIS WAR?
This is an issue that would deserve a lengthy essay, but in summary, I believe that this war highlights five underlying trends and reveals five fundamental needs.
Five key trends :
- The international security situation is deteriorating rapidly. We deplore the fact that brutality and violence are becoming uninhibited and that imperialist impulses are returning. The use of force is now seen as a legitimate means of imposing one's interests. The international order is crumbling and multilateralism is in crisis. So at the rate things are deteriorating, we have to prepare ourselves for the worst-case scenario, i.e. another Russian aggression, in three or four years' time, this time against a European country, thanks to a weakening of Western cohesion.
- The scope of conflict is widening all the time. The war in Ukraine highlights the renewed importance of information and electromagnetic fields, but without calling into question the central role of land, sea, air and cyber environments. Tomorrow, the exo-atmospheric environment will play an increasingly important role.
- The battlefield is increasingly transparent, dissipating some of the fog of war. We have discussed this at length in previous questions.
- Technology is levelling out. High-performance weapons can be manufactured using readily available, mass-market technologies. Defence innovation is increasingly coming from the civilian world, particularly in the digital field. In the war in Ukraine, the best example is drones.
- The saturation of the battlespace with all types of weaponry is a direct consequence of the previous trend, which enabled the mass production of inexpensive equipment. This has led to a boom in denial-of-access strategies, notably electromagnetic jamming, minefields, airborne or naval drones and ground-air defence.
These five trends reveal five needs:
- Moral forces and national cohesion: moral forces are the source of values such as courage, daring and initiative. They are the fruit of the hardening, training and confidence of soldiers in the cause they serve. The strength of moral forces is also directly linked to the cohesion, mobilisation and resilience of the nation, which stands united behind its combatants. In a high-intensity conflict, it is impossible to win without a united nation.
- The quality of command enables us to take the initiative and orchestrate the effects in the seven areas of conflict that I have described. Artificial intelligence will revolutionise the chain of command, i.e. the nervous system of operations.
- In a high-intensity conflict, mass and technology are essential for imposing a balance of power and saturating the adversary. To reconstitute mass, we need to get away from the fatality that has condemned us for decades to having very expensive and therefore sample-based capabilities. This does not mean that we have to give up on capabilities high tech, These are by their very nature costly, but we need to make more room for low-cost capacity. The low tech and the high tech. This is known as hilo mix.
- Strategic depth is essential if we are to last in a long war. Our strategic depth means controlling our dependencies. It lies in European strategic solidarity, via the EU and NATO, in the knowledge that there is growing doubt about the reliability of the United States. For us in the military, this means strengthening interoperability with our allies, reinforcing our weapons stocks which, if needed, must be replenished very quickly thanks to manufacturers capable of increasing their production rates very, very quickly and over the long term.
- The ability to innovate and adapt is also a key factor in long wars. In Ukraine, the adaptation loop between sword and shield is very rapid, particularly in the field of drones and electromagnetic warfare. One is constantly adapting to the other. It generally only takes 2 months for one of the belligerents to deploy a response to an innovation by its opponent. Innovation concerns tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). In terms of equipment, the innovation lies mainly in the ability to adapt existing, mass-market technologies to mass-produce inexpensive equipment, such as drones or communications systems based on the 4G mobile phone network or civilian satellite constellations like Starlink.
