Eric Frécon, a French researcher with a doctorate in political science, is based in Singapore, on the shores of the Strait of Malacca, where piracy has been much talked about. He teaches at Command and Staff College of Brunei and Singapore University of Social SciencesA research associate at IRASEC (Institut de recherche sur l'Asie du Sud-Est contemporaine), IRSEM (Institut de recherche stratégique de l'Ecole militaire) and the Ecole navale, where he also taught from 2012 to 2018, he previously coordinated the Ministry of Defence's Southeast Asia Observatory (DGRIS-Asia Centre, 2012-2019).
Author of Among the pirates of Indonesia (Fayard, 2011), he takes stock of the current state of piracy, a phenomenon that various players are combating as part of the fourth circle of the national defence perimeterinternational security. His comments are not binding on the organisations he works with.
PIRACY WAS A MAJOR PHENOMENON IN THE 2000S AND EARLY 2010S. WHAT IS THE SITUATION TODAY?
If you read the official statistics, in particular those of the International Maritime Bureau[1]The phenomenon has completely disappeared in the Somali Basin (the last two incidents date from 2018, in addition to two others in 2018 and 2021 in the neighbouring Gulf of Aden). But would the phenomenon resume immediately if the international community's efforts ceased? Several initiatives are currently involved in this area:
- of the European Union, through the missions Atalanta (launched in 2008) and more recently EUTM Somalia (Training Mission) and EU CAP Somalia (Capacity Building Mission),
- and the CTF (Combined Task Force) 151, created in 2009,
- from a wide range of countries, grouped together for the Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) Conferences.
In the Gulf of Guinea, incidents have never really ceased - except for a sharp drop in Nigeria in 2021-2022, which tends to be confirmed (one case reported in the first half of 2023). That said, the risk is only shifting to other countries: Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Sierra Leone, etc. As in Somalia, the incidents involve hostage-taking (29 in 2022), but for shorter periods. Buildings linked to oil operations in the Gulf are the main targets.
In Latin America, ports may have been the target of theft, and some cases have been linked to drug trafficking. Peru has the highest number of cases in this region (12).
But the most worrying area has once again become South-East Asia, after the golden age of ghost ships (boarded, hijacked, unloaded, disguised and renamed - like the Karaboudjan of Captain Haddock) at the turn of the year 2000. More specifically, it is in the southern part of the Strait of Malacca, at the foot of the fortress of Singapore, that pirates (in international waters and exclusive economic zones) and sea bandits (in territorial waters) operate.[2]. There were 38 reported attacks (out of 115 worldwide) in 2022, and already 20 for the first half of 2023. So the curves are crossing: down worldwide (201 cases in 2018) but up in the Singapore Strait (3 in 2018).
Fortunately, in 2022, no sailors were killed or injured, although this in no way conceals the 41 hostage-takings (compared with 8 in 2021... and 141 in 2018) and the physical or psychological violence that crews may endure during attacks.
HOW CAN THIS PHENOMENON AFFECT THE STABILITY OF STATES?
In Somalia, the state was clearly out of its depth. The pirates took advantage of its failure and made matters worse. The hypothesis would be almost the opposite: "quasi-" or "proto-" states have been able to finance and build themselves on piracy in the Horn of Africa.
In South-East Asia, islands have fallen under the yoke of local potentates who engage in piracy or maritime banditry. In Indonesia, we saw criminals living without worrying about the authorities. The local chiefs admitted to buying social peace in this way: no injuries, no deaths in the merchant navy, reimbursement of flights by the insurance companies and enough to eat from the bandits: the scheme worked... as long as terrorists didn't demand the services of the local gangs. If they did, the village chief would immediately call Jakarta. So, seemingly, the situation remained under control.
More generally, two researchers have argued in their book that piracy requires a minimum of infrastructure (and therefore a state presence) in order to thrive[3].
Above all, in the longer term, Marie-Claude Smouts' proposal on terrorism - taken up by Samy Cohen in the State resistance - remains attractive in the case of pirates: "It is a singular paradox that terrorist [or pirate] practices emanating from non-state actors have not marked the victory of transnationalism over the state. On the contrary, recourse to public power appears to be the only bulwark against the diffuse threat. The State is challenged, but it emerges strengthened".[4].
If we take this line of reasoning a step further, it is true that piracy can even be used as an instrument or, let's say, as a useful pretext for multilateral partnerships or exercises.
WHAT IS THE SITUATION IN THE STRAIT OF MALACCA, YOUR MAIN AREA OF OPERATIONS?
Today, if we were to zoom in on the Strait of Malacca, the States are not threatened. As early as 2004, under pressure from possible interference from Washington (which was thinking of the - false - pretext of pirate-terrorist collusion to position itself in a strategic zone for Beijing), the countries bordering the Strait organised themselves to (try to) cooperate better.
And we have to deal with Singapore - the biggest military budget in South-East Asia - and Indonesia - where the presidential project since 2014 has focused on reviving the archipelago's maritime identity.
