People stand among American, British, Danish and Ukrainian flags in front of a makeshift memorial to Ukrainian servicemen and international volunteers killed in action against Russian troops, on Independence Square in Kiev on 5 February 2025 - GENYA SAVILOV / AFP
On 30 January, the Institut de recherche stratégique de l'École militaire (IRSEM) hosted a conference-debate with an unambiguous title: "The unequal sharing of the burden of peace in Ukraine". Organised by Maud Quessard, Director of the Europe, Transatlantic Space and Russia Department, the event featured Canadian researcher Justin Massié, full professor and Director of the Political Science Department at the Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM), and also co-director of the Strategic Analysis Network and the The Rubicon.
The question of the support given to Ukraine by its allies regularly arouses controversy, not least because of statements made by US President Donald Trump. According to a German think tankKiel Institute for the World EconomyAccording to the Institute for International Relations, €267 billion in aid has been allocated to Ukraine since 24 February 2022, including €130 billion in military aid and €118 billion in financial aid. "Europe as a whole has clearly outstripped the United States in terms of aid to Ukraine", notes the institute, counting €114 billion for the United States and €132 billion for Europe, adding the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Norway and Iceland to the members of the European Union.
THE MAJOR POWERS DO NOT CARRY THE GREATEST RELATIVE WEIGHT
For Justin Massié, there are a number of key points to note, starting with the fact that "the burden is unevenly shared across time and space":
- The major powers do not carry the greatest relative weight
- There are several types of carer: the free riders (Italy, Spain, Canada, Turkey), reliable allies (Estonia, United Kingdom), increasingly unreliable allies (United States, Poland), and increasingly reliable allies (Germany, France, Finland).
It arrived at these findings by studying the efforts of the various countries since February 2022. As a percentage of their GDP, the main contributors in 2022-23 were Estonia (0.91%) and Latvia (0.81%).
In 2023-24, these were Denmark (2.3%), Estonia (1.67%) and Sweden (1.46%). Over the same period, some countries agreed to a "considerable increase" in their support: Finland (from 0.09% to 0.71%), Germany (from 0.08% to 0.39%) and France (from 0.04% to 0.16%).
At the same time, the UK (0.17%) and Canada (0.08%) remained constant, while Turkey (from 0.01% to 0%) and Italy (from 0.05% to 0.01%) were "consistently low". And two countries decided on a "considerable reduction": the United States (from 0.2% to 0.09%) and Poland (from 0.4% to 0.07%).
As this conflict enters its 4the year, Justin Massié sees three possible scenarios for the development of this aid to Ukraine.
The first would be of the "Minsk III" type, in reference to the 2015 Minsk II international summit that led to a ceasefire during the war in the Donbass: a "fragile ceasefire" that would lead to "the partition, neutrality and demilitarisation of Ukraine and the reconstitution of Russian forces". This scenario would be pushed by Trump, for whom "no agreement would be worse than the current situation", and would require Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to "accept capitulation".
THREE POSSIBLE SCENARIOS: CEASEFIRE, "KOREAN MODEL" OR STATUS QUO?
Reflecting a "refusal to share the burden", this first scenario would mean a halt to American and European aid, a need for Europe to step up its defence of its eastern flank, and the maintenance or reduction of the American military presence on the continent (currently 100,000 soldiers). Justin Massié considers this scenario "unlikely in the short term".
The second scenario, on the other hand, would be one of "enhanced burden sharing": it would involve a freezing of the conflict along the lines of the "Korean model", with :
- Mutual deterrence made possible by security guarantees and foreign weapons in a Ukraine turned into a war economy;
- Substantially increased aid to force Vladimir Putin to make concessions,
- Western forces present in Ukraine
- Putin accepting his failure.
"This scenario is just as unlikely in the short term, as Putin is not making any concessions at the moment," comments Justin Massié.
These first two scenarios being "the worst", the most likely is the third, the "status quo": "Russia still believes in victory, Ukraine refuses to lay down its arms, and Trump agrees to break his promise".
In this case, the war would continue on the basis of "current burden sharing", which translates into "uncertain American support" but "long-term European support". Contrary to the latter hypothesis, Justin Massié notes that "Trump is a narcissist and wants his Nobel Peace Prize".
Noting that "several billion dollars would be needed to compensate for a possible withdrawal of American aid", Justin Massié points out that it is "much more difficult to give the necessary troops than the necessary money", particularly because of the "drastic reduction in forces in Europe since the 1990s, with the exception of Poland and the Baltic States":
"To have operational capacity tomorrow, you need to have invested 5 or 10 years ago.
THE KEY ROLE OF THREAT PERCEPTION
Pierre Haroche, Associate Professor of European and International Politics at the European School of Political and Social Sciences (ESPOL) at the Catholic University of Lille, who has been invited to take part in this conference-debate, looks at Europe's role in the negotiations:
"Putin wants to decide the future of Europe without the Europeans, and to a certain extent, so does Trump. If they want to be heard, the Europeans have to come up with something."
He also notes that "in addition to the financial and arms costs, we need to consider the security costs: a neutral Ukraine means a different structure for our eastern flank, with a weakened system".
In conclusion, Justin Massié notes that "geography is one of the main determinants" of aid to Ukraine, with countries on Europe's eastern flank being more involved. Another major determinant is the perception of threats (by public opinion in particular), which is "key":
"This calls for better communication of the threat to influence perceptions and capabilities.
People stand among American, British, Danish and Ukrainian flags in front of a makeshift memorial to Ukrainian servicemen and international volunteers killed in action against Russian troops, on Independence Square in Kiev on 5 February 2025 - GENYA SAVILOV / AFP
