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A decisive victory won quickly, outnumbered, far from home, after deceiving his opponents and adapting his initial plans: this is how Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz struck the imagination in December 1805. Add to that a dose of prestige – three armies each commanded by their emperor – and a pinch of luck – the battle took place exactly one year after Napoleon's coronation.er –, and you have the recipe for a legendary battle.
«Austerlitz is the most carefully planned, most thought-out and most analysed battle in the world,» says historian Guillaume Lasconjarias, Director of Studies and Research at IHEDN. His Belgian colleague Bruno Colson, who co-edited the reference work «Cambridge History of the Napoleonic Wars» for the prestigious British university, agrees:
«Austerlitz is the greatest French victory in history, a fact recognised by all military theorists in every country.»
«This victory has been studied so extensively that accounts of it can be found everywhere,» adds François Houdecek, head of special projects at the Fondation Napoléon and editor of Napoleon's Correspondance générale.
On the morning of 2 December 1805 (11 Frimaire Year XIV, according to the Republican calendar still in use at the time), the French emperor and his Grande Armée were positioned between Brünn and Austerlitz, in Moravia, in what is now the Czech Republic. Opposing him were the other European powers of the Third Coalition: the United Kingdom, which co-financed the campaign, had no troops on the ground, but Russia and Austria-Hungary were present with armies commanded by their respective emperors, Alexander Ier and Francis Ier.
«Winning a great battle that would end the war»
Before finding himself there, 1,300 kilometres from Paris, Napoleon Ier left the camp at Boulogne-sur-Mer, where the Grande Armée had been training for many months in preparation for the invasion of England. Abandoning this plan, he marched eastwards, where he had already defeated the Austrians at Ulm (Bavaria) in October. After taking Vienna, which had been left undefended by the Austrians, without a fight, he sought a decisive confrontation with the Austro-Russians.
«He must win a major battle that would end the war,» comments Bruno Colson, «because he is in a delicate situation: Prussia, which was neutral, could get involved because the Tsar had just passed through Berlin and was on good terms with the King of Prussia.».
With around 50,000 men, Napoleon anticipated that the Allies, twice as numerous, would want to confront him near Austerlitz, on terrain he had scouted. The day before, he feigned weakness on his right flank and abandoned the Pratzen plateau overlooking the battlefield. On the morning of the 2nd, the Russians and Austrians, convinced, concentrated their forces in the south, moving their troops and thus leaving the centre of their defences, notably the crucial Pratzen plateau, unprotected.
At the decisive moment, the French emerged from the fog and launched a devastating attack on the plateau. They cut the allied army in two, causing immediate disorganisation. Meanwhile, the corps of Marshals Bernadotte and Davout joined the battle, reducing the French numerical inferiority.
The allied right wing, isolated to the south, was caught in a pincer movement, crushed, and its hasty retreat across the frozen ponds completed the rout. In less than 10 hours, the battle was over, with the French suffering ten times fewer casualties than their opponents.
«The victory is resounding, we couldn't have hoped for better.»
This spectacular victory destroyed the coalition and forced Austria to surrender. «It brought Francis Ier to request peace, signed in Pressburg at the end of December,» recalls Bruno Colson. «Never before had such a decisive battle been won so far from the victorious country. It marked the end of the Third Coalition.» The historian continues:
«This battle came at just the right moment to consolidate the empire and stabilise the domestic situation in France: despite financial problems, the markets were reassured and Napoleon's power was strengthened.»
For François Houdecek, «the victory is resounding, we couldn't have asked for anything better: two major opponents defeated, with relatively few losses.» The expert comments:
«Napoleonic battles are won by the number of mistakes that are not made. On that day, Napoleon made almost none. Austerlitz shows the importance of reconnaissance: all possibilities were mastered. But he also demonstrated adaptability. Faced with less organised opponents, his strength lay in his unity of command: he alone made decisions and gave orders, which were transmitted and then executed very quickly by seasoned and highly trained soldiers, after two years at the Boulogne camp. He knew how to make the most of the best strike force available at the time, a perfectly forged military tool, with soldiers acting almost perfectly automatically. »
Guillaume Lasconjarias considers this battle to be «extremely complex, because when it begins, nothing has been decided. That is why it is now the most simulated battle in wargaming exercises, in military schools and elsewhere»:
«Beyond the myth of this battle, it was Napoleon's genius and insight at Austerlitz that gave rise to the idea of the brilliant battle, because it was prepared, thought out and conducted down to the smallest detail. He relied on surprise, insight and, above all, the ability to think faster than the enemy: not thinking in his place, but thinking ahead of the enemy.».
For all commentators, in addition to making people believe that the surrounding villages were poorly protected, abandoning the Pratzen plateau was his masterstroke. «Opponents think that retreating from the highest point, where you have the greatest advantage, is counterintuitive,» continues Guillaume Lasconjarias. «So they fall into the trap.»
ON 3 DECEMBER, NAPOLEON HIMSELF WROTE THE LEGEND OF AUSTERLITZ.
On 3 December, Napoleon himself began to write the legend of Austerlitz. «We live on an account of the battle forged by the emperor himself, which leads us to believe that he had planned everything in advance,» warns François Houdecek.
In a letter to Talleyrand, his Minister of Foreign Affairs, he summarises:
«I can only write a few words: an army of 100,000 men, commanded by the two emperors, has been completely destroyed.»
On that same day, 3 December, the emperor addressed his soldiers with a proclamation that has remained famous:
«[...] An army of one hundred thousand men, commanded by the emperors of Russia and Austria, was, in less than four hours, either cut off or scattered. Those who escaped your sword drowned in the lakes [...] My people will welcome you back with joy, and you need only say, «I was at the Battle of Austerlitz», for them to reply, «Here is a brave man».»
