Mobilisation, putting a historical concept into perspective
Mobilisation is first and foremost a lived experience, the images of which have spanned the last century, with the two world wars. In 1914, France was able to mobilise its male population because it had a tool at its disposal - universal conscription - which could be deployed throughout the country, using tried and tested mechanisms. The famous posters that were put up had been ready since 1904! However, this mobilisation was less enthusiastic than is generally thought, which raises the question of how to mobilise people over the long term.
This link between public support and the mobilisation process is echoed in certain dictatorships, where a strong bond between the army, the state and society is cultivated. Nazi Germany is an example of a regime that played on reflexes already present under the imperial regime, developing a cult of power and a community of combat (Kampfgemeinschaft). While the war largely ended in defeat, Hitler's regime managed to mobilise more and more people, particularly when the fighting was taking place on home soil. The direct threat served as a spur to arm the people as part of the VolksturmAn extraordinary gathering of men aged between 18 and 60, in a fight that had become desperate.
In the aftermath of the Algerian War, France experienced a threefold distancing: firstly, from an armed conflict in metropolitan France; secondly, from the practical experience of conscription since its suspension; and thirdly, from the different ways in which young people were mobilised. How and why should a form of national service be maintained at a time when we have nuclear deterrence, and when young people and society are changing rapidly? The examples of the 1970s, with the soldiers' committees, can be read less as anti-militarism than as opposition to forms of imposition of authority that no longer correspond to the demands of better trained and educated conscripts.
The case of Ukraine today
The Ukrainian mobilisation, both dazzling and massive, is rooted in the widely shared conviction that this is a "just war", fought for the very survival of the nation in the face of Russian aggression. Heir to the Soviet conscription system, Ukraine abolished military service in 2013 before reintroducing it in 2014 - with shortcomings in recruitment, persistent corrupt practices and mistrust of the armed forces in Ukrainian society. Above all, a large number of citizens' initiatives, both individual and associative, have been set up to complement the action of the state. This logic bottom-upThe first shock of the invasion in February 2022 was absorbed by a highly decentralised system. But as the conflict spread, the issue became one of lowering the age of mobilisation and the question of demobilisation, even temporary, for soldiers.
Although this issue is open to debate, the principle of mobilising everyone according to their skills is widely supported, due to the conviction that they must resist the aggressor. Nevertheless, the Ukrainians have realised that they need to reform their army and reflect on their long-term strategy. One solution is to play on the two coexisting mobilisation systems: a centralised institutional model and a voluntary system. Where conscripts ultimately have less choice over their postings, volunteers can be employed directly by units recognised for their efficiency and high survival rate. This creates a competitive dynamic, especially as the strongest brigades have more resources at their disposal. The aim of this communication strategy is to avoid forced conscription; voluntary recruitment means that soldiers with the qualities and skills required for a given post are better employed. This also reduces the risk of desertion. In November 2024, a reform simplified the procedures for changing brigade by offering the possibility of changing posts and assignments to other sectors and other units.
Finally, Ukraine is taking advantage of technological innovations to encourage this 2.0 mobilisation. The example of Lobby X Â offers an innovative approach to online recruitment, with an employment platform and recruitment agency integrated into all Ukrainian government websites. This initiative also extends to supporting veterans in their professional retraining.
Taking the measure of new challenges
In European societies anaesthetised by a period of peace, it is first and foremost a question of repairing the armies and, above all, of initiating a genuine revival of power. There is a triple dimension: military, of course, but also economic - with the problem of the war economy - and the renewal of the moral forces of the nation as a whole - which implies carefully assessing the degree of acceptability of the measures required.
As far as the military dimension is concerned, as the Chief of the Defence Staff has often said, we need to "win the war before the war", which calls for a threefold mobilisation. The first is mental, by anticipating our needs, defining our army models as well as possible, and planning for major threats. NATO is one of the key players in this preparation, working with the nations. Secondly, physical mobilisation: for the French armed forces, this means demonstrating our proven ability to operate with our allies and partners, and to be deployed rapidly. Finally, this mobilisation must also be multilateral, especially at a time when American posture and support are being called into question; the time seems ripe for a genuine European pillar within the Alliance, with the necessary efforts to overcome the disparity of visions and the unequal distribution of forces between States.
The industrial dimension is no less important. The concept of a war economy is ambiguous in many respects, even if it has the advantage of uniting defence industries around a common dynamic. The main stumbling block for industry remains the lack of a clear hierarchy of our priorities and resources. Although the 2019-2025 military programming law has been respected, it has not allowed us to go beyond the strict format envisaged. Only by stepping up investment, logistics and productivity will we be able to reverse the trend. Priorities include a number of resources: human resources first, with a focus on young people. Secondly, financial resources, with the debt threatening our sovereignty. Finally, energy, digital and artificial intelligence resources also require sustained attention.
The final challenge is a moral awakening. Public opinion, particularly at European level, is experiencing this return to war in different ways. The proximity and nature of the threat vary depending on whether you are in Riga or Lisbon. Although the European Union has recently taken on this dimension, it is coming on the heels of decades in which the issue of defence was either absent or very much downplayed. However, we can point to major efforts and an acceleration, reflected in the many programmes launched to provide practical support to Ukraine in its fight, such as ASAP - the programme designed to deliver more munitions.
The revival of mobilisation in France
These upheavals are also experienced in France, and are reflected in forms that are more a matter of commitment than mobilisation; the best example is the success of the military reserve and the National Guard. The best example of this is the success of the military reserves and the National Guard. This structure is understood as a capacity to federate forces to complement the internal security forces and the armed forces. The idea is not to raise reservists en masse, but to raise specialist skills to meet the operational needs of the armed forces, while at the same time responding to the desire of volunteers to serve. The principle is based on a partnership policy between the armed forces, certain companies and their reservists. These reservists, who are twice citizens, provide the armed forces with their sometimes very specific know-how, and give their civilian employers a "mature strength" in their ability to solve problems that companies sometimes face.
However, the debate should not be considered closed. The return of conflict in Europe does not simply mean that the traditional foundations of conscription can be re-established. Since the 1960s, and especially the 1970s, armies have been broadly defined as a "public crisis response service" or, in the 1980s, as a youth service divorced from its military purpose. The succession of external interventions in the 1990s and 2000s have clarified matters, and the younger generations now have a clearer perception of what the army is. The army enjoys genuine popularity, which is also due to its neutrality and the fact that it is seen as the life insurance policy of the entire nation.
Strengthening the link between the army and the nation is therefore always a necessary undertaking. This has led us to revisit the stages of the citizenship programme, which begins with the census at 16 and accompanies young French people until they are 25 years old.e The reform of the "Defence and Citizenship Day" is part of the drive to strengthen the link between young people and the armed forces, by radically modernising the content of this day. It is a response to the main challenge facing the armed forces in 2035, with the risk of demographic "hollow classes" that will weaken a recruitment system that is already under pressure, making it necessary to re-evaluate recruitment resources.
Conclusion: A new vision
This symposium demonstrates the extent to which the concept of mobilisation is still relevant today. Mobilisation is a dynamic; it works differently depending on whether we are in a scenario of aggression against national territory or in another scenario. In peacetime, it involves preparation, planning and anticipation in order to respond to what might happen. It calls for a form of upstream commitment, whether sectoral or individual, personal or professional. But it only really comes into its own when the crisis hits.
