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Summary
- This fact sheet looks at Poland's recent history, in particular the stages involved in establishing a democratic regime after 70 years as part of the socialist bloc that emerged from the Second World War. It also looks at the country's integration into specific geopolitical communities through various forms of multilateral cooperation, such as the Visegrad Group, the Weimar Triangle and, more recently, the Lublin Triangle.
- The analysis focuses on how Poland has accelerated the modernisation of its army since the first Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and especially since 2022, with implications for the rest of the European continent.
- Finally, the outlook raises the question of Poland's role in European industrial cooperation.
Context - A country at the heart of Europe, a member of various multilateral cooperation forums
The borders of present-day Poland were established at the end of the Second World War: following the Potsdam Conference (1945), all the German territories to the east of the Oder-Neisse line were attached to Poland, while the USSR acquired the former eastern part of the country, populated mainly by Belarusians and Ukrainians. The new Poland therefore moved westwards. Located within Moscow's sphere of influence, the Polish People's Republic was proclaimed in 1952. Its constitution was inspired by the Soviet model, and it was governed by a single party that had to deal with tensions throughout its history. Despite some liberalisation of the regime between 1956 and 1970, protests continued to grow, especially as the many economic and social difficulties facing the country encouraged the emergence of a more structured opposition. In 1980, the Solidarnosc trade union was officially formed under the leadership of Lech Walesa, and became a major opposition force. To break this momentum, General Wojciech Jaruzelski's government declared martial law in December 1981, cracking down on strikes and arresting opposition leaders. The state of siege was lifted in July 1983, but the country's economic situation remained worrying, with no let-up in protests. In 1989, negotiations finally took place between the government and the opposition and elections were held, bringing victory to Solidarnosc. In 1990, Lech Walesa was elected President of the Republic by universal suffrage, marking the end of the Communist regime. This new Polish freedom was part of a movement that swept away the governments loyal to Moscow between 1989 and 1991.
On the one hand, Poland is a major player among the countries of Central Europe. In February 1991, the Visegrad group, also known as the V4, was founded by Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (from 1993, the Czech Republic and Slovakia). The aim was to facilitate cooperation between these states, and then to encourage their integration into the European Union and NATO. Following the accession of the four states to the European Union in May 2004, the group developed a more or less common foreign policy and focused on specific objectives, such as strengthening a Central European identity within the EU.
Poland was also becoming an important geopolitical player for the countries of Western Europe. In August 1991, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher created the Weimar Triangle. This time it was a trilateral cooperation forum between France, Germany and Poland. Its aim was to involve France in German-Polish reconciliation, to strengthen dialogue and political cooperation between the three countries and also to support Poland's integration into NATO and the EU. Poland joined NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004. The Weimar Triangle thus evolved into a forum for consultation between the three countries, prior to European negotiations.
These two formats are complemented by more recent ones: The Three Seas Initiative was launched in 2016. This is a forum made up of thirteen Central and Eastern European countries that are members of the European Union. Led largely by Poland, the initiative focuses mainly on energy, transport and digital technologies. In 2020, the Lublin triangle, which brings together Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine, will be added to the various multilateral cooperation forums. One of the explicit aims of the Lublin Triangle is to bring Ukraine closer to the Three Seas Initiative, and more broadly to put in place a trilateral response to common challenges. These formats include Ukraine as a full player in a forum bringing together members of the EU and NATO.
As for the real impact of these different formats, the Visegrad group gained visibility within the European Union between 2015 and 2013 when the ultraconservative Law and Justice party (PiS) came to power. Its leaders placed particular emphasis on defending Polish national interests within the EU and criticised what they perceived as Franco-German domination of European affairs. Visegrad defends the sovereignty of Member States within the EU, a liberal vision of the single European market, the repatriation of certain competences to the national level and opposes European federalism. Its members are also opposed to the policy of distributing refugees by quota within the EU in 2015.
Since the re-election of Donald Tusk of the centre-right Civic Platform (PO) party in 2023, the Weimar Triangle has regained importance. In particular, the leaders of France, Germany and Poland have sought to use this format to coordinate their support for Ukraine.
Analysis - Pivot, the fulcrum and soon the bulwark of Europe?
Today, Poland plays a central role within the European Union for a number of reasons. Firstly, since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the European Union's centre of gravity has gradually shifted eastwards. Poland is strategically located on the Baltic Sea, surrounded by Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad.
