Open data: when tracking sites reveal strategic moves

Published on :

22 September 2025
In recent years, flight tracking, navigation and even running applications have enabled the general public to keep track of important diplomatic or military movements. Governments are now taking this into account.
Open data : quand les sites de « tracking » dévoilent des mouvements stratégiques - Lundis de l'IHEDN
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When it comes to tracking, there is no need for hacking: pirating data is not necessary to track the movements of an official aircraft, a military ship or even a head of state, thanks to public data compiled on legal and often free applications. Until recently, governments didn't really appreciate this reality, which has made it possible to document, for example, an American diplomatic visit to Taiwan, European military support for Ukraine, or Vladimir Putin's use of a palace on the Black Sea.

To observe the skies, applications such as Flightradar24, Globe ADS-B Exchange or OpenSky Network rely on the signals emitted by aircraft communication systems (Automatic Dependent Surveillance-BroadcastADS-B). Just after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, open source intelligence analysts (open source intelligence, OSINT) used these sites to track Ilyushin II-76s (Russian military transport aircraft). By analysing their itineraries, thanks to the intermittent activation of their ADS-B beacons for airspace security reasons, they were able to determine that they were transporting equipment or troops to the front. This confirmed the direction of the Russian offensive.

In the other camp, the general public was able to follow military flights, mainly those of the United States and NATO, in particular the regular passage of spy planes or drones (Global Hawk, RC-135 Rivet Joint, E-8C, ARTEMIS) over Ukrainian territory or its approaches, sometimes just before Russian ground or air offensives. For example, on 15 August 2023, the route of a Global Hawk was followed live on public websites as it carried out a surveillance mission over the Black Sea, approaching the Crimean peninsula.

NANCY PELOSI'S FLIGHT TO TAIWAN FOLLOWED BY MILLIONS OF PEOPLE

In 2022, an official US flight became one of the most followed on the FlightRadar24 website: then Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi flew to Taiwan, bypassing the South China Sea to avoid hostile airspace. This sensitive diplomatic trip became a public spectacle for millions of people.

Lou Osborn, an analyst and member of the NGO Investigations with Impact (INPACT) and an auditor at the IHEDN national session in 2024-25, points out, however, that "most of the time, you can't see the military or official aircraft, which only connect their signal at certain times". The specialist, who is also involved in the organisation All Eyes On Wagner, which monitors this private military company linked to Russia, can nevertheless give numerous examples, particularly in Africa, especially when states use commercial flights:

"At the end of 2021, everyone started to take an interest in what was happening in Mali because of the numerous rotations of Russian-affiliated aircraft. Similarly, in Libya, we were able to locate Russian-occupied military bases because of the rotation of commercial aircraft departing from Russian military bases in Syria. We have also spotted an official Russian state aircraft, chartered by the Ministry of Urgent Affairs, delivering mercenaries and weapons in 2023 and 2024, after the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the emblematic boss of Wagner".

The principle is the same for tracking ship movements, this time using the AIS system (Automatic Identification System) and websites such as MarineTraffic and VesselFinder. In the Black Sea, following Russia's withdrawal from the grain agreement in July 2023, analysts have been able to document the increase in Russian naval patrols and confirm the maritime blockade of Ukraine. In the Kerch Strait, which separates this sea from the Sea of Azov, amateur analysts were able to observe the accumulation of Russian and Ukrainian military vessels long before any incidents were officially reported there.

A RUSSIAN CARGO SHIP UNDER SANCTIONS HAS JUST VISITED ALGERIA

In the South China Sea, clashes between the Chinese and Philippine coastguards have been documented by analysing the movements of support and supply vessels, as well as patrols, in disputed areas. In the Mediterranean, "at the beginning of September, the Russian cargo ship Adler, under international sanctions, was spotted in Algeria", says Lou Osborn.

More surprisingly, OSINT analysts also rely on applications used by individuals. At the end of 2024, Le Monde revealed in an investigation that it had been able to document the movements of four important heads of state - the Americans Joe Biden and Donald Trump, the Frenchman Emmanuel Macron and the Russian Vladimir Putin - thanks to the Strava running app used by their bodyguards.

"Strava is an old technique used by OSINT communities," explains Lou Osborn: "Most of the time, people lock their accounts incorrectly. If you search by location, you can find out which race routes are out there, where you can access unprotected accounts." The general public learned that President Putin's bodyguards spent long periods (and jogged) around a gigantic palace on the shores of the Black Sea, which Russia has always denied belongs to the head of state.

Because of the recklessness of soldiers, Strava also allowed "osinteurs" to find out the location of a United Arab Emirates military base in Eritrea. And in the United States, the investigative website Bellingcat was able to identify CIA agents because they logged beers on a dedicated app inside a spy base...

"For a long time, the military never imagined that they could be targeted off duty, including in their private lives, and the various Strava cases show that the authorities were not aware of this," comments Lou Osborn. "Today, the reality is different, and governments are taking into account the fact that targeting can be very broad."

This is forcing the OSINT community to adapt:

 "Nowadays, aircraft switch off their transponders. So we work more on the basis of human error. Where we used to be able to get the complete route of an aircraft, today we work with programmes that make route projections, and we are increasingly cross-checking with satellite images".

To find out more, click here:

"Bargains and limits of OSINT, the new sinews of waran IHEDN conference in June 2023