A researcher at the Centre for Security Studies at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), Héloïse Fayet is in charge of the Deterrence and Proliferation research programme. Her work focuses mainly on nuclear issues: doctrines of nuclear-armed states, proliferation in the Middle East and North-East Asia, and the impact of new technologies on deterrence. She also works on armed forces in the Middle East, intelligence policy in France and strategic foresight. She is a regular lecturer, notably at Sciences Po Paris, the École Normale Supérieure and the IHEDN.
Héloïse Fayet previously spent several years with the French Ministry of Defence as an analyst specialising in the Middle East. She graduated from Sciences Po Paris with a bachelor's degree, followed by a double master's in international security and journalism, and spent several years at university in the Middle East.
HOW DO WE DEFINE THE CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE?
Deterrence emerged at the same time as armed conflict: the aim is to convince your adversary that the cost of his action outweighs the benefits he will derive from it, and that it is therefore profitable for him not to act. This can be done by threat of punishment if he carries out his action anyway, or by complicating the action itself, for example by protecting the territory to be conquered.
Nuclear deterrence is specific in that it is total, or even "deterrent". absolute "As the American theorist Bernard Brodie put it. Indeed, while an adversary may be tempted to take offensive action if he is threatened only by a conventional response, however significant that response may be, he is supposed to be entirely deterred by the prospect of a nuclear response because of the dramatic, unimaginable consequences of such retaliation. So, even if nuclear deterrence is not the only explanatory factor, there have been no high-intensity open conflicts between major nuclear powers since the end of the Second World War, because no country is prepared to risk its destruction in a nuclear response to a first attack, conventional or otherwise.
However, to be effective, this deterrent must be credible, which is complex given that it cannot be used under real conditions, unlike conventional weapons. Activities of strategic signalling are therefore conducted by the endowed states, such as exercises simulating the use of a weapon, qualification firings of new missiles, and more or less aggressive rhetoric.
WHAT ARE THE SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE FRENCH NUCLEAR DETERRENT?
If the French deterrence is not officially directed against a specific adversary, it can nevertheless be described as a "weak to strong" deterrent, capable of dissuading even a State whose arsenal is far superior to its own. Today, France has around 290 strategic nuclear warheads delivered either by cruise missiles carried by fighter aircraft (airborne component), or by ballistic missiles fired from nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.
In comparison, the United States and Russia each have nearly 1,600 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, a figure limited by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. New START which expires in 2026. The arsenals of the other nuclear-weapon states are smaller: around 420 for China (and growing) and 230 for the United Kingdom.
The French concept is linked to that of "strict sufficiency": France possesses the means to inflict damage equivalent to the "value of France", so that the cost of an attack against France's vital interests outweighs the benefits that an adversary might derive from such an attack. Until the end of the Cold War, this damage was measured in terms of the death of the enemy population: for example, we needed to be able to destroy 15 to 20 million Soviets. This macabre logic still underpins nuclear strategies, although today targeting is officially directed at the adversary's centres of power and gravity.
Furthermore, the French doctrine rejects the possibility of limited nuclear war and therefore tactical nuclear warfare, as the consequences would be dramatic for European territory.
These specificities in terms of doctrine and strategy are at the origin of the independence of the French deterrent and of a political and industrial sovereignty that persists to this day.
FRANCE IS THE ONLY POWER IN THE EUROPEAN UNION TO BE "ARMED". IN THE EVENT OF AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM, COULD IT SHARE ITS DETERRENT WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS?
The United States has already experienced several periods of retreat without this calling into question the extended deterrent from which it benefits not only its NATO allies but also its partners in Asia (Japan, South Korea, Australia). This deterrence, which involves deployment of US nuclear bombs in certain NATO countries, as well as conventional forces, is at the heart of the Atlantic Alliance and the transatlantic relationship, and it seems unlikely that it will be called into question, even by a second term of office for Donald Trump.
However, we need to be prepared for all eventualities, and France's nuclear deterrent clearly has a role to play in this. defence of Europe. This European dimension of the French deterrent was already implied in the 1972 White Paper, but was clearly expressed by President Macron in his speech on defence strategy and deterrence in February 2020, and in subsequent speeches. In particular, it encourages European countries to take an interest in the French nuclear deterrent and to clearly state their needs and ideas in this area. It has to be said that, for the moment, this offer has not really found its audience: European countries, especially those that are members of NATO, remain deeply attached to the American nuclear deterrent, which they consider to be the only credible one.
A certain degree of ambiguity is obviously necessary in the French declaratory policy: the presidential speech thus limits itself to declaring that "France's vital interests have a European dimension". However, this is not a concrete commitment that can be understood by the Allies, which is detrimental to their attraction to France's European deterrence strategy.
If France wants to play a more important role in the defence of Europe through its deterrent, then we need to be more proactive. political commitments and strategic decisions must be taken.