In reality, the battle lasted more than nine hours, his opponents numbered 90,000, and «only» 25,000 were «destroyed» (killed or wounded). And contrary to a persistent legend, none of them drowned in the frozen ponds, explains François Houdecek:
«The effect produced was completely magnified by Napoleon: there were no deaths in the ponds. They were emptied in 1806, and only a few horse carcasses and equipment were found. So yes, there was a powerful psychological effect at the time, but victory had already been achieved.»
On 2 December 2005, Professor Bruno Colson gave a lecture at the Hôtel des Invalides on the impact of this battle on military thinkers. He quoted some comments made by Napoleon himself, which were less grandiloquent than his remarks to Talleyrand or his grognards:
«Success in war depends so much on timing and intuition that the Battle of Austerlitz, won so swiftly, would have been lost if I had attacked six hours earlier.»
During his exile on Saint Helena, he told Gouraud, one of his generals, that the absence of the Prussians had helped him:
«At Austerlitz, the army was the strongest I ever had. Good soldiers, a superb battle! Great results achieved in the presence of three emperors! If the Prussians had marched, I confess I would have been in great difficulty.»
AT LEAST IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURYe CENTURY, AUSTERLITZ SHAPES ALL MILITARY THINKING
The fact remains that the battle had an immediate influence on military theory. «At least in the 19th century, it shaped all military thinking, not only in France, but also in Prussia and the United States,» explains Guillaume Lasconjarias. «One example is during the American Civil War: at the first Battle of Bull Run in 1861, the two commanding generals of the North and South tried to apply Napoleon's tactics at Austerlitz.»
This influence is primarily due to two major strategists who were contemporaries of Napoleon. The Swiss Antoine de Jomini, who served on the staff of the Grande Armée and witnessed part of the battle, and the Prussian Carl von Clausewitz. «For Clausewitz, Austerlitz remains the model battle in which one succeeds in luring one's adversaries and judging them correctly,» summarises Bruno Colson. «And, according to him, Napoleon would not succeed in doing so again in 1812 during the Russian campaign.»
Then, continues the Belgian historian, «each era reinterprets history somewhat according to its own concerns». In his 2005 lecture, he mentions Colonel La Barre Duparcq, director of studies at the Saint-Cyr military academy during the Second Empire, who «admires Napoleon's insight and intuition» in that he «foresees the Austro-Russian plan, takes appropriate measures and carries them out to the letter»:
«During the action, he successively commits his forces and compels the adversary to bring all his forces into play, even his reserves, while he carefully conserves his own reserves, keeping them fresh until the favourable moment, and then launches them against the adversary in such a way as to produce a event. Such skill in using one's reserves suggests a combination of prudence and strength.»
At Saint-Cyr, Austerlitz all year round, every year
Since the Second Empire, the Battle of Austerlitz has shaped the curriculum at the École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr, founded by First Consul Napoleon Bonaparte in 1802, which still trains the majority of French Army officers today.
For Saint-Cyriens, the Gregorian calendar is not really used within the school walls: the ten months of schooling are designated by the ten letters A, U, S, T, E, R, L, I, T, Z. And every year, a re-enactment of the battle is organised, «the 2S»: so today is 2 S 220.
«We celebrate Austerlitz because it is said to be the battle where the first Saint-Cyriens died in combat,» says General Vincent Le Cour Grandmaison, president of the Friends of the Officer's Museum Association at the Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan Military Academy. «At first, they were pillow fights, a bit informal. Then it gradually became more structured.»
Today, the 2S brings together around 400 participants, who battle it out within the school grounds around a valley and a small plateau renamed Pratzen. «Apart from Napoleon's staff, the other costumes are made from odds and ends,» continues the general. Even though the school's command is involved, there is still a schoolboyish side to it – we saw Napoleon land by parachute! The students of 1era year (the «bazars») play Austro-Russian soldiers, while their elders play the French «because it's more glorious, they're the ones who charge on horseback».
This annual celebration also includes a memorial ceremony, with the names of Saint-Cyriens who died during the year being read out and all those present being called out by their graduating class – in the school's main courtyard, known as the Cour d'Austerlitz since 1905.
A few decades later, in 1921, Captain Charles de Gaulle was an assistant professor of military history at Saint-Cyr, and devoted one of his lectures to the campaign of 1805.
He considers that Napoleon masterfully applies «the great principles of war: economy of forces, concentration of resources, action in successive phases, surprise, security, liaison».
THE PERFECT EXAMPLE OF DE GAULLE'S PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMY OF FORCE
According to De Gaulle, Austerlitz is «an immortal example of the application of the principle of economy of forces in battle».
The highly influential British strategist Basil Henry Liddell Hart, a contemporary of De Gaulle, saw Austerlitz as Napoleon's «masterpiece in the art of battle»:
«Luring his opponents by encouraging them to extend their left flank to attack his line of retreat, he launched his centre against the weakened ‘joint’ of their formation, thus achieving such a decisive victory that, twenty-four hours later, the Emperor of Austria sued for peace.»
For François Houdecek, Austerlitz forms part of the «triptych» of Napoleon's legendary victories, along with Jena and Friedland: «Clear-cut, decisive victories that are beyond dispute». But the formation of the Fourth Coalition the following year, this time with Prussia, meant that, in the end, «Waterloo was a more decisive battle than Austerlitz».
Nevertheless, according to Bruno Colson, Austerlitz illustrates a simple and striking idea: «The triumph of intelligence over brute force.»