On the other hand, Donald Tusk's resolutely pro-European stance and his party's membership of the largest political group in the European Parliament, the European People's Party (EPP), have enabled Poland to play a major role in the European elections of 2024. His close adviser, Piotr Serafin, has been appointed Commissioner for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration.[1]. An important portfolio given the discussions on the potential joint financing of the European defence effort. Added to this is the fact that Poland took over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union on 1 January.er January 2025. Its slogan «Security, Europe» clearly reflects the priorities of the Tusk government in a fragile international political context.
Poland wants to make an impact and has been asserting itself as a new military power since 2014, seeking to strengthen and increase its military capabilities. In particular, it is launching a plan to modernise the Polish army, with 14 billion euros of investment planned.[2]. In 2022, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it plans to increase the defence budget to at least 3% of GDP from 2023 and aims to double the number of military personnel to 300,000 by 2035. Poland currently spends 4.7% of its GDP on defence, and aims to build Europe's leading land army. To achieve this, the various political forces, otherwise highly polarised, have managed to reach agreement via the law on the Defence of the Nation, which forms the basis for rearmament. Poland currently has 200,000 military personnel, including 130,000 professionals as well as reservists and volunteers in the territorial forces.[3]. They also have more tanks and artillery than other European countries.[4]. We are in a transitional phase; some of the equipment is old, dating from the Soviet period, and some of it - particularly the tanks - has been handed over to the Ukrainians. For this reason, the country is investing heavily in the expansion and modernisation of its army. If the equipment acquisition targets are met, Poland should become Europe's leading army by 2035.[5]. By this date, Poland wants to have a defence capable of combating the Russian threat.
Indeed, the latter is the priority of Polish defence policy and has given rise to major strategic choices in recent years. Before the war in Ukraine, the Poles relied on an elastic defence to retreat and recapture lost territory with the help of NATO allies in the event of a Russian attack. But this approach was abandoned following the massacres committed by the Russians at Boutcha, on the outskirts of Kyiv. In practical terms, this involves reinforcing the existing defence infrastructures on the borders with Russia and Belarus.[6]. These borders are largely wild, bordered by thick forests, swamps and hundreds of lakes. They do, however, have vulnerable points, such as the Suwalki corridor in the north-east, or the «Brest Gate», named after the town in Belarus, a strip of land 80 kilometres wide that has been used many times in history for east-west troop movements. Warsaw is only 160 kilometres from this area. The government therefore undertook the (re)construction of a firm and fixed line of defence, known as the «Eastern Shield». Decided at the end of 2024, this line of defence will include walls, mines, ditches and bunkers to prevent Russian forces from penetrating Poland. Heavy, light and technological, these defences stretch over 700 kilometres and should be operational in 2028. They have forward defence capabilities, including very powerful long-range artillery to deal with threats in depth, up to a distance of 150 to 300 kilometres. This large-scale border is seen as a bulwark designed to protect the whole of Europe, not just Poland. It is also designed to in fine, In January 2024, the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians announced that they would integrate the «Baltic Defence Line», a network of fortified positions including bunkers and «anti-mobility defensive installations».
The main aim of these lines of defence is to deter Russia. But Poland's position as a «European bulwark» also makes it a key player in the defence of Europe, giving it influence in debates and the ability to demand that regional issues - and in particular the future of Ukraine - are not debated without it, as was the case for Minsk 2 in 2015.
Perspectives - A pragmatic arms policy?
For historical reasons, Polish defence policy has until now been characterised by a strong transatlantic bias. This was characterised by the massive purchase of American equipment, in particular the F35. For pragmatic reasons, such as speed of delivery, flexibility and attractive cost, Poland has also begun to diversify its arms sources since the war in Ukraine. For example, out of 1,600 units of land equipment, it has 1,000 South Korean K2 tanks and 366 American Abrams tanks. In addition, the contracts signed with South Korea in July 2022 include technology transfers and cooperation that could ultimately make the Polish defence industry more autonomous and even put it in competition with its Western European counterparts.[7].
[1] See also: Celia Burgdorff, «A geopolitical Europe at last? What can we learn from the first von der Leyen Commission? IHEDN, Note d'analyse 6.
[2] Martin Laï, «Poland, the eastern pillar of Europe's defence: continuities and opportunities», Thomas More Institute, March 2024
[3] Clément Daniez, «Guerre en Ukraine : ‘En 2035, les Polonais auront la première armée, et de loin’», L'Express, 5.02.2025
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Jakub Iwaniuk, «Poland's plan to become Europe's ‘eastern shield’», Le Monde, 2.01.2025
[7] Frédéric Zalewski, «Poland's massive rearmament: causes, consequences and controversies», The Conversation, 6.10.2022
To find out more
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