In the south-east of France, numerous ceremonies are currently being held to celebrate various battles from the victorious Alpine campaign. Then as now, the great principles of mountain warfare apply, even as the latest technologies take their place in the field.
As far back as antiquity, a number of campaigns fought in mountainous terrain left their mark on history. The battle of Thermopylae, in 480 BC, taught us an early lesson: the importance of knowing the terrain, even more crucial than in other types of theatre. Although they eventually won the battle, the Persian invaders under the great king Xerxes Ier suffered heavy losses against Greeks who were ten times outnumbered and more familiar with this narrow pass between the sea and the high hills.
The need to know the terrain and the difficulties of mountainous terrain were already highlighted in the first known strategic treatise, the famous "Art of War" by the Chinese general Sun Tzu, written in the 6th century.e century BC.
HANNIBAL AND BONAPARTE, TWO MYTHICAL CROSSINGS OF THE ALPS
Two legendary Alpine crossings illustrate the importance of logistical preparation. The first was by the Carthaginian general Hannibal Barca, in the winter of 218 BC. With his Roman adversary Scipio further south, near the mouth of the Rhône, Hannibal crossed the mountain range in a fortnight with around 100,000 men and elephants, duly equipped with warm clothing and food supplied by allied Gallic tribes.
After King Charles VIII in 1494, Napoleon Bonaparte, then First Consul, was the second French head of state to cross the Alps, in May 1800, at the head of 40,000 men. This epic journey, the subject of a famous propaganda painting showing the future emperor on a prancing horse, had been meticulously prepared by Bonaparte - who was in fact riding a mule, an animal more at home at an altitude of 2,000 metres.
While studying at the École Militaire in the mid-1780s, Napoleon had read Lieutenant-General Pierre-Joseph de Bourcet's "Principles of Mountain Warfare", published in 1775. Born in an Alpine village, Bourcet had led several mountain campaigns and spent years drawing up the first military maps of the Alps. His method began with an analysis of the terrain. In this book, some of whose concepts are still taught today, Bourcet theorises positions and marching orders, and even proposes a fictitious campaign, the forerunner of the wargames contemporaries.
"AMONG THE MOST DIFFICULT IN MILITARY OPERATIONS".
Subsequent great strategists, such as Clausewitz and Jomini, also wrote at length about warfare in the mountains. Studying combat in the Alps in his turn, the Austrian general of the XIXe century Franz Kuhn von Kuhnenfeld believes that "the attack and defence of a mountainous country must be ranked among the most difficult of military operations".
In France, the most recent work on the subject is "Guerre en montagne" (Éditions Economica, 2020), by Generals Hervé de Courrèges, Pierre-Joseph Givre and Nicolas Le Nen. In it, they detail six tactical principles of warfare in this environment, showing both the physical and moral commitment required and the risks and advantages of verticality:
- Preparing for the conditions of engagement: hardening bodies and shaping minds to overcome the environment
- Ubiquity: flabbergasting the enemy with an all-out threat
- Opportunism: creating opportunities in a revealing environment
- Battlefield domination: whoever holds the high ground exploits the low... whoever doesn't hold the low ground loses the high ground.
- Complementary fires: using a matrix of fires against the enemy
- Siege the enemy: wage war against the enemy's lines of communication.
"The mountain is as much the ally of the strong as it is the enemy of the weak", emphasises General de Courrèges, who trained at the Chamonix high mountain military school and was formerly commanding officer of the 4e régiment de chasseurs de Gap (Hautes-Alpes) and former commander of the 27e mountain infantry brigade.
THE EQUALISING 'TYRANNY' OF THE MOUNTAIN ENVIRONMENT
The current Director of the IHEDN adds that "whatever their nature, their technological level and their modes of action, armed forces operating in mountainous terrain inevitably suffer from the equalising 'tyranny' of an environment with immutable specificities". But by applying the six principles mentioned above, the mountains "become an ally, a true multiplier of effectiveness".
Two battles from the Alps campaign fought just 80 years ago illustrate this point: those of the Roc Noir and the Roc de Belleface. On 27 March 1945, the soldiers of the 13the Battalion of Alpine Chasseurs (13e BCA) had to retake the Roc Noir fortifications from the German-Italian enemy, at an altitude of 2,342 metres. They launched the offensive despite the fog, after artillery preparation. Around the rock, a company fought hand-to-hand in the enemy trenches, while a detachment created a diversion by climbing a nearby mountain. Victory was achieved after a week of fierce fighting.
The fighting at Roc de Belleface, a week later in the same Tarentaise valley, was emblematic for another Alpine chasseur battalion, the 7e BCA. At 2,857 metres high, this mountain was essential for observing the enemy position in the sector. A first section of ski scouts first went around the rock from the north before climbing its icy 45° slope. Meanwhile, a combat section launched the assault on the south-east side. The almost simultaneous capture of these two mountains freed the Petit-Saint-Bernard pass, a major communication route, and thus a large part of Savoie, at the cost of 90 French casualties.[1].
WHEN TEMPERATURES KILL MORE SOLDIERS THAN FIGHTING
In the mountains, poor preparation of troops and unfamiliarity with the terrain can have disastrous effects. During the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir, fought in November-December 1950 in a mountainous region during the Korean War, the freezing temperatures caused at least as many non-combat casualties as direct confrontations. For 17 days, some 30,000 UN soldiers (American, British and South Korean) held out against around 120,000 opponents from Communist China, who surrounded them. Most of the UN troops managed to escape, but an estimated 40,000 to 60,000 soldiers, three quarters of them Chinese, were wounded or froze to death, while the fighting left between 8,000 and 20,000 dead and 20,000 wounded.
Unlike the principles of lowland warfare, those of mountain warfare have changed little since the mid-18th century.e century, which saw the advent of high-performance firearms. "This is above all because they are the result of environmental constraints," explains General de Courrèges. "Admittedly, technological advances in weapons, communications, intelligence and tactical transport have made mountain manoeuvres easier.
We saw this in 2020 during the second war in Nagorno-Karabakh, when the Azerbaijani army's drones enabled it to significantly weaken the Armenian anti-aircraft defence, despite the mountainous terrain of the Mourovdag range. But at present, this progress "has not fundamentally transformed the principles of mountain warfare", concludes General de Courrèges.
[1] The Roc Noir and Roc de Belleface battles are mentioned. by the Mémoire des Alpins website and, to mark their 80th anniversarye anniversary, in the journal "Soldats de Montagne" of the Fédération des soldats de montagne, no. 23, winter 2025.
To find out more
General Hervé de Courrèges, General Pierre-Joseph Givre, General Nicolas Le Nen: "Guerre en montagne", 3e edition, Economica, 2020
Credit: ©Jeremy BESSAT/armée de Terre/Défense
