Raymond Aron, «Politics and Strategy», 4 November 1952
French National Archives, reference number 20100024/16
Philosopher, journalist, political scientist, sociologist, historian… The liberal thinker Raymond Aron (1905–1983) exerted a considerable influence in his fields of study, particularly in the areas of international relations and strategy – we owe him, for example, Reflections on War, Clausewitz (Gallimard, 1976).
Between 1952 and 1976, he gave four lectures to students at the IHEDN, whilst teaching successively at Sciences Po, the University of Paris, the École pratique des hautes études and then the Collège de France, all the while contributing editorials to the Figaro.
His first talk therefore focuses on the relationship between politics and strategy. He bases his argument on examples drawn from the recent history of the two world wars, but also from earlier periods, including the Romans, the Persians and, in particular, the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC):
«The Peloponnesian War remains the finest war story in the world because it offers, in a striking distillation and within a limited geographical scope, all the problems we are trying to unravel on a global scale, so that everything is more human, more intelligible, more perfect in the Peloponnesian War. One element of this perfection is the passage of time, which makes us forget the horrors.»
In his view, «constantly intervening in the conduct of military operations for political reasons is a mistake that Clausewitz condemned long ago. Ignoring the primacy of politics over strategy is another mistake».
He cites two counter-examples from the Second World War: US President Roosevelt, a civilian who «saw only military victory and nothing beyond», and German Chancellor Hitler, another civilian (since he had never risen above the rank of corporal), «convinced of the primacy of politics over strategy ».
Aron analyses the relationship between politics and strategy amongst the various belligerents in the two world wars, before turning his attention to the dynamics of alliances, which he classifies into two categories: temporary allies and lasting allies.
Speaking off the cuff, he comments on the context of the early days of the Cold War, with two political systems «in total rivalry», «in contact across virtually the entire globe», each with «a dominant power whose margin of superiority is immense»: the United States and the USSR.
After citing numerous real-life examples illustrating different types of warfare and strategy (the Balkans, Serbia in 1914, the remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 1936, German strategy in 1914–18 and 1939–45, etc.), he turns his attention to alliances: he urges «every country within an alliance» to retain «the greatest possible scope to act in accordance with its own interests within the coalition».
Hence the «most difficult problem», that of the «European army»:
«Is it possible for France to be part of a continental coalition with countries that have no obligations outside the continent? I am not offering an answer.»
According to Raymond Aron, «one must be aware of the limits of French power, but guard against both defeatism and vanity: these are the two dangers».
General André Beaufre, «General Strategy», 15 November 1965
French National Archives, reference number 20100024/52
General André Beaufre (1902–1975) was one of the most influential French strategists of the 20the century. Drawing on his experience in the theatres of operations during the Second World War and the Indochina War, he developed the concept of the «strategy of deterrence» and the indirect approach.
His major work, Introduction to strategy (1963, reprinted by Fayard/Pluriel, 2012), theorises the dialectic of wills in a nuclear world, establishing him as a key figure in Western strategic thought. He has had a lasting influence on modern military thought by emphasising the interdependence between political issues and the conduct of operations.
General Beaufre spoke no fewer than 12 times to IHEDN students between 1952 and 1969. Most of these speeches, which focused on nuclear deterrence, are classified as secret.
On 15 November 1965, he spoke in his capacity as director of the French Institute for Strategic Studies, which he had founded following his retirement from the military. He elaborated on his concept of «total strategy», which he contrasted with «the old definition of military strategy», which was «the art of employing military forces to achieve the objectives set by politics»:
«The broader definition of «total strategy» will therefore be: the art of employing strength to achieve the objectives set by the high politics. "
A look back at the development of French military thought in the early 20the In the 19th century, he notes that it was shaped «under the influence of Clausewitz’s exegetes – chiefly German ones»: «War was conceived solely in a frenzied, paroxysmal form, in which the outcome could only result from a bloody military victory.»
Meanwhile, Beaufre recounts, at the École de Guerre, «an elderly colonel» argued the opposite: «It was the power of arms—and therefore of fire—that we had to take as our starting point, in order to devise a sound tactical approach whose possibilities would dictate everything else.»
Placed in the reserve as a brigadier-general, this officer was called up in 1914 and went on to become General-in-Chief, then Marshal of France: Philippe Pétain. He subsequently reshaped military thinking in line with his convictions, «striking the word »strategy« from the vocabulary»: equipment and tactics took precedence over concepts and strategy. «A swing of the pendulum that went too far» on the part of ‘our elders of 1918’, as General Beaufre goes on to say:
«By focusing solely on tactics and resources, they had devised a dead-end doctrine of defensive warfare, underpinned by a total national effort. The tragedy of 1940 was a direct consequence of this.»
Furthermore, the «massive mobilisation of the state that was Hitlerism» stood in contrast to a French conception of national defence that was, at the time, lacking in «guiding principles». It was not until after the Second World War that national defence regained its guiding principles, and that strategy returned to the forefront. His lecture concludes with «the enormous innovation of the nuclear weapon», thanks to which «strategy, previously misunderstood and forgotten, was to enjoy a resurgence of interest».
The next instalment in our series «The Pen and the Shield» will be published next week: «French society».
The IHEDN would like to thank the Archives Unit within the Prime Minister’s Office for facilitating access to these speeches.
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