WHAT IS THE GLOBAL IMPACT OF PIRACY ON MARITIME TRADE TODAY?
The big shipowners don't necessarily think about piracy every morning when they shave. These companies equip ships that are fast enough, tall enough and well lit enough not to be targeted by pirates, who are often very pragmatic and opportunistic.
Most of the incidents in South-East Asia involve armed robbery and theft at sea by thugs from the kampung (villages) on small islands, in rural areas, not far from mouse ports (or pelabuhan tikus) hidden in the mangroves. Not far away, better organised urban gangs, made up of Indonesians who have come to the special economic zones opposite Singapore in the hope of finding factory jobs, can steal barges full of metal in order to sell the scrap metal.
These same gangs freelance can take advantage of information gathered north of the Strait to board a ship and then siphon off the cargo. In all cases, the consequences in terms of regional maritime traffic are minor. The same applies to the Gulf of Guinea: crude oil prices have never been affected at global level.
The fear could be that insurance companies will classify a particular area as a "risk area". war risk zone in the event of a "pirate peak", which would increase costs - as in the Strait of Malacca in the mid-2000s.
On another scale, there are possible links between piracy and violations of UN sanctions, with reported cases of fuel theft and transfers between ships on the high seas. While world trade may not be in jeopardy, global governance could be affected and abused.
WHAT MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO COMBAT THIS PHENOMENON? WHAT IS THE PROPORTION OF STATE OR INTER-STATE ACTION, AND PRIVATE ACTION?
Like Caesar against the indomitable Gauls, everything has been done to annihilate the pirate Hydra - or Phoenix. "If you shut the door in his face, he'll come back through the windows". In Indonesia, more than one gang leader has ceased his activities, returned to his native island, tried to retrain... before returning to the Straits of Malacca and relaunching his illicit activities (as soon as he realised that patrols were hardly effective - due to a lack of equipment or procedures facilitating cross-border prosecutions).
On a more academic note, let's say that all paradigms (realist, liberal, transnationalist), and therefore all actors (state, private, non-governmental), have come and gone: individually or in concert, through organisations ad hoc or permanent, to offer boats, satellite images, on-board protection - sometimes armed -, training or security plans (compulsory since the entry into force in 2004 of the ISPS code or International Ship and Port Facility Security), local aid to reclaim the lawless areas on land where vocations are born, and so on.
In any case, the geography remains. The Strait of Malacca is like a canyon in which ships have to spend at least one night. For criminals, too, the reasons for taking to sea persist. And there is no shortage of prey as trade becomes increasingly maritime...
However, multilateral efforts within the framework of the MDA (Maritime Domain Awareness), in order to have the most accurate picture of maritime activities, whether legal or not. What's more, the coastguards are increasingly involved with the navies. This raises the question of coordination not only on a regional scale - or "minilateralism", in the Strait of Malacca and the Jolo and Sulawesi Seas - but also on a national scale, between all the maritime agencies involved.
MICA IN BREST, A CENTRE WITH WORLDWIDE EXPERTISE
France has a unique model, Action by the State at Sea (AEM), in which the coastguard function is shared and managed by maritime prefects under the authority of the Prime Minister. This model has been emulated in the Gulf of Guinea and could make sense in Southeast Asia, where Indonesia, for example, is still trying to define the contours of its maritime governance, with more than a dozen government agencies involved in its waters.
Symbolic of these developments, the MICA Center (Maritime Information Cooperation and Awareness Center), based in Brest, has gone from strength to strength since its creation in 2016. It is responsible for compiling the information received from French liaison officers within the Information Fusion Centres Singapore, Madagascar and New Delhi (in order of creation) but also from the merchant navy ships integrated into the Voluntary Naval Cooperation (CNV); it also hosts other sub-regional centres for the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea.
But there is still a lot to be done, in terms of coordination this time between the sea (where the pirates are arrested) and the land (where the cases are investigated, on the basis of the evidence correctly collected - or not - at sea), as well as in terms of intelligence that is no longer satellite or radar-based but human and as close as possible to the reality of the pirates. This is why NGOs, after States and security companies, could have an increasing say, especially if we zoom out and consider the issue in a wider context: that of the very UN "human security", when food, health, political or other issues can have an impact on the criminal dimension.
[1] IMB, Piracy and armed robbery against ships report for the period 1 January - 31 December 2022London, ICC, 2023, 29 p.; IMB, Piracy and armed robbery against ships report for the period 1 January - 30 June 2023London, ICC, 2023, 26 p.
[2] According to the classifications of the International Maritime Organisation and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The latter only recognises piracy on the high seas (article 101).
[3] U. Daxecker, B. Prins, Pirate Lands. Governance and Maritime PiracyOxford, Oxford University Press, 2021, 264 p.
[4] Smouts (Marie-Claude) et al, Dictionary of international relationsDalloz, 2003, p. 484. Quoted by S. Cohen, State Resistance. Democracies facing the challenges of globalisationParis, Seuil, 2003, 264 p.
