Guillaume Lasconjarias is a graduate of the Ecole Normale Supérieure and holds a doctorate in history. He specialises in issues of new conflictualities, in particular hybridity and the war in Ukraine. He was a senior research fellow at the NATO Defense College from 2012 to 2018, where he gained a thorough understanding of the Alliance's operations, issues and developments. Since 2022, he has been head of the Studies and Research Department at IHEDN.
HOW IS THE ALLIANCE SHAPING UP AS IT MEETS FOR ITS FIRST SUMMIT SINCE THE 75TH ANNIVERSARY SUMMIT IN JULY 2024?
This summit in The Hague seems to have relatively modest ambitions given the international situation. Traditionally, the United States plays a major role in setting the agenda, which seems to have been less the case with the current administration. President Trump's personal misgivings about the Alliance are well known, although he has said little about them since taking office. The Allies have taken advantage of this to give greater prominence to the Ukrainian question, but Donald Trump's personal stance raises questions, especially since the scheduled meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky at the G7 summit did not take place.
So we have an Alliance in a paradoxical situation: it appears to have never been more important in terms of its influence and the combined power of its member states. In the space of a decade, since 2014 and the very first invasion of Ukraine, NATO has undergone a profound transformation. Member States had pledged to spend more, and they are spending more - although this acceleration has increased more markedly from 2022 onwards. Regional plans have been reviewed, and the Allies are insisting on the ability to deploy more troops collectively - we're talking about several tens of thousands of combatants. The capability process has been reviewed, with a particular focus on the readiness of states, armies and equipment.
However, the paradox is that behind this real effectiveness, there are weaknesses: the Member States are riven by internal tensions that have a strong impact on the cohesion of the organisation, whether it be the rise of extremist political movements or the relations that certain governments maintain with Russia. It should also be remembered that the summit is being held in the Netherlands, the country of the current Secretary General Mark Rutte, but whose government has resigned...
WHAT ARE THE KEY ISSUES THAT COULD EMERGE, PARTICULARLY IN RELATION TO THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT?
As far as Ukraine is concerned, the participation of President Zelensky is the subject of debate; he should be present, as the majority of countries wish to involve him, but he will probably not be invited to the formal meeting where only the 32 Allies sit in the person of their Heads of State or Government. It is to be hoped that the commitments made at previous summits (Vilnius in 2023 and Washington last year) will be reiterated, namely that Ukraine will progress along a path that will lead it to become one of the Allies. However, obstructions are to be expected, as the consensus on Ukraine's integration has tended to crumble for some time. The new Polish President, for example, has campaigned against Ukraine's accession while guaranteeing his country's continued support for Kiev.
However, we can expect support for Ukraine to be reaffirmed in the shadow of one demand: the United States will refuse to pay more. It is up to the Europeans to do more and better, bearing in mind that they must first respond to what will be at the heart of this summit: spending more on their own defence.
This is the main outcome of this meeting: a new commitment from the Allies in terms of investment and an increase in their defence budgets to 5% of their GDP. This increase follows an initial commitment made in Newport in 2014, when the States were aiming for 2%. Today, 22 of the 32 Allies have reached or exceeded the threshold of 2% of GDP devoted to defence - up from 3 in 2014. Collectively, the European Allies and Canada now spend $485 billion - or 2.02% of their combined GDP.
But Washington is demanding more, hence the new target of 5% of GDP, on which the Allies have already agreed. In practice, we need to separate 3.5% for defence efforts and 1.5% for related investments, such as resilience or infrastructure. For a country like France, this means doubling our defence budget in five years (from 2025 to 2030) from €50 billion to €100 billion - 3% of GDP - or €122 billion for a target of 3.5%.
WHAT CAN WE EXPECT FROM PRESIDENT TRUMP, WHO WAS NOT IN OFFICE LAST YEAR?
Everything has been done to ensure that this summit goes off without a hitch and without taking any risks. The fear of a brutal announcement by Trump proclaiming the practice of the empty chair or of a form of "sleep-in" (rather than withdrawal) by the USA from NATO seems to me to be limited at present. All the more so as the American President will arrive in The Hague with a significant victory, that of increased defence spending by Europeans whom he has constantly accused of not doing enough. He has been helped in this by the active diplomacy of Secretary General Rutte, who has spared no effort. Even 6 months ago, it seemed difficult to convince the Allies, a third of whom have still not reached the 2% mark. The only question is the deadline: 2030? 2032?
Then there is the question of the place that will be given to the European Union and its representatives, in a context of continuing negotiations on customs barriers and taxes imposed on the old continent. The question of a European pillar of NATO is less and less taboo, as is the need for strategic autonomy - no doubt to be reformulated so as not to openly offend Washington.
Finally, we can also look at what will be said about the other partnerships that NATO has forged, and the role that the Alliance could play in the Indo-Pacific. The United States does not seem to be in favour of this.
In short, The Hague will take the form of a summit where caution is the order of the day, to ensure that the family photo remains smiling.
To find out more, here are three topical fact sheets from the IHEDN Studies and Research Department:
- NATO enlargement, past and present (9 July 2024)
- Putting Allied defence spending into perspective (11 July 2024)
- An Alliance in action (19 July 2024)
The Heads of State and Government of the 32 Member States at the previous summit in Washington in July 2024.